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Abstract
Mobile devices have become essential for accessing information services anywhere at
any time. While the so-called geographic multicast (geocast) has been considered in
detail in existing research, it only focuses on delivering messages to all mobile devices
that are currently residing within a certain geographic area. This thesis extends this no-
tion by introducing a Spatiotemporal Multicast (STM), which can informally be described
as a „geocast into the past“. Instead of addressing users based on their current locati-
ons, this concept relates to the challenge of sending a message to all devices that have
resided within a geographic area at a certain time in the past.
While a wide variety of applications can be envisioned for this concept, it presents se-
veral challenges to be solved. In order to deliver messages to all past visitors of a cer-
tain location, an STM service would have to fully track all user movements at all times.
However, collecting this kind of information is not desirable considering the underly-
ing privacy implications, i.e., users may not wish to be identiﬁed by the sender of a
message as this can disclose sensitive personal information. Consequently, this thesis
aims to provide a privacy-preserving notion of STM.
In order to realize such a service, this work ﬁrst presents a detailed overview of possible
applications. Based on those, functional, non-functional, as well as security and privacy
objectives are proposed. These objectives provide the foundation for an in-depth litera-
ture reviewof potentialmechanisms for realizing an STMservice.Among the suggested
options, the most promising relies on Rendezvous Points (RPs) for datagram delivery.
In simple terms, RPs represent „anonymous mailboxes“ that are responsible for certain
spatiotemporal regions. Messages are deposited at RPs so that users can retrieve them
later on. Protecting the privacy of users then translates to obfuscating the responsibili-
ties of RPs for speciﬁc spatiotemporal regions.
This work proposes two realizations: CSTM, which relies on cryptographic hashing,
and OSTM, which considers the use of order-preserving encryption in a CAN overlay.
Both approaches are evaluated and compared in detail with respect to the given objec-
tives. While OSTM yields superior performance-related properties, CSTM provides an
increased ability of protecting the privacy of users.

Zusammenfassung
Mobilgeräte bilden heute die Grundlage allgegenwärtiger Informationsdienste. Wäh-
rend der sogenannte geograﬁscheMulticast (Geocast) hier bereits ausführlich erforscht
worden ist, so bezieht sich dieser nur auf Geräte, welche sich aktuell innerhalb einer
geograﬁschen Zielregion beﬁnden. Diese Arbeit erweitert dieses Konzept durch einen
räumlich-zeitlichen Multicast, welcher sich informell als „Geocast in die Vergangenheit“
beschreiben lässt. Dabei wird die Zustellung einer Nachricht an alle Nutzer betrachtet,
die sich in der Vergangenheit an einem bestimmten Ort aufgehalten haben.
Während eine Vielzahl vonAnwendungen für dieses Konzept denkbar sind, so ergeben
sich hier mehrere Herausforderungen. Um Nachrichten an ehemalige Besucher eines
Ortes senden zu können,müsste ein räumlich-zeitlicherMulticast-Dienst die Bewegun-
gen aller Nutzer vollständig erfassen. Aus Gründen des Datenschutzes ist das zentrali-
sierte Sammeln solch sensibler personenbezogener Daten jedoch nicht wünschenswert.
DieseArbeit befasst sich daher insbesonderemit dem Schutz der Privatsphäre vonNut-
zern eines solchen Dienstes.
Zur Entwicklung eines räumlich-zeitlichenMulticast-Dienstes erörtert diese Arbeit zu-
nächst mögliche Anwendungen. Darauf aufbauend werden funktionale, nicht-funk-
tionale, sowie Sicherheits- und Privatsphäre-relevante Anforderungen deﬁniert. Die-
se bilden die Grundlage einer umfangreichen Literaturrecherche relevanter Realisie-
rungstechniken. Der vielversprechendste Ansatz basiert hierbei auf der Hinterlegung
von Nachrichten in sogenannten Rendezvous Points. Vereinfacht betrachtet stellen die-
se „anonyme Briefkästen“ für bestimmte räumlich-zeitliche Regionen dar. Nachrichten
werden in diesen so hinterlegt, dass legitime Empfänger sie dort später abholen kön-
nen. Der Schutz der Nutzer-Privatsphäre entspricht dann der Verschleierung der Zu-
ständigkeiten von Rendezvous Points für verschiedene räumlich-zeitliche Regionen.
Diese Arbeit schlägt zwei Ansätze vor: CSTM, welches kryptograﬁsche Hashfunktio-
nen nutzt, sowie OSTM, welches ordnungserhaltende Verschlüsselung in einem CAN
Overlay einsetzt. Beide Optionen werden detailliert analytisch sowie empirisch bezüg-
lich ihrer Diensteigenschaften untersucht und verglichen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass OSTM
vorteilhaftere Leistungseigenschaften besitzt, während CSTM einen besseren Schutz
der Nutzer-Privatsphäre bietet.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, cellular phones have been designed solely for verbal and short-text com-
munication. However, with the emergence of aﬀordable and powerful smart phones,
mobile devices have become essential to access data and information services anywhere
at anytime [Sut12]. Such services not only enable direct communication among friends,
they also allow to connect users who share interests or reside at similar geographic lo-
cations. With such mobile information services in mind, this thesis aims to investigate
a novel messaging concept that is based on past movements and whereabouts of users.
Before outlining this concept in detail, the following section provides a short overview
of existing, widely-known communication paradigms in computer networks.
Unicast Today, hosts usually exchange information by sending messages over packet-
switched networks [TW11]. Here, destinations are explicitly addressed with the nu-
meric identiﬁers assigned to the respective hosts. For example, in the widely employed
Internet Protocol (IP), these address identiﬁers are encoded as integers with a length of
32 bits in version 4 as speciﬁed in Request for Comments (RFC) 791 [Pos81a] or 128 bits
in version 6 (cf. RFC 2460 [DH98]) of the protocol. These numeric identiﬁers are used
by the network protocols to forward the messages along routes through the network,
ultimately delivering them to their intended destination host.
Multicast While addressing the destination host of a message directly with its iden-
tiﬁer is an appropriate technique for one-to-one communication, it is rather ineﬃcient
when considering one-to-many communication where a source distributing a piece of
information has to send multiple messages that have to be forwarded along possibly
redundant routes in the network. In order to improve this approach for one-to-may
communication, also referred to as multicast per unicast, the use of network-layer multi-
cast, like IP Multicast (RFC 1112 [Dee89]), has been suggested. Furthermore, due to the
limited deployment of support for network-layer multicast in the infrastructure of the
Internet, the use of application-layer multicast has been proposed in order to distribute
information in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) fashion using overlay-based message distribution
schemes, for example [BBK02]. These techniques require that the hosts interested in
receiving the information distributed by the source host join a multicast group.
Geographic multicast While multicast groups are typically addressed via arbitrary
identiﬁers, e.g., in case of IP multicast, from a reserved block of IP addresses, the con-
cept of a Geographic Multicast (geocast) has been suggested to implicitly deﬁne multicast
groups by addressing all nodes currently residing in a speciﬁc geographic destination
area [NI97; IN99]. Note that in order to realize such a geographic multicast, nodes in
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Multicast Area
(in the past)
Receivers
Figure 1.1 Overview of the concept of Spatiotemporal Multicast (STM). The dark gray circle
represents the destination region with the locations of the red, yellow, and blue
nodes at some point in time in the past. While the current locations of these nodes
are outside of this area, they are considered as potential receivers of the message as
they have been residing at this area during the addressed time span in the past.
the network have to be aware of their locations. For rather static network infrastruc-
tures like the Internet, the locations of nodes can either be conﬁgured manually or esti-
mated using geolocation databases [PS01]. In case ofMobile Ad hocNetworks (MANETs),
nodes can estimate their current whereabouts by employing the Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) or performing distance measurements to speciﬁc landmarks (often also re-
ferred to as anchor nodes) that are aware of their coordinates [NN01].
While several geocast protocols have been proposed in the past (e.g., in [Mai04]), they
only consider the current locations of nodeswhen distributingmessages. Therefore, this
thesis extends the concept of geocast and proposes a novel concept for a spatiotemporal
multicast message delivery, which is described in detail in the following section.
1.1 Problem Statement
Thiswork aims at extending the traditional concept of geocast by additionally introduc-
ing temporal coordinates to address users by their past whereabouts. The goal here is
to deliver amulticast message to all nodes that have been residing at a given geographic
destination area at some point in time in the past. This concept, named Spatiotemporal
Multicast (STM), can thus informally be summarized as a “geocast into the past”.
Figure 1.1 shows an example of this concept with a dark gray circular region deﬁning
the geographic destination area addressed by an arbitrary multicast message. Here, in
contrast to a geocast where only nodes inside this area would receive a message, for
a spatiotemporal multicast, all nodes that have been inside this area some time ago
are potential receivers. Accordingly, when sending a spatiotemporal multicast message
for this area at some time in the past, the receiver nodes may have already left the geo-
graphic area andmoved somewhere else.Hence, the destination address of a spatiotem-
poral multicast message, which this work refers to as an spatiotemporal datagram (st-data-
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gram), corresponds to a deﬁned geographic area over a speciﬁc time interval, which is
also known as spatiotemporal region (st-region).
A wide variety of mobile information services can be envisioned for this concept. How-
ever, along with the opportunity for innovative applications, it is crucial to consider
the arising privacy and security implications. Therefore, this work not only considers
the design and potential implementations of STM services, but also incorporates an in-
depth analysis of relevant privacy and security properties.
Accordingly, this thesis intends to answer the following research questions:
• Howmay a privacy-preserving spatiotemporal multicast service be realized?
• Which realization option is most promising, given the proposed application scenarios?
• What is the impact of the respective parameters of each chosen realization option on
privacy, security, and performance-related aspects?
In particular, based on an extensive literature survey anddiscussion of appropriate real-
ization options, this work focuses on so-called Rendezvous Point-based schemes. Here,
the advantages and disadvantages of two possible realization options, as well as the
inﬂuence of their respective parameters, are investigated in detail.
1.2 Contributions of this Work
This thesis provides the following scientiﬁc contributions.
First, the novel concept of a privacy-preserving spatiotemporal multicast is introduced
and several possible application scenarios for this concept are proposed. Furthermore,
a comprehensive set of functional, non-functional, as well as privacy and security ob-
jectives is provided for the realization of STM services.
Given the outlined applications and objectives, this work discusses the design space
for realizing STM services based on an extensive survey of the state of the art of related
research areas. Here, in order to identify the most promising approaches of the design
space, a qualitative comparison of their feasibility is provided.
Focusing on Rendezvous Point-based schemes, this thesis introduces two possible real-
izations: a cluster-based scheme which is based on cryptographic hash functions and a
hierarchical spatiotemporal token aggregation scheme, as well as an overlay-based re-
alization which builds upon the Content-Addressable Network (CAN) [Rat+01a] and
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) [Agr+04].
In order to highlight the feasibility of the suggested schemes for real-world applications,
a witness-based report veriﬁcation approach is proposed and evaluated.
As the application of OPE in the context of an STM service provides unique challenges,
this work provides an extensive evaluation of existing and novel OPE schemes that aim
to improve the security properties of existing approaches.
Finally, an extensive simulative and analytic evaluation and comparison of the privacy,
security, and performance properties of the proposed STM service realizations is pro-
vided, along with a detailed discussion of strengths and weaknesses.
4 Introduction
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides a short introduction on the background of several key topics, in-
cluding the basics of mobile communication networks, security in computer networks,
techniques for privacy protection, as well as fundamentals of order-preserving encryp-
tion schemes. Please note that readers with an existing understanding of these topics
are encouraged to simply skip the respective parts of this chapter.
In Chapter 3, a detailed analysis of the problem of privacy-preserving spatiotemporal
multicast is provided, outlining possible application scenarios, as well as functional,
non-functional, privacy and security objectives. Furthermore, an extensive survey of the
state of the art of related research topics is given, including, among others, geographic
multicast schemes, location-based services, privacy protection techniques, as well as
approaches for content-based publish/subscribe. Then, four diﬀerent realizations for
STM services are discussed while identifying possible strength andweaknesses of each
of the introduced schemes. Finally, the focus of this thesis on so-called Rendezvous
Points-based schemes is motivated with a detailed discussion of the expected beneﬁts
of this class of STM approaches.
Based on the outlined service realizations, Chapter 4 presents two Rendezvous Points-
based STM schemes: a cluster-based approach which is based on cryptographic hash
functions and a hierarchical token aggregation scheme, as well as an overlay-based ap-
proach which relies on the Content-Addressable Network (CAN) [Rat+01a] as well as
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) [Agr+04]. Therefore, the chapter introduces a net-
work and attacker model with presumed privacy- and security-related goals of adver-
saries. Then, for each of these approaches, a detailed discussion of the expected func-
tional, non-functional, security and privacy objectives under the given network and
attacker models is presented. Finally, a case study of the cluster-based approach is pro-
vided which evaluates a novel witness-based report veriﬁcation scheme for large-scale
disasters, highlighting the feasibility of an STM service in a real-world application.
In order to evaluate the privacy and security properties of the introduced STM and
report veriﬁcation approaches, Chapter 5 presents several possible attack scenarios of
increasing strength against the given schemes and suggests metrics which lay the foun-
dation of the following evaluation. Then, the ability of each approach to provide the
respective privacy and security objectives is analyzed and discussed in detail under the
previously described attacks. Finally, the cluster-based approach and the overlay-based
STM scheme are compared with respect to the given objectives.
Chapter 6 considers the performance of each of the suggested service realizations using
an extensive simulation study. In particular, the eﬀectiveness of the hierarchical token
aggregation scheme, as well as the impact of various performance-relevant parameters
are evaluated and discussed in detail. Here, communication eﬃciency, scalability, mes-
sage delivery speed, elasticity of infrastructure, as well as robustness against failures
are included in the discussion. Based on the gained insights, both realizations are com-
pared with regards to the initial design objectives.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, summarizing results, gained insights, as well
as scientiﬁc contributions. Furthermore, directions for future work are suggested, mo-
tivating research in the area of privacy-preserving spatiotemporal multicast beyond
approaches and application scenarios investigated in detail within this thesis.
2 Background and Fundamentals
This chapter considers fundamental aspects and mechanisms that are necessary to un-
derstand the details of the STM service realizations that are proposed in this thesis. This
includes terminology and basic architecture of mobile communication systems and cel-
lular networks, structured Peer-to-Peer networks, security and privacy measures, as
well as tools for the simulation of communication networks and user mobility.
2.1 Mobile Communications and Long-Term Evolution (LTE)
This section outlines the general high-level architecture of cellular networks, including
an overview of the basic components of the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) standard.
PGWSGW
MME HSS
eNBUE
Public Data 
Network
Evolved Packet Core E-UTRAN
UE eNB
. .
 .
. .
 .
Figure 2.1 High-level overview of the LTE network architecture [cf. 3GP14d].
Wireless wide-area networks aim to enable mobile users to communicate via a ﬁxed
infrastructure that is deployed in the service area of the network [Rap01]. With initial
approaches like the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and the Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) standard focusing on voice calls and the Short
Message Service (SMS), both standards rely on a combination of circuit-switched and
packet-switched networking. However, due to the increasing demand for mobile data
connections with high data rates and low latencies, the LTE standard has been intro-
duced to provide a basis for the challenges of an increasing number of users and the
shift of the focus on voice calls to mobile data connections [Cox12]. Accordingly, LTE
employs a simpliﬁed architecture featuring only a packet-switched domain and relies
on Voice-over-IP (VoIP) to transport voice calls through the packet-switched network.
In LTE, the cellular network consists of the following components that can be distin-
guished betweenmobile devices, entities of theEvolvedRadioAccessNetwork (E-UTRAN)
and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) [3GP14d; Cox12] (see Figure 2.1).
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User Equipment The mobile device of a user, for instance, a smart phone, is generally
referred to as User Equipment (UE). Each device has a unique identiﬁer, the so-called
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). In order to prevent adversaries from ob-
taining the IMSI and to prevent the tracking of users, UEs obtain a Globally Unique Tem-
porary Identiﬁer (GUTI) that may be changed at regular intervals.
EvolvedNodeB In order to allowmobileUEs to performvoice calls and send or receive
data transmissions, so-called base stations, also referred to as Evolved NodeBs (eNBs), are
deployed in the service area. These base stations have several antennas that enable the
communication between the eNBs and the UEs through one or more so-called sectors.
Typically, base stations use three sectors covering an arc of 120○ each. In this context, a
radio cell can either refer to a single sector or to a group of sectors that are served by the
same base station. Either way, due to the limited communication range and capacity of
a radio cell, it is necessary to setup a large number of base stations and radio cells to
operate a nation-wide cellular network. Since the capacity of a cell, i.e., the number of
UEs that can be served simultaneously, depends on the combined data rate of all mobile
devices in the respective cell, cellular networks usually employ a so-called cell hierarchy.
Here, the general idea is, on one hand, to cover wide areas of the network using radio
cells of a size of several kilometers with lower data rates (referred to as macro cells)
and, on the other hand, to employ small radio cells with high data rates in hot spot or
densely-populated areas like the center of a city. Such smaller radio cells may be micro
cellswith a size of a few hundredmeters, pico cells for indoor environments, or femtocells
installed in the homes of users. Accordingly, when moving through the network, UEs
not only perform relocations or, in case of ongoing data transmissions, handovers between
the base stations, they may also be assigned to diﬀerent types of radio cells depending
on additional parameters like the speed at which users are traveling or the current load
situations in diﬀerent radio cells.
Home Subscriber Server The Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is a database that contains
information about all subscribed users and is, e.g., involved in authenticating UEs.
Mobility Management Entity The Mobility Management Entity (MME) is responsible,
e.g., for tracking the whereabouts of UEs, assigning GUTIs, controlling the activation
and deactivation of data streams (referred to as bearers) in the EPC, and security-related
tasks like managing the authentication of UEs in interaction with the HSS. While each
UE is only served by oneMME at a time, a cellular network usually consists of multiple
MMEs that are responsible for diﬀerent geographic areas.
Packet Data Network Gateway When referring to an external public network like the
Internet, LTE uses the term Public Data Network (PDN). In order to enable UEs to com-
municate with entities residing in such a PDN, LTE speciﬁes the use of Packet Data Net-
work Gateways (PGWs). All messages that are exchanged between the EPC and a PDN
must be relayed via these gateways. Since, within the EPC, data streams are managed
as bearers, PGWs are responsible for performing Network Address Translation (NAT) be-
tween the IP addresses of the internal network core and the respective public network.
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Serving Gateway Finally, Serving Gateways (SGWs) act as routers between eNBs and
the PGW. Each UE, at a time, is only served by a single SGW that may be changedwhen
UEs change their locations. Apart from forwardingmessages between base stations and
the EPC, SGWs are involved, i.e., in handing over UEs between eNBs.
2.2 Security in Computer Networks
With the digital revolution and the wide-spread use of the Internet, a large variety of
potential risks have become evident which require techniques and protocols that allow
to securely exchange information despite the inherent threats [cf. Sch03]. While this
chapter cannot discuss all potential threats and existing countermeasures, the follow-
ing sections outline the most fundamental security objectives and possible attacks and
provide an overview of some basic cryptographic techniques and protocols that are
necessary to understand the proposed schemes of this work.
2.2.1 Security Objectives and Potential Threats
Regarding the secure communication in computer networks, the following objectives
should be considered [Sch03]:
• Confidentiality: Only authorized entities should be able to read the transmitted
or stored information.
• Data Integrity: It should be possible to detect both unintentional and intentional
modiﬁcations of the exchanged information. Please note that this requires the se-
cure identiﬁcation of the entity from which the information originates.
• Controlled Access: Only authorized entities should be able to access certain in-
formation or services.
• Accountability: It should be possible to identify the entity that is responsible for
a certain event like the utilization of a service.
• Availability: The services that are provided by a speciﬁc system should be avail-
able and function correctly.
In order to violate the aforementioned security objectives, adversaries can rely on one
or more of the following technical strategies [Sch03].
• Eavesdropping and Traﬃc Analysis: If entities are able to gain access to certain
parts of the communication infrastructure (e.g., network nodes or the transmis-
sion wire), they might be able to read or analyze the exchanged information.
• Masquerade: An entity may to pretend to be an entity with another identity.
• Violation of Authorization: Entities could try to use certain services or to access
certain information that they are not allowed to gain access to.
• Manipulation of Information: Entities might modify, delete, delay, or replay cer-
tain parts of the transmitted information. Furthermore, they could generate and
transmit falsiﬁed data.
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• Denial of Events: An entity might deny its involvement in certain events like the
utilization of a service.
• Sabotage: Finally, entities could perform speciﬁc actions that aim to interferewith
the availability or the correct functionality of a system or certain services.
In order to prevent the violation of the given objectives and to protect against the out-
lined threats, the following security services are of relevance [Sch03].
• Authentication: This service aims to enable an identiﬁcation of communication
entities that is resilient against manipulation.
• Data Integrity: Apart from the need to authenticate entities, this service is respon-
sible for the ability of entities to detect anymodiﬁcation of the original content that
has been transmitted by an authenticated entity.
• Confidentiality: This service aims to protect the conﬁdentiality of information by
preventing unauthorized entities from reading the content of a transmission or
determining speciﬁc aspects such as the originator or recipient of a transmission.
• Access Control: The access control service ensures that only authorized entities
are permitted to access a certain service or some piece of information.
• Non-Repudiation: Finally, this service aims to ensure that the originator of a cer-
tain event can be held accountable for his or her actions.
2.2.2 Cryptographic Techniques and Protocols
This section provides a short overview of some basic cryptographic techniques and
protocols that are of relevance for this thesis.
Symmetric encryption Symmetric encryption algorithms rely on a cryptographic key K
that is returned by a key generation scheme K to transform a plaintext p into a ciphertext c
using an encryption algorithm Enc(K, p) = c [cf. Sch03; MVV10; FSK12]. Here, it should
be only possible to retrieve the original plaintext of a given ciphertext using K and a
decryption algorithm Dec(K, c) = p. Prominent examples of such symmetric encryption
schemes include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Triple-DES.
Asymmetric encryption In contrast to symmetric encryption schemes relying on a sin-
gle key for both encryption and decryption, asymmetric cryptographic algorithms em-
ploy a pair of two keys: a private key −K that is kept secret and a public key +K that is pub-
lished [cf. Sch03;MVV10; FSK12]. Accordingly, such asymmetric schemes are often also
referred to as public-key cryptosystems. Given these keys, it is possible to either encrypt
a plaintext p with −K and decrypt the resulting ciphertext c with the corresponding
public key +K (for example, in order to verify a signature authenticating the origin of a
message) or to encrypt p with +K and decrypt the resulting c with the private key −K
(e.g., in order to ensure that only the owner of −K may decrypt a message). In order
to realize asymmetric encryption, existing approaches rely on mathematical problems
like the factorization of large prime numbers (for instance, in the RSA cryptosystem) or
the problem of the discrete logarithm (e.g., in the ElGamal encryption scheme).
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Cryptographic hash functions In general, a hash function h maps an input value of an
arbitrary bit length to an output value h(⋅) of a bit length that is ﬁxed for the respective
hash function. Compared to traditional hash functions, cryptographic hash functions have
to fulﬁll the following additional properties [cf. Sch03]:
• Pre-image resistance: Given a hash value y, it must not be possible (with reason-
able eﬀort) to determine a value x such that h(x) = y.
• Second pre-image resistance: Given a value x, it must not be possible (with rea-
sonable eﬀort) to determine a second value x′ ≠ x such that h(x) = h(x′).
• Collision resistance: Finally, it must not be possible (with reasonable eﬀort), to
ﬁnd two values x1 ≠ x2 returning the same hash values h(x1) = h(x2).
Cryptographic hash functions can be used, for example, to verify the integrity of mes-
sages, to create message authentication codes, or as building blocks in cryptographic
pseudo-randomnumber generatorswhich arementioned in the following paragraph.
Cryptographic pseudo-random number generators Pseudo-random number gener-
ators are based on deterministic algorithms that, given a truly random bit sequence,
returns a considerably longer bit sequence yielding the impression of a truly random
sequence [cf. Sch03; MVV10]. Such generators are susceptible to attackers inferring the
future output of the algorithm based on the observation of previous pseudo-random
numbers generated by the scheme. Therefore, for cryptographic applications, it is nec-
essary to designCryptographic Pseudo-RandomNumber Generators (CPRNGs) that prevent
adversaries from predicting subsequent pseudo-random numbers from the previously
observed values. Examples for such generators include the RSA pseudo-random bit gen-
erator and the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudo-random bit generator.
Transport layer security There exists a wide variety of security protocols aiming to
realize security services at diﬀerent layers of the ISO/OSI reference model [cf. Sch03]. A
prominent example operating on the transport layer is the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol (RFC 5246 [DR08]). This scheme aims to secure an end-to-end communica-
tion between two entities by addressing the security services of authentication, data
integrity, and conﬁdentiality outlined above.
2.3 Techniques for Privacy Protection
When considering user privacy in communication networks, existing approaches usu-
ally focus on either the anonymity of users in computer networks, i.e., the privacy
of their identities in an ongoing communication [EY09], or location-related privacy
considerations [Wer+12]. Accordingly, the following sections provide an overview of
schemes that are relevant for this thesis according to those two research directions.
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2.3.1 Anonymous Communication
This section ﬁrst presents an overview of the terminology and the privacy objectives for
anonymous communication in computer networks, as well as an overview of potential
threats against the anonymity of users.
2.3.1.1 Terminology and Potential Threats
In general, anonymity is considered as the inability of an adversary to identify an entity
within a set of entities, i.e., the anonymity set [PH10; EY09]. Note that anonymity should
be distinguished from the so-called pseudonymity. While the former corresponds to the
inability of attackers to identify users within the anonymity set, the latter refers to enti-
ties using an identiﬁer that is diﬀerent from their actual identities. A single pseudonym
might even be used by multiple entities which then is referred to as a group pseudonym
with entities sharing this pseudonym forming an anonymity set.
When considering anonymity of communication in computer networks, Pﬁtzmann and
Hansen [PH10] reﬁne the following properties:
• Unlinkability: Unlinkability refers to the inability of adversaries to distinguish
whether two or more messages are related or not. This notion can be diﬀerenti-
ated between recipient anonymitywhere attackers are unable to link sent messages
to their true recipients and sender anonymity where received messages cannot be
linked to the original sender. Furthermore, unlinkability between senders and re-
cipients of messages is also known as relationship anonymity.
• Undetectability: Undetectability corresponds to the inability of attackers to de-
termine the existence of a certain message. Accordingly, this property presents a
stronger notion than unlinkability.
• Unobservability: Finally, unobservability refers to both the undetectability of a
message, as well as the anonymity of entities involved in the corresponding infor-
mation exchange (even against other entities that are involved in this exchange).
2.3.1.2 Anonymization Techniques
In this section, a short overview is given regarding existing mechanisms and protocols
that aim to fulﬁll the aforementioned privacy objectives [cf. BFK00].
Mixes and mix networks Chaum [Cha81] introduces the concept of a so-called mix
which aims to provide anonymity and relationship anonymity, i.e., unlinkability be-
tween senders and receivers of messages [PH10]. The basic idea here is to relay mes-
sages via the mix and hide the links between senders and receivers by collecting a suﬃ-
cient number of messages before relaying a batch of messages in order to be able to hide
the links between senders and receivers. Accordingly, mixes ﬁrst generate a pair of a
private and public key, allowing a sender to encrypt its message containing the address
of the recipient with the public key of the mix that should forward the message. Fur-
thermore, in order to enable a receiver to respond to a message, a sender can include
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the address of the mix that should be used to forward the response back to the sender
as well as its own address (encrypted with the public key of respective mix).
A single mix may not be suﬃcient to achieve anonymous communication since, for
instance, the mix might not be considered trustworthy. Therefore, the concept of a mix
can also be extended to build a so-called mix network. Here, senders have to specify the
encryption of the full path through the mix network, allowing a mix, in each hop, to
obtain the address of the next mix. Accordingly, the encryption of the path has to be
performed recursively, which results in:(A1,Enc+K1(A2,Enc+K2(A3,Enc+K3(A4, . . . Enc+Kn(AR,Enc+KR(m)) . . .))))
Here, Ai corresponds to the address of the i-th mix along the path of nmixes, AR to the
address of the recipient, and m to the message that should be transmitted.
A notable example of research building upon the concept of mixes is the Web MIXes
approach [BFK01]which has resulted in thewell-knownAN.ON / JonDonym system1.
Onion routing and Tor Since mix networks are often considered less appropriate for
low-latency applications due to their need to ﬁrst collect a suﬃcient number of mes-
sages before forwarding the next batch, Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson [GRS96] and
Edman and Yener [EY09] propose the concept of onion routing. The basic idea here to
employ onion routers to relay messages in the network. Similar to mix networks, each
onion router maintains a private and a public key, again allowing entities to deﬁne a
path through the network. In contrast to mix networks, however, the quite expensive
asymmetric encryption is only used to setup a circuit that later uses symmetric encryp-
tion when forwarding messages along the intended path. The symmetric keys (one for
each link between the routers along the path) are generated by the entity initiating the
construction of the circuit and are distributed in a setup message referred to as onion:(A1,Enc+K1(A2,K1↔2,Enc+K2(A3,K2↔3, . . . Enc+Kn(An,K(n−1)↔n,∅) . . .)))
Before sending amessage to the ﬁrst router along the circuit, a sender encrypts themes-
sage once for each symmetric keys beginning at the “inner” layer K(n−1)↔n and ending
at the “outer” layer K1↔2. Then, when forwarding messages, each onion router can re-
move a layer of encryption and forwards the result to the next router of the circuit.
A prominent example of the application of onion routing is Tor [MSD04; EY09]. This
scheme introduces several modiﬁcations of the original onion routing approach in or-
der to improve its security and performance properties.
2.3.2 Location-Related Privacy
Apart from anonymous communication techniques, the challenge of protecting the
whereabouts of mobile users from adversaries has emerged in the context of Location-
Based Service (LBS) [cf. Kru09; RP09; BKE12], Participatory Sensing [cf. KFD10; HKH10;
Chr+11a], aswell asGeosocial Networks [cf. Fre+10; Rui+11]. Hence, this section provides
an overview of potential risks and objectives that should be considered to protect the
privacy of users in this context.
1http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de
12 Background and Fundamentals
2.3.2.1 Threats and Privacy Objectives
The main privacy issue regarding location information is the risk of adversaries infer-
ring the identities and habits of users, allowing them to build and collect user proﬁles
[cf. GKP10; Rui+11]. Accordingly, the following threats must be considered:
• Sensitive locations: A potential threat can arise from the location data itself re-
vealing sensitive information about the identities or private and professional lives
of users. This might include the revelation of health problems, personal habits, or
aﬃliations with certain interests.
• Re-identification: Apart from the threat of disclosing sensitive location informa-
tion, users could be re-identiﬁed via their location data. This might, for instance,
enable adversaries to obtain the identities of users.
In terms of location-related privacy objectives, apart from the anonymity of users, the
following aspects should be considered [Rui+11]:
• Location privacy: Attackers should not to be able to infer the locations of users at
any time.
• Co-location privacy: It should not be possible to determine the co-location of
users, i.e., their common presence at the same time and place.
• Absence privacy: Attackers should not be able to to infer the absence of users
from certain locations in order to prevent adversaries from determining whether
users have been absent from a location where they were supposed to be.
2.3.2.2 Classification of Countermeasures
This section classiﬁes possible approaches that may be used to protect the privacy ob-
jectives of users. The following categories may be considered as countermeasures [cf.
Kru09; RP09; KFD10; Cot11; Wer+12; Gao+13].
• Access control: Apossible countermeasure to protect the location privacy of users
is to control the access to relevant data. This approach, however, yields the risk of
the collected location data being disclosed to adversaries.
• Pseudonymity: Users might provide location data using pseudonyms in order
to protect their identities. However, this yields the risk of the identities of users
being inferred from the provided locations.
• Data obfuscation: Finally, in order to protect the location privacy of users, an
approach might rely on one or more of the following obfuscation techniques:
– Perturbation: An obfuscation technique that aims to keep the granularity of
information is the perturbation of data. These techniques may, for example,
artiﬁcially modify locations by introducing random noise or jumbling the
movement paths of users [Chr+11b]. Another approach in this context is to
rely on the well-known concept of k-anonymity [Swe02]. Here, the basic idea
is to groupnodes in so-called tessellation areas ormix zones according to spatial
and temporal constraints such that a speciﬁc user is always indistinguishable
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from at least k − 1 other users. Note that, in such a mechanisms, it is also
possible to introduce dummy locations to hide the locations of users.
– Generalization: Another obfuscation technique is the generalization of the
location data which aims to reduce the granularity of the provided location
information. This may be achieved, for example, by using data aggregation
schemes like the average of a set of locations.
– Data suppression: In order to hide sensitive areas, users may suppress these
locations or generate dummy locations for these regions.
– Data distribution: Finally, in order to obfuscate location data, the relevant
information can be stored on nodes in a distributed manner.
Note that these techniques are also often used in the context of privacy-aware data
publishing, e.g., for the purpose of data mining [cf. Fun+10].
2.4 Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE)
While traditional probabilistic encryption schemes are able to provide strong security
guarantees by transforming structured plaintexts into completely unstructured cipher-
texts [cf. MVV10], recent research eﬀorts also consider the realization of encryption
mechanisms that allow to perform operations on the ciphertexts which still convey
some of the properties of the underlying plaintexts [cf. KL07]. An example of such an
approach isOrder-Preserving Encryption (OPE)which aims to enable to preserve the or-
der of plaintexts p ∈ D that are encrypted to ciphertexts c ∈ R, whereas ∣D∣ ≤ ∣R∣ [cf.
Beb02; Hac+02; OSC03; Agr+04; Bol+09]. Note that, in this work, the plaintext space D
is also called domain, while the ciphertext space R is referred to as range. Accordingly,
for an OPE scheme S , given plaintexts p1, p2 ∈ D and the corresponding ciphertexts
c1, c2 ∈R, the following condition holds for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ∣D∣:
pi < pj ⇐⇒ ci < cj
Here, S = (K,Enc,Dec) is a symmetric OPE scheme that consists of an encryption al-
gorithm Enc(K, p) = c and the respective decryption algorithm Dec(K, c) = p. Further-
more, K is a key returned by a randomized key generation algorithm K.
The following sections now provide an overview of existing OPE schemes and outline
security notions that have been considered in the analysis of these approaches.
2.4.1 OPF-based Approaches and the Ideal Object
For domains and ranges of integer values, Bebek [Beb02] suggests the summation of
randomly chosen numbers that are mapped to the plaintexts. A similar approach using
polynomial functions is proposed by Ozsoyoglu, Singer, and Chung [OSC03]. Note that
these schemes basically produce Order-Preserving Functions (OPFs) from speciﬁc sub-
classes of the set OPFD,R, i.e., strictly monotonically increasing functions that are used
as keys in the encryption process.
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The ideal object In order to evaluate the security properties of OPE schemes that are
based on OPFs, Agrawal et al. [Agr+04] introduce an OPE scheme drawing OPFs from
the complete set of OPFD,R uniformly at random. Their approach ﬁrst draws M = ∣D∣
numbers uniformly at random from the range R = {1, . . . ,N} Then, the chosen inte-
ger numbers are sorted in ascending order, resulting in the sequence of ciphertexts
c1, . . . , cM. Using these ciphertexts, the encryption function f (p) is deﬁned as follows:
f (i) ∶= ci ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ M
Furthermore, the decryption function f −1(ci) is deﬁned as:
f −1(ci) ∶= i ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ M
Agrawal et al. [Agr+04] empirically evaluate this approach by its ability to provide
resilience against estimation exposure. Given that an adversary is able to correctly es-
timate, with α% of conﬁdence, that plaintext p is in [p1, p2], then (p2 − p1)/ ∣D∣ deﬁnes
the amount of exposure at α% conﬁdence level. In their work, the authors consider the
ciphertext-only attack, where an adversary has access to all ciphertexts and no informa-
tion about the plaintext space. Then, the goal of an attacker is to obtain information
about the domain from the distribution of ciphertexts in a database. While the authors
provide a scheme for skewing the ciphertext distribution to a given target distribution
in order to hide the distribution of plaintexts, they do not quantify the estimation expo-
sure of the OPF that is used for encryption. Instead, they focus on the indistinguisha-
bility of the domain and range distributions, as well as the percentile exposure, i.e., the
average change between the percentiles of the plain- and ciphertext distributions.
IND-CPA and IND-OCPA Later, Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] analyze the security proper-
ties of the aforementioned encryption scheme, which they refer to as the “ideal object”
based on the intuition that this approach should represent an optimal OPF construc-
tion scheme due to the random selection of an OPF f ∈ OPFD,R. For their analysis,
the authors rely on the well-established security notion of the indistinguishability of
ciphertexts, i.e., Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) (see Deﬁni-
tion 2.4.1) [GM84; Bel+98]. The basic idea of this notion is that an adversary must not
be able to distinguish which one of two chosen plaintexts has been encrypted by a so-
called left-or-right encryption oracle LR. More formally, the LR oracle encrypts the plain-
text pb based on the choice of the bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Accordingly, depending on the “world”
the adversary resides in, either the plaintext p0 (left world) or p1 (right world) is en-
crypted and returned to the attacker. Note that the oracle will not modify its choice of
the bit b when answering consecutive queries from the adversary. In other word, theLR oracle will always return either the encryption of the plaintexts from the left or the
right world and the challenge for the adversary is to guess in which of the two worlds
she is residing in. Furthermore, note that, in this work, the values of the bit b are also
denoted with l = 0 and r = 1 for the sake of easier comprehensibility.
Deﬁnition 2.4.1 (IND-CPA). Let LR(⋅, ⋅, b) denote the function that, on inputs pl, pr re-
turns pb. Furthermore, let K
$←Ð K denote the random generation of a key K by a key
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generation algorithm K. For a symmetric encryption scheme S = (K,Enc,Dec) and an
adversary A and b ∈ {l, r}, consider the following experiment:
Experiment Expind-cpa-bS (A)
K $←Ð K
d $←Ð AEnc(K,LR(⋅,⋅,b))
Return d
It is required that each query (pl, pr) that Amakes to its oracle satisﬁes ∣pl ∣ = ∣pr∣. Then,
the IND-CPA advantage for an adversary A against S is deﬁned as:
Advind-cpaS (A) = Pr [Expind-cpa-rS (A) = r ] − Pr [Expind-cpa-lS (A) = r ]
It is easy to see that this notion is not directly applicable to OPE as ciphertexts leak the
order of plaintexts. Therefore, Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] introduce the following weak-
ened notion of Indistinguishability under Ordered Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-OCPA).
Deﬁnition 2.4.2 (IND-OCPA). IND-OCPA follows the deﬁnition of IND-CPA except
that the adversary is only allowed to query the LR oracle for (p1l , p1r), . . . , (pql , pqr) satis-
fying the following condition for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q:
pil < pjl ⇐⇒ pir < pjr
In terms of indistinguishability of ciphertexts under the left-or-right encryption oracle,
IND-OCPA is the highest achievable notion of security for OPE. However, using the
so-called big jump attack (see Deﬁnition 2.4.3), Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] show that any
OPF-based OPE scheme can only achieve IND-OCPA if the size of the ciphertext spaceR is exponential in the size of the plaintext space D. This is due to ciphertexts not only
leaking information about the order of plaintexts, but also mutual distances.
Deﬁnition 2.4.3 (Big jump attack). Consider the adversary AEnc(K,LR(⋅,⋅,b)) against S
with three LR oracle queries in the following experiment of IND-OCPA:
p $←Ð {1, . . . ,M − 1}
c1 ←Ð Enc(K,LR(1, p, b))
c2 ←Ð Enc(K,LR(p, p + 1, b))
c3 ←Ð Enc(K,LR(p + 1,M, b))
Return r if c3 − c2 > c2 − c1
Otherwise, return l
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In this attack, the adversary chooses the left plaintexts 1, p, and p+1, as well as the right
plaintexts p, p + 1, and M based on the randomly chosen plaintext p ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}.
Then, from the given ciphertexts c1, c2, and c3 returned by the three oracle queries, if
c3 − c2 > c2 − c1, the adversary can guess that the right plaintexts have been encrypted.
Otherwise, if c3 − c2 ≤ c2 − c1, she can guess that the left plaintexts have been encrypted
by the LR oracle. Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] show that, with distances among ciphertexts
reﬂecting the distances among the underlying plaintexts (to some degree), the adver-
sary has a high probability of correctly guessing whether the left or right plaintexts
have been encrypted unless ∣R∣ is exponential in ∣D∣.
POPF-CCA Motivated by the restriction that ∣R∣ has to be exponential in the size of ∣D∣
for an OPE scheme to achieve IND-OCPA, researchers have suggested weakened secu-
rity notions. E.g., Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] introduce the alternate security notion of
Pseudo-Random Order-Preserving Function (POPF) advantage under Chosen-Ciphertext At-
tack (POPF-CCA). This notion aims to describe the ability of an adversary to distinguish
a given Pseudo-RandomOrder-Preserving Function (POPF) from a true RandomOrder-Pre-
serving Function (ROPF), i.e., a function uniformly randomly chosen fromOPFD,R. Here,
the terms ROPF and “ideal object” both refer to the same OPF construction scheme.
They rely on this security notion to analyze a lazy-sampling scheme that they suggest
for generating the “ideal object”. However, while this scheme allows to eﬃciently sam-
ple a ROPF that is used as a key in S from a seed using a CPRNG, this notion does not
provide any information about the actual security properties of the “ideal object”.
IND-OLCPA Another weakened notion of IND-OCPA is proposed by Xiao and Yen
[XY12a]. Here, in order to restrict the ability of adversaries to perform the big jump
attack if ∣R∣ is not exponential in the size of domain ∣D∣, they introduce the security no-
tion of Indistinguishability under Ordered and Local Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-OLCPA).
When issuing queries to the LR oracle, this notion presumes that adversaries are only
able to issue queries that do not contain the problematic big jumps. However, these
weakened notions are only of limited use for practical applications due to their unreal-
istic assumptions about the abilities of adversaries.
Apart from IND-OCPA, several alternative security notions have been proposed.
Average min-entropy In order to improve the understanding of the security features
of the “ideal object”, Xiao and Yen [XY12b] suggest the use of the information theo-
retic notion of average min-entropy. This notion represents the expected number of bits
zh of a plaintext that remain secret against a known plaintext attack based on h plain-
texts. Here, while assuming that an adversary is able to choose the plaintexts for which
she obtains the corresponding ciphertexts, the authors focus on average-case security
where the challenge ciphertexts presented to the attacker are chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from the set of undisclosed plaintexts. Theymotivate their decision by the fact that
worst-case security does not allow to conduct an appropriate evaluation of OPE, i.e., it
is easy for an adversary to reverse a ciphertext c = f (p + 1) by requesting encryptions
of the plaintexts p and p + 2.
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r, z-WOW and r, z-WDOW In order to understand the security features of the “ideal
object”, Boldyreva, Chenette, and O’Neill [BCO11] propose the notions of r, z-Window
One-Wayness (WOW) (Deﬁnition 2.4.4) and r, z-Window Distance One-Wayness (WDOW)
(Deﬁnition 2.4.5), whereas 1 ≤ r ≤ M and z ≥ 1. Here, given a challenge set of z challenge
ciphertexts chosen uniformly at random, the advantage of an attacker is her ability to
correctly guess a window of size r in which at least one of the underlying plaintexts
respectively at least one of the distances between two plaintexts of the given ciphertexts
is within. Considering the advantage of an adversary in terms of a plaintext interval
instead of an exact plaintext, these notions provide a more generalized version of one-
wayness that incorporates the fuzziness of information leakage.
Deﬁnition 2.4.4 (r, z-WOW). For a set S and a value n ≤ ∣S∣, let CombSn denote the set of
n-element subsets of S. Then, the r, z-window one-wayness advantage of an adversary A
against an OPE scheme S is deﬁned as:
Advr,z-wowS (A) = Pr [Expr,z-wowS (A) = 1 ]
Here, Expr,z-wowS (A) corresponds to the following experiment:
Experiment Expr,z-wowS (A)
K $←Ð K ; p $←Ð CombnDz ; c $←Ð Enc(K,p)(pL, pR) $←Ð A(c)
Return 1 if:(pL − pR)mod M + 1 ≤ r and there exists p ∈ p so that either p ∈ [pL, pR]
or ( pL > pR and p ∈ [pL,M]∪ [1, pR] )
Otherwise, return 0
Note that due to the modular condition in Deﬁnition 2.4.4, the speciﬁed one-wayness
window can also “wrap around” the domain.
Deﬁnition 2.4.5 (r, z-WDOW). The r, z-window distance one-wayness advantage of an ad-
versary A against an OPE scheme S is deﬁned as:
Advr,z-wdowS (A) = Pr [Expr,z-wdowS (A) = 1 ]
Furthermore, let Expr,z-wdowS (A) denote the following experiment:
Experiment Expr,z-wdowS (A)
K $←Ð K ; p $←Ð CombnDz ; c $←Ð Enc(K,p)(d1, d2) $←Ð A(c)
Return 1 if:
d2 − d1 + 1 ≤ r and there exist distinct pi, pj ∈ p
with pj − pi mod M ∈ [d1, d2]
Otherwise, return 0
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In order to infer upper and lower bounds on r, z-WOW and r, z-WDOW for the “ideal
object”, the authors rely on the so-calledmost likely plaintext (m.l.p.) of a ciphertext c and
the most likely plaintext distance between two ciphertexts c1 and c2.
Deﬁnition 2.4.6 (Most likely plaintext of “ideal object”). Given an encryption schemeS = (K,Enc,Dec) and c ∈R, if pc ∈ D is a plaintext such that
Pr [K $←Ð K ∶ Enc(K, p) = c ]
achieves a maximum at p = pc , then pc is referred to as a (or, if unique, “the”)most likely
plaintext (m.l.p.) for c.
Deﬁnition 2.4.7 (Most likely plaintext distance of “ideal object”). Given an encryption
scheme S = (K,Enc,Dec) and c1, c2 ∈R, if dc1,c2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} is such that
Pr [K $←Ð K ∶ (c1, c2) = Enc(K, (p1, p2)) ; p2 − p1 mod M = d ]
achieves a maximum at d = dc1,c2 , then dc1,c2 is referred to as a (or, if unique, “the”)most
likely plaintext distance from c1 to c2.
Considering the “ideal object”, Boldyreva, Chenette, and O’Neill identify upper and
lower bounds for small and large windows sizes (see Table 2.1). In terms of WOW, they
show that, given a small window of r = 1, any adversary’s probability of inverting one
of z encryptions of random plaintexts is bounded by approximately by b ⋅ z/√M where
b is a constant. Since, for reasonable z, this probability is small, the authors consider
the “ideal object” secure under WOW if r = 1. Analogous to the WOW case, the authors
show that the “ideal object” is also secure under WDOW if r = 1.
For larger windows, Boldyreva, Chenette, and O’Neill provide lower bounds on the
WOW and WDOW advantage of adversaries against the “ideal object” (see Table 2.1).
In particular, for WOW, they proof that an adversary can (with high probability) invert
one of the z given encryptions of random plaintexts to within a size of b
√
M where b
is a constant. This lower bound highlights the insecurity of the “ideal object” for larger
windows as the bound does not even depend on the size of the ciphertext space N.
Given this behavior of the “ideal object”, the authors state that while it is hard for an
adversary to guess the exact plaintext (or plaintext distance) of a given ciphertext (or a
pair of ciphertexts), guessing the approximate plaintext or plaintext distance is easy.
(X , θ, q)-Indistinguishability In order to analyze the one-wayness and partial indistin-
guishability of ciphertexts, Malkin, Teranishi, and Yung [MTY13] introduce the notion
of (X , θ, q)-indistinguishability. In their suggested security game, ﬁrst, a so-called chal-
lenger draws two plaintexts p∗0 and p∗1 that satisfy the condition ∣p∗0 − p∗1 ∣ ≤ θ. Then, these
plaintexts are presented to the adversary along with q observed plaintext-ciphertext
pairs whose plaintexts have been sampled using the distributions X = (Xi)i=1..q. Fur-
thermore, the challenger chooses the value of bit b uniformly at random and presents
the encryption of p∗b , i.e., either Enc(K, p∗0) or Enc(K, p∗1), to the adversary. Given this
information, the advantage of an adversary regarding (X , θ, q)-indistinguishability is
deﬁned by her ability to correctly guess the value of bit b, that is, her ability to de-
termine whether she is given the encryption of plaintext p∗0 or p∗1 . Finally, the authors
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Table 2.1 WindowOne-Wayness (WOW) /WindowDistance One-Wayness (WDOW) bounds
on any adversary’s advantage against the “ideal object” according to [BCO11].
Small Window LargeWindow
r = 1 r ≈ z/√M
WOW
“Secure”
Adv1,z-wowROPFD,R(A) < 9z√M − z + 1
“Insecure”
Advr,z-wowROPFD,R(A) ≥ 1− 2e−b2/2
WDOW
“Secure”
Adv1,z-wdowROPFD,R(A) < 9z(z − 1)√M − z + 1
“Insecure”
Advr,z-wdowROPFD,R(A) ≥ 1− 2e− (r−1)22 M−2(M−1)2
suggest an OPE scheme that is able to achieve this notion of indistinguishability such
that an adversary is not able to distinguish the encryptions of two plaintexts p∗0 and p∗1
that only diﬀer in their ⌊log θ⌋ lower-order bits.
2.4.2 Modular OPE
Investigating alternative OPE schemes that are not longer strictly order-preserving,
Boldyreva, Chenette, and O’Neill [BCO11] propose the Modular Order-Preserving En-
cryption (MOPE) scheme. Their scheme prepends a secret random oﬀset to the plain-
texts in order to establish a modular order among the ciphertexts. Hence, given the
random oﬀset j, the modular encryption function Enc⋆ for a plaintext p is deﬁned as
the modiﬁcation of the encryption function Enc:
Enc⋆(K, j, p) = Enc(K, p − jmod ∣D∣)
Accordingly, the modular decryption function Dec⋆ for a ciphertext c corresponds to:
Dec⋆(K, j, c) = Dec(K, c + jmod ∣D∣)
This modiﬁcation enables an OPE scheme to achieve optimal r,w-WOW security. In
terms of r,w-WDOW, the resulting level of security corresponds to the r,w-WDOW
that is provided by the underlying OPE scheme. However, once only a single plaintext-
ciphertext pair is disclosed to an adversary, the security of the MOPE reduces to the
level of security that the employed OPE approach is able to provide.
2.4.3 Generalized OPE
Due to the inability of the “ideal object” to provide IND-OCPA, Xiao and Yen [XY12a]
introduce Generalized Order-Preserving Encryption (GOPE) (cf. Deﬁnition 2.4.8). GOPE
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deﬁnes a key as the set {pi, rpp′ ∣ 1 ≤ p < p′ ≤ ∣D∣} whereas rpp′ ∈ Z3 is randomly gener-
ated for 1 ≤ p < p′ ≤ ∣D∣. Here,pi represents the permutation of the set of all possible com-
parisons among plaintexts {(x, x′) ∣ 1 ≤ x < x′ ≤ ∣D∣}. For a plaintext p, the respective ci-
phertext c corresponds to the set {(pi(p′, p), rpp′)) ∣ p′ < p}∪{(pi(p, p′), 1+ rpp′) ∣ p′ > p}.
With a ciphertext c = Enc(p) containing ∣D∣− 1 elements, it is possible to determine the
order of c with respect to all ciphertexts c′ ≠ c. Accordingly, two ciphertexts c and c′
are compared as follows: if c and c′ are equal, the comparison algorithm returns “=”.
Otherwise, it retrieves the two distinct elements with matching i = pi(p, p′) from the
sets of both ciphertexts, that is, (i, s) ∈ c and (i, s′) ∈ c′. Then, the algorithm returns “<”
if s− s′ = 1 or “>” if s− s′ = 2. In order to decrypt a ciphertext c,Dec ﬁrst retrieves the two
elements (i, s) and (i′, s′) from the set of c. Then, the underlying plaintext is the element
p that appears in both pi−1(i) and pi−1(i′).
Deﬁnition 2.4.8 (GOPE). Let S = (K,Enc,Dec,C) denote a symmetric GOPE scheme.
• K: Given the domain size M = ∣D∣, the key generation algorithm K draws a ran-
dom permutation pi of the set {pi, rpp′ ∣ 1 ≤ p < p′ ≤ M} and randomly generates
rpp′ ∈Z3 for 1 ≤ p < p′ ≤ M.
• Enc: For a given plaintext p, the encryption algorithm Enc returns the cipher-
text c = {(pi(p′, p), rpp′)) ∣ p′ < p}∪ {(pi(p, p′), 1+ rpp′) ∣ p′ > p}
• Dec: For a given ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm Dec retrieves (any) two
elements (i, s) and (i′, s′) from the set of the ciphertext and returns the plaintext p
which appears in both pi−1(i) and pi−1(i′).
• C: For two given ciphertexts c and c′, the comparison algorithm C returns “=”
if c = c′. Otherwise, C retrieves (i, s) from the set c and (i, s′) from the set c′. If
s − s′ = 1, the algorithm returns “<”; if s − s′ = 2, it returns “>”.
Finally, the authors show that GOPE can achieve both IND-OLCPA and IND-OCPA.
2.4.4 Index Tagging Schemes
Initial approaches realizing OPE employ traditional encryption schemes in order to
generate ciphertexts and order them into buckets based on the order of the respective
underlying plaintexts [Hac+02; BCO11; Hor+12]. Then, the ﬁnal ciphertext consists of
this bucket identiﬁer and the encrypted value. Note that this kind of encryption tech-
nique originates from the application of OPE in the context of encrypted databases, e.g.,
for the purpose of outsourcing encrypted data to untrusted cloud service providers.
Here, the order-preserving property of OPE is necessary for the database system to
perform eﬃcient range queries over the encrypted data for a given range of ciphertexts[c1, c2] that correspond to the plaintext range [p1, p2]. Accordingly, by using the bucket
identiﬁers of ciphertexts, Database Management Systems (DBMSs) can build indexing
structures (e.g., search trees) over the encrypted values. By varying the bucket size, it is
possible to provide a trade-oﬀ between the risk of plaintext exposure and the overhead
of returning an unnecessarily large result set of matches containing false positives to
the client having issued the query [Hor+12].
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CEOE Boldyreva, Chenette, and O’Neill [BCO11] suggest an alternative index tagging
scheme for static and pre-determined domains, referred to as Committed Eﬃcient Order-
able Encryption (CEOE). For their approach, the authors suggest a combination of tradi-
tional probabilistic encryption and a tagging scheme that uses a key andD as input and
constructs a monotone minimal perfect hash functionmapping the i-th largest plaintext ofD to the tag value i. In order to analyze their approach, the authors introduce the no-
tion of Indistinguishability under Committed Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CCPA). Similar
to IND-OCPA, in this notion, an adversary chooses two challenge vectors of equal size
and order before key generation in order to allow the key generation algorithm to in-
corporate these vectors as input. The advantage of an adversary is then deﬁned by her
ability to correctly guess whether she is presented encryptions of the ﬁrst or the second
challenge vector. Finally, the authors show that their approach is able to achieve their
proposed notion of IND-CCPA.
Mutable OPE Popa, Li, and Zeldovich [PLZ13] propose a dynamic tagging scheme,
referred to as Mutable Order-Preserving Encoding (mOPE), that is based on a balanced
search tree. This tree is used to store the plaintexts that are encrypted with an arbitrary
deterministic encryption scheme DET whose security properties correspond to that of
a pseudo-random function. In their approach, a ciphertext c of a plaintext p consists
of DET(p) and the binary encoding of the path from the root to the position of p in the
search tree. Due to the proposed binary encoding, two given ciphertexts c1 and c2 can be
compared by simply comparing the decimal value of the binary encoding of the path
which corresponds to testing whether the path to c1 is left from the path to c2. Since
the binary encoding of c can become stale when the tree is balanced, e.g., on insert
operations, the server has to maintain an OPE Table which contains a mapping of the
permanent valueDET(p) to the current binary encoding. This table allows to retrieve the
mutable binary encoding for c using the ﬁxed part DET(p) of the ciphertext c. While the
authors show that their approach is able to achieve IND-OCPA, it requires an interactive
protocol, in which the client has to support the untrusted server in ﬁnding the correct
position of DET(p) in the tree.
2.5 Summary
This chapter provided an overview of relevant background knowledge, including mo-
bile communications, fundamentals of network security and privacy protection, as well
as existing research on order-preserving encryption. Having outlined these topics, the
following chapter analyzes the problem statement of this thesis in detail.

3 Problem Analysis
This chapter provides an overview of potential applications, highlighting the respective
privacy concerns that might arise in each scenario. Furthermore, several functional,
non-functional, as well as privacy and security objectives are introduced andmotivated
by the outlined applications. Then, the most relevant objectives for these application
scenarios are identiﬁed in order to provide general reference scenarios that should be
investigated when evaluating the privacy, security, and performance properties of STM
services. Finally, a variety of potential realizations of STM services are discussed in
detail, motivating the focus on speciﬁc approaches that are considered in this work.
3.1 Application Scenarios
A wide variety of useful implementations can be envisioned for STM services. This
work considers ﬁve novel applications originating from various domains:
• Mobile social services
• Retroactive advertising
• Crime investigation
• Disease control
• Report veriﬁcation in disasters
These application scenarios are described in detail in the following sections.
3.1.1 Mobile Social Services
An STM service could be useful for realizing novel social services for mobile devices.
For example, an STM service might enable the sharing of information among strangers
that have been residing at the same st-region, e.g., in order to exchange pictures about
a cultural event that has been held in the past. Here, while users may be interested in
receiving this information, they may not want to be identiﬁable by the sender of the
message. Protecting the privacy of receivers is an important issue in this context, as,
otherwise, senders could abuse the service to obtain detailed information about the
receivers of certain st-datagrams.
While, technically, such sharing functionalities could also be realized in traditional on-
line social networks like Facebook orGoogle+, thiswould require that the service provider
is able to track the whereabouts of all subscribed users at all times in order to be able to
distribute the corresponding information to the subset of users that have been spatially
and temporally close to the destined st-region. However, considering the revelation of
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the interest of governmental intelligence agencies in analyzing the online behavior of
citizens [GM13; Gre13] in 2013, it is unlikely that users are always willing to fully dis-
close their movements in an automated manner to a service provider with unknown
interests or obligations beyond the intended fulﬁllment of the delivery of st-datagrams.
Therefore, an STM service should ideally be able to protect the privacy of its users not
onlywith respect to the sender, but alsowith regards to an untrusted service provider.
3.1.2 Retroactive Advertising
Apart from mobile social services that aim to exchange information, another possible
commercial application for an STM service is retroactive advertising, that is, spatiotem-
poral advertising after certain events. For example, businesses may be interested in ad-
dressing potential customers that have been residing at a certain st-region, e.g., during
the public viewing of a football game that attracted a larger number of viewers than an-
ticipated. Since, in such occasions, there is not always a detailed list of participants or
the respective companies may not have access to these subscriptions due to certain pri-
vacy policies, an STM service could still enable businesses to advertise their products
or announce special oﬀers to the visitors of events that have already past.
Here, similar to the mobile social service application in Section 3.1.1, it is important
to protect the privacy of the potential customers. Otherwise, advertising companies
might, for example, oﬀer a discount to all visitors of a past music festival in order to
obtain a detailed list of possible customers for their products without their knowledge
or consent. Note that while an STM service can be useful for advertising purposes, the
respective applications on the mobile devices of users may enable them to deactivate
certain notiﬁcations and advertisements. Nevertheless, it could also be useful to incor-
porate a certain amount of ﬁxed advertisements into the service in order to obtain the
funds that are necessary to establish an STM service and to provide the desired return
on investment. Since this kind of advertisement does not aﬀect the privacy of users,
this can present a viable trade-oﬀ between the competing interests of customers, who
would like to use the service without any advertisements, and businesses, which have
to rely on these advertisements to provide the ﬁnancial means to operate the service.
3.1.3 Crime Investigation
In crime investigation, law enforcement oﬃcers often have to rely on eye-witnesses to
reconstruct the circumstances of a felony [BD12]. In order to determine credible sources
of information, it can be necessary to inform the public about the detailed location, the
estimated time frame, as well as known details of the respective crime [OW10]. As the
public is often willing to support investigations, oﬃcials are usually faced with a large
amount of traces that, in the end, do not contain much relevant information.
Here, an STM service can provide the distinct opportunity to support oﬃcials in their
investigations. By enabling investigators to send amessage to all users that have been re-
siding spatially and temporally close to the st-region atwhich the crime has presumably
been committed, they are able to directly address and ask potential witnesses to sup-
port the ongoing investigation by reporting any suspicious observations to the police.
Moreover, this approach enables oﬃcials to discover so-called unaware witnesses that are
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doubtful whether their observations are relevant and should be reported [OW10] by
speciﬁcally addressing them as potential witnesses and hence reassuring them to step
forward and get in contact with law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, investigators
are able to speciﬁcally address potential eye-witnesses that are more likely to be able to
provide reliable information, reducing the eﬀorts that are necessary to reconstruct the
course of a crime.
For such an application to gain broad acceptance among participants and within a so-
ciety, it is important to ensure that the movements and whereabouts of users are not
being constantly tracked and recorded. Apart from preventing the large-scale violation
of the privacy of citizens for the sake of crime investigation, protecting the privacy of
users is also crucial when investigating severe crimes. Here, potential witnesses that are
reluctant and fearful of retaliation have to be protected from perpetrators and possible
associates to make sure that these witnesses are not anxious of testifying in court. Ac-
cordingly, adversaries – i.e., perpetrators and their associates – must not be able to infer
the identities of users that have been close to the crime scene.
3.1.4 Disease Control
When considering the outbreak of an infectious or contagious disease, e.g., in epi-
demics, the eﬀorts of the respective centers for disease control are usually on determin-
ing the source of the outbreak. Here, an infectious disease is deﬁned as “an illness caused
by a speciﬁc infectious agent or its toxic products that arises trough transmission of that agent
or its products from an infected person, animal, or reservoir to a susceptible host, either directly
or indirectly through an intermediate plant or animal host, vector, or inanimate environment”
[LA01], while a highly infectious disease that is transmitted by contact is referred to as
a contagious disease. Determining the source of the outbreak usually requires the in-
fection of several victims in order to recognize commonalities pointing to the source of
the outbreak of the respective disease. This became visible, for example, in the outbreak
of the Enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC) bacterium in Germany in the spring of
2011 [Fra+11], where the German institutions for disease control, i.e., the Robert Koch
Institute as well as the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, were not able to determine
the source of the infection as contaminated sprouts until, after roughly three months,
53 people had died and 3,842 had suﬀered from infection [Ado+12].
In order to support oﬃcials in the investigation of epidemic threats, recent research
eﬀorts have tried to incorporate social media streams sources like Twitter to establish
early warning systems [Dia+12]. However, while determining the source of the out-
break is one of the most important challenges for the centers of disease control, another
challenge is to prevent further spread of the disease given a highly contagious disease.
In particular, the early identiﬁcation of carriers that do not yet show any symptoms due
to an incubation delay is crucial here. This is especially important as incubation delays
are typically in the magnitude of several hours, days, or even weeks [EK97], allowing
people that are unaware of their infection to widely spread the disease.
To address this challenge, an STM service oﬀers the distinct possibility of warning po-
tential carriers of the disease that they might have come into contact with a known
victim. For example, by analyzing the cell phone records and movements of a known
victim, an STM service allows oﬃcials to send a warning message to the respective st-
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regions visited by this victim, asking users that have also been residing in this area to
report to their respective center for disease control and seek medical treatment.
In order to protect the privacy of possible carriers, it is important that these persons
are able to visit a hospital or contact their respective center for disease control without
having, for example, public media, news agencies, or sensation-seekers on the World-
Wide Web naming individuals or locations that might have been at a high risk of in-
fection at some time in the past. Furthermore, in order to protect the privacy of victims
of a disease, it is important that such individuals or organizations are not able to ob-
tain information about the st-regions addressed in the warning messages dispatched
by oﬃcials. Accordingly, for an STM service addressing this use case, it is crucial that
adversaries, unless they are not aﬀected by these warnings themselves, are neither able
to detect that an st-datagram containing such a warning has been dispatched, nor must
they infer the time and place referred to in this message.
3.1.5 Report Verification in Disasters
Another application for an STM service is motivated by a witness-based veriﬁcation
approach for reports that are issued by ﬁrst responders or users from the aﬀected pop-
ulation in disaster situations.Here, an STMservice is necessary to conﬁrm reports about
certain events by asking potential witnesses that have been residing close to the corre-
sponding st-region of the event whether or not they can conﬁrm this report.
The following paragraphs now provide a detailed motivation and description of this
veriﬁcation approach, highlighting the need for a privacy-preserving STM service.
One of the primary challenges of responding to natural disasters and large-scale catas-
trophes (like ﬂoods, earthquakes, cyclonic storms, tornadoes, or wildﬁres), technolog-
ical disasters (structural ﬁres, dam failures, hazardous materials incidents, or nuclear
accidents), aswell asman-made disasters resulting from social conﬂicts (e.g. riots, wars,
terrorism, or Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents) is the
unpredictability of events and the extend of the damage that often overburdens the
emergency response forces of the aﬀected communities [Qua93]. Although there has
been a wide variety of research considering the improvement of information and com-
munication technology of oﬃcial ﬁrst responders from governmental and non-govern-
mental agencies, e.g. [Mei+02; Fra+10; Hri+10], over the last few years, the concept of
public participation in emergency and disaster response has emerged as a new topic of
research, promoting to enable interaction among users from the aﬀected population
(citizen-to-citizen communication), as well as the exchange of information between oﬃ-
cial ﬁrst responders and so-called citizen journalists from the aﬀected population [PL07;
SPS08; Pal+10; GBG11; Har+11]. This vision of a self-organized disaster response struc-
ture is based on the observation that more andmore people are in possession of mobile
devices with powerful sensors (like high-resolution cameras and GPS) and are familiar
with Internet-based services and technologies. Furthermore, as indicated by sociolog-
ical studies of previous catastrophic events, there seems to be the tendency of people
feeling the urge to support and help each other out under the extraordinary circum-
stances of disasters [Auf04; Sol09].
Motivated by the eﬀorts of incorporating the public into the disaster response, thiswork
proposes several basic information and communication services that can be envisioned
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in order to provide the necessary technological fundamentals for public participation.
Figure 3.1 shows the information needs and services according to the phases of the iter-
ative disaster management process proposed in the National Incident Management Sys-
tem (NIMS) of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the USA [Fed08].
The following sections now provide an overview of the information needs in a disaster,
as well as the information services that can be deduced from these needs.
3.1.5.1 Information Needs in Disasters
In disasters, there are, in general, two groups of actors that can be identiﬁed: oﬃcial
responders and the aﬀected population inside the area of the incident. Here, oﬃcial re-
sponders usually consist of the emergency forces of the aﬀected communities, federal
agencies like the FEMA, as well as inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies,
like the Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs (OCHA) as part of the United
Nations (UN) or the International Red Cross.
Several of the information needs of these two groups are the same, while some aspects
are more relevant to one or the other. Between both groups, the following one- or two-
way information and communication pathways have to be considered [Pal+10]:
• Communication among oﬃcial responders
• Communication among the aﬀected population
• Communication between oﬃcials and the population
The following paragraphs shortly describe the information needs of both groups.
Oﬃcial responders In order to be able to organize and coordinate the actions that are
necessary for an eﬀective response to the disaster, the various institutions and organiza-
tions have to be able to communicate with each other, e.g., by email, voice communica-
tion, multimedia streaming, or collaborative web-based applications. Therefore, oﬃcial
responders ﬁrst have to obtain knowledge about the situation at hand, also referred to
as situational awareness [HBC11]. This usually includes information about the locations
of victims, damages to infrastructures and buildings, or remaining and evolving haz-
ards in the area of the incident [Auf89; SPS08; HBC11]. In order to be able to develop
a eﬀective plan of action, decision makers have to obtain this information as soon as
possible, in a timely and accurate manner.
Aﬀectedpopulation In contrast to the information needs of oﬃcial responders, which
are more focused on obtained a complete picture of the situation, for the aﬀected pop-
ulation it is crucial to obtain information about the situation in their current surround-
ings. This includes, for example, information about the locations of hospitals or shelter
camps, as well as information about how to safely get to these locations by using the re-
maining infrastructure. Furthermore, for public ﬁrst responders from the aﬀected pop-
ulation, it is important to know where assistance is needed, that is, where speciﬁc re-
sources are required or where potential victims may be trapped nearby. Finally, friends
and relatives of aﬀected citizens are usually interested in learning about the where-
abouts and well-being of their loved ones.
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Figure 3.1 Overview of information services for disaster response with respect to the phases
of the disaster management cycle (depicted in a dark gray color). The services are
deduced from the corresponding information needs that arise in each phase.
3.1.5.2 Information Services for Disaster Response
Motivated by the outlined information needs, this work suggests a variety of possible
information and communication services that may be relevant for disaster response. As
shown in Figure 3.1, the information needs and services in a disaster can be organized
according to the following four phases of disaster management, which are inspired by
the steps and procedures described in the NIMS of the FEMA [Fed08]:
• Situation assessment: The goal in this phase is to obtain awareness of the cur-
rent circumstances in the disaster area. This involves obtaining information about
damages, hazards, locations of victims, and resources that are still available.
• Resource reviewing: In this phase, decision makers try to review the personnel
and resources that are available for response actions.
• Action planning: Given the assessed situation as well as the available resources,
decision makers develop an incident action plan which describes the tasks and
operations, as well as the resources that are required to perform these actions.
• Plan execution: In the ﬁnal phase, the tasks described in the incident action plan
are executed by ﬁrst responders in the incident area. For decision makers, it is
important to retrieve feedback about the progress of operations and arising issues
in order to be able to adapt their actions in the incident action plan deﬁned in the
next iteration of the disaster management cycle.
Given these phases, the following paragraphs describe the relevant information and
communication services for disaster response. Here, this work distinguishes between
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services focused on decentralized and distributed datamanagement, as well as services
for communication and information exchange.
Datamanagement services Services focused on data management are used to realize
distributed database features in order to store and retrieve information.
• Damage assessment: This service provides a registry of damages that have been
dealt to relevant parts of existing buildings and infrastructures such as hospi-
tals, shelter buildings, or transportation infrastructure. Such information can be
reported by ﬁrst responders and volunteers from the aﬀected population.
• Hazard monitoring: Damages to buildings or infrastructures can lead to haz-
ardous conditions in certain parts of the disaster area. Thus, this service should
enable real-timemonitoring and prediction of evolving and newly arising hazards
to be considered by oﬃcials and the aﬀected population.
• Victim registry: In order to locate potential victims in the disaster area, a victim
registry service should be able to provide a list of people that have presumably
been residing in the area before the incident. Furthermore, such a service should
enable the monitoring of the status of victims and patients, e.g., providing infor-
mation about their medical condition and current whereabouts.
• Needs registry: An important aspect in a disaster is the eﬀective management of
resources that are usually only scarcely available. Therefore, it is necessary to keep
track of the needs and resource requests in order to be able to establish en eﬀec-
tive resource usage and distribution plan. In particular, a needs registry service
should provide detailed information about such requests, like the location where
the resource is needed or the urgency of the request.
• Resource inventory: Eﬀective resourcemanagement in disaster response not only
requires knowledge about the needs, but also about the resources that are actually
available. Hence, a resource inventory service should enable users to obtain an
overview of resources and personnel that is available, as well as an estimated time
at which currently used resources will be available again.
• Task monitoring: When organizing response operations, oﬃcials and volunteers
have to be able to monitor ongoing operations and the progress of assigned tasks.
Accordingly, this service should provide this information, enabling an appropri-
ate adaption of the next steps and measures of the incident action plan.
Communication services These services allow users to exchange information by ad-
dressing speciﬁc users or relying on attribute-based addressing for communication.
• Event/needs reporting: In order to be able to gather information about the cur-
rent circumstances in the incident area and to develop an incident action plan, an
reporting service is required. This reporting service should enable both oﬃcial
and voluntary ﬁrst responders to report observed events and arising needs for
speciﬁc resources to the respective registries of the data management services.
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• Information dissemination: In a disaster area, it is important to be able to issue
warnings about reported hazards and announce information, e.g., about evac-
uation routes. Hence, in order to make the information from the respective data
management services available to the aﬀected population, an information dissem-
ination service is required. Please note that while this service can also be realized
with more traditional measures like radio or television broadcasts, more sophis-
ticated implementations on mobile devices allow for suggestions and warnings
that are tailored to the individual needs and whereabouts of users.
• Navigation: With existing infrastructures often having suﬀered from damages
due to the disaster, a navigation service should provide the extended capability
to ﬁnd routes in the remaining parts of the infrastructure while circumventing
existing hazards. Furthermore, in order to prevent an overload of certain roads,
for example, this service should also aim to provide individual suggestions that
realize a global distribution of the load on the remaining infrastructure network,
as well as the load and resources available at the destinations, like the number of
beds that are still available at a hospital.
• Request/pledgemediation: An issue of eﬀective disaster response is, on one hand,
to know about available resources, and, on the other hand, to match these re-
sources to existing requests. Accordingly, a request/pledge mediation services
should automatically match these needs to available resources in order to sup-
port self-organized support actions among the aﬀected population.
• Expert consultation: In a disaster area, apart from physical resources, like power
generators or fuel, the knowledge of experts can also be an important resource.
Therefore, an expert consultation service could enable ﬁrst responders to locate
and establish communication with certain specialists, like doctors or paramedics.
• Contacting friends: Friends or relatives often have to worry for several days or
weeks about the well-being of their loved ones among the aﬀected population.
Hence, it could be useful to provide a service that allows users in the incident
area to inform friends and relatives of their current situation.
The detailed realization of these services is beyond the scope of this work. However,
one of the most fundamental aspects to consider is the implementation of the event
and needs reporting service since it allows ﬁrst responders to obtain situational aware-
ness and, accordingly, provides the basis of information for all of the other services.
Figure 3.2 visualizes this aspect by showing the ﬂow of information from the event and
needs reporting service to other services. With this service representing such a fun-
damental source of information, it is crucial to consider the quality and correctness of
such user-provided information [GBG11; Tap+11]. Accordingly, the following section
describes a possible approach for report veriﬁcation that aims to realize countermea-
sures against malicious users reporting inaccurate or false information.
3.1.5.3 Witness-based Report Verification
This work introduces a novel concept of a crowdsourcing approach for report veriﬁca-
tion that relies on witnesses from the aﬀected population to verify the correctness and
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Figure 3.2 Information ﬂow originating from the event and needs reporting service. Since it
is crucial to obtain accurate and correct information about the current situation in
the disaster area, this service has to implement techniques for report veriﬁcation.
alleged urgency of events that have been reported by users from the aﬀected popula-
tion. Figure 3.3 provides an overview of this concept. The basic idea here is to enable
users from the aﬀected population to issue reports about observed events via their mo-
bile devices. Reports are sent to a so-called veriﬁer node that is responsible for deciding
about the correctness, accuracy, and urgency of reports. In order to be able to make an
appropriate decision, the veriﬁer issues conﬁrmation requests to a subset of users that
are potential witnesses for the reported event. The conﬁrmation requests contain infor-
mation about the reported event and ask the possiblewitnesses to judge the correctness,
accuracy, and urgency of the event. Then, witnesses are free to respond to this request,
e.g., by specifying whether they can conﬁrm this event, have to reject it, or are not sure
about their decision. Finally, after having received an appropriate number of responses,
the veriﬁer can rate the respective report, e.g., by using majority-based voting.
One of the challenges in organizing the inquiry of witnesses is to deliver the conﬁrma-
tion requests to potential witnesses, i.e., users that have been close to the corresponding
st-region of the event. While, at ﬁrst, a geocast may also seem to be a viable approach to
reach witnesses, it does not incorporate the speciﬁc circumstances in disasters. On one
hand, relying on a geocast would demand fromwitnesses to stay close to the event that
should be conﬁrmed. This, however, it not a realistic assumption in disaster situations,
where users are likely to be traveling to certain locations, like shelter camps. Further-
more, the veriﬁcation approach should be able to operate in a delay-tolerant manner
and support the deferring of votes to allow witnesses to respond to the request at a
later point in time, for example, in case they currently have to assist a victim.
Apart from the issue of delivering conﬁrmation requests to witnesses, an STM service
should also be able to protect the privacy of users in this scenario. Considering techni-
cal mechanisms that are able to protect the privacy of witnesses is especially important
in case of disasters as the execution of organizational countermeasures, like legal re-
strictions, cannot be guaranteed under these circumstances.
Please note that the outlined scheme is only meant to present a ﬁrst step into the area
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Figure 3.3 Overview of the concept of witness-based report veriﬁcation. In this scheme, users
can report speciﬁc observation about certain events to a veriﬁer that tries to conﬁrm
or reject the respective events by organizing an inquiry among potential witnesses,
i.e., users that have been close to the st-region of the event. Witnesses reply with
their decision, allowing the veriﬁer accept or reject a report, e.g., by relying on a
majority-based voting scheme. In this context, an STM service presents a viable
solution for interviewing witnesses in a privacy-preserving manner.
of verifying reports with crowdsourcing schemes. An actual realization should also
consider further aspects like providing appropriate incentives for participation, the in-
tegration with existing emergency response procedures, as well as the safety of users
from the aﬀected population in order to prevent users from taking irresponsible risks
when reporting events or trying to validate received reports.
3.1.6 Conclusion
In this section, several potential applications for an STM services from very diﬀerent
domains have been proposed.While all of these services highlight the need for a service
providing a “geocast into the past”, they are also clear indicators for the necessity to
incorporate privacy considerations early in the design of such a service. Before going
into the details of possible realizations for a privacy-aware STM service, the following
section ﬁrst presents an extensive overview of design objectives to be fulﬁlled.
3.2 Design Objectives
This section is divided into three parts discussing the functional, non-functional, as
well as the privacy and security objectives that should be fulﬁlled by an STM service.
Here, the ﬁrst subsection distinguishes between mandatory functional objectives that
are relevant for almost any conceivable use case, and optional objectives that provide
service properties for the purpose of convenience.
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3.2.1 Functional Objectives
3.2.1.1 Mandatory Objectives
An STM service should provide the following mandatory functional objectives, i.e., it
should be able to support the following features:
• Long-term support: A sender should be able to send an st-datagram to nodes
having resided in an area several hours, days, or weeks ago. The actual duration
that should be supported depends on the application of the STM service. For mo-
bile social services (Section 3.1.1) a duration of up to several hours and days may
be suﬃcient in order to share information with other users. However, with the
incubation time of infectious and contagious diseases often extending up to sev-
eral days or even weeks, an application like disease control (Section 3.1.4) may
demand the delivery of messages addressing an st-region from a long time ago.
• Reliable delivery: The service should be able to achieve a high delivery ratio, i.e.,
all users that have been present at the addressed st-region should eventually re-
ceive an st-datagramwith a highprobability. Achieving high reliability inmessage
delivery is crucial considering the acceptance of the service among users.
• Accurate delivery: Similar to the previous objective, the service should be able
to achieve a high delivery accuracy, i.e., users should only receive st-datagrams
for which they are legitimate recipients, i.e., for which they have actually been
addressed by the sender. In other words, the ratio of false positives among the
messages delivered to users should be low. This objective is crucial to prevent
users from obtaining messages for which they are not an intended recipient.
• Precise region addressing: Senders should be able to precisely address st-regions.
Please note that this concerns the precision of region addressing, i.e., the smallest
unit that a sender is able to address in space and time, and not the geometric
speciﬁers that a sender may use to address an st-region.
• Range destinations: With the exact destination time and location, e.g., of the out-
break of a disease, usually not known, the service should provide the ability to
address a range of st-regions.
3.2.1.2 Optional Objectives
• Cancellation of delivery: For a sender, it may be useful to cancel an ongoing de-
livery of messages. Users having already received the message may optionally be
notiﬁed about the cancellation, depending on the application.
• Modification of delivery: According to themodiﬁcation of a delivery, for a sender,
the ability tomodify the destination st-region or the content of an st-datagram that
is currently being delivered may also be useful. Since some users may already
have received the st-datagram, again, these users should be notiﬁed of the new
content (if they are receivers) or be informed that they were not meant to receive
the respective message suggesting to ignore the received content. This objective
provides an STM service with the ability to revoke previous information, how-
ever, this is only suitable for applications where the user is asked to take further
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action, e.g., to report to the police as potential witnesses of a crime as outlined
in Section 3.1.3. In contrast, in terms of mobile social services, such an revocation
feature may be less useful as the information itself, like pictures, has already been
revealed to other users.
• Sender feedback: In order to obtain an overview of the state of a delivery, a sender
maywant to be notiﬁed aboutwhether an st-datagramhas been delivered success-
fully. Here, the servicemight provide a senderwith feedback about the state of his
or her delivery by either binary feedback where a sender receives binary informa-
tion about the success or failure of the delivery regarding all potential receivers,
or by numeric feedback with a sender receiving the number of successes and fail-
ures – or the success ratio – among all receivers. Note that while this feature may
be useful for a sender, it may be rather challenging to implement considering the
privacy implications outlined later on in this chapter.
• Advanced addressing: Apart from the ability to address range destinations, for a
sender, several advanced speciﬁersmay be useful to allowmore complex address-
ing schemes that can be relevant in various application scenarios of the service.
– Geometric specifiers: In order to address an st-region, an STM service might
beneﬁt from supporting diﬀerent geometric shapes as speciﬁers for destina-
tion regions, e.g., rectangular, circular, polygonal, or path st-regions.
– Dynamic addressing: The destination st-region that a sender aims to ad-
dress may not always be of ﬁxed and static nature. For example, regarding
the crime investigation reference scenario (Section 3.1.3), law enforcement
agencies may be interested to address potential witnesses spatially and tem-
porally close to a crime scene if not much time has past since this event
in order to obtain a manageable amount of evidence. However, over time,
if not enough evidence can be gathered, such agencies could beneﬁt from
a destination st-region that increases with the time that has passed since
the addressed point in time. Please note that, while the same eﬀect could
be achieved by sending several diﬀerent st-datagram over time, supporting
dynamically changing st-region allows to implement performance optimiza-
tions, for example, in order to prevent duplicates among the st-datagrams
received by users having resided close to the addressed st-region.
– Conditional and probabilistic addressing: When addressing users at a spe-
ciﬁc st-region, even a short presence of a user at this region will implicate
his or her membership in the group of receivers. Therefore, in order to pro-
vide a more ﬁne-grained addressing of users, the probability of a user being
considered as a receiver could instead depend on the residence time at the
region. Also, considering the advertisement application (Section 3.1.2), an
company may, for example, wish to oﬀer a speciﬁc discount only to a certain
percentage of users that have been residing at a certain st-region. Further-
more, apart from a probabilistic speciﬁcation of receivers, it may be useful to
introduce additional conditional constraints, e.g., in order to only consider
users having resided at the st-region for a speciﬁc minimum duration while
not having exceeded a certain maximum residence time.
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• User-defined privacy policies: While an STM service should be able to provide
certain privacy features, which will be discussed in Section 3.2.3, users of the ser-
vice may want to additionally reﬁne their individual privacy properties. This can
be useful, for example, to let users hide certain areas like their home location from
the service. Note that while hiding speciﬁc areas will prevent the reception of st-
datagram for this region, this is not necessarily an issue since users are able to
decide whether they prefer to miss certain st-datagrams or protect sensitive in-
formation about their whereabouts by not interacting with the service at some st-
region. Although certain policies like hiding the home location of a user might
also be achieved by switching oﬀ the mobile device or terminating the respective
application on the device, a convenient way of specifying such policies as part of
the service may be necessary for a strict realization.
3.2.2 Non-functional Objectives
In terms of the non-functional objectives of STM services, i.e., the requirements for the
qualitative service properties, the following aspects should be considered:
• Delivery speed: The delivery delay, i.e., the time between sending and receiving
an st-datagram, should be appropriately small (depending on the respective use
case). For instance, given the envisioned applications described in Section 3.1, a
delivery delay in the order of magnitude of several minutes or even a few hours
are likely to be still acceptable.
• Eﬃciency: STM service realizations should be eﬃcient in the use of communica-
tion, computation, and memory resources in all parts of the infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, the necessary resources should be equally distributed among the ser-
vice entities to balance the system load.While these requirements are very general
and independent of an STM service, regarding the eﬃcient use of communica-
tion resources, two concrete requirements can be identiﬁed. On one hand, the ser-
vice should be able to achieve a high delivery accuracy. On the other hand, there
should be no duplicates among the received st-datagrams, that is, users should
not receive multiple copies of the same message.
• Scalability: The service should be able to provide scalability with respect to the
supported time span (according to the objective of long-support), the number of
users, as well as the number of st-datagrams that are to be delivered. Moreover,
service should scale with an increasing size of the destination st-region of a mes-
sage, i.e., an increasing geographic area or length of the speciﬁed time interval,
which corresponds to an increasing number of receivers of an st-datagram. Fi-
nally, when considering data exchange applications like image sharing, the ser-
vice should be capable of scaling with an increasing payload size of st-datagrams.
• Elasticity of infrastructure: The service should allow ﬂexible adaptation of the
service infrastructure in order to cope with varying load conditions.
• Robustness: Finally, an STM service should provide robustness against the fail-
ure of parts of the infrastructure, considering the failure of service entities and
components, as well as parts of the infrastructure of the relevant communication
networks that are required by the service.
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3.2.3 Privacy and Security Objectives
In terms of the security and privacy objectives of an STM service, the following aspects,
which are partially based on and inspired by [Sch03], should be considered:
• Privacy of receivers: As outlined in the introductory part of this thesis in Chap-
ter 1, one of the most fundamental privacy objectives of a privacy-aware STM
service is the ability to protect the privacy of the participants of the service, i.e.,
users (potentially) receiving st-datagrams. In order to achieve this goal, this work
incorporates and adapts the followingwell-established objectives [Kru09; Fre+10]:
– Anonymity: Attackers must not infer the identity of the users receiving an
st-datagram. Otherwise, they could unwillingly be associated with the infor-
mation addressed in the message.
– Location privacy: Attackers must not infer the past, present, or future loca-
tions of users up to a deﬁned accuracy. This is important as, for example,
knowing the locations of users during the night time can reveal their home
addresses, ultimately allowing adversaries to infer their identities [GP09].
– Co-location privacy: Attackers must not be able to decide whether two users
have been residing at the same location at the same time. Otherwise, with in-
formation about single or multiple encounters of speciﬁc users, adversaries
may be able to infer social connections and build social graphs that provide
a deep insight into the social environments of users. Knowledge about pre-
vious encounters can be harmful as, for example, innocent users could acci-
dentally be linked to certain events like crimes or terrorist attacks.
Note that, in terms of co-location, this work proposes two notions of an en-
counter between twousers: direct encounterswhere usersmeet physically, and
indirect encounters in which one user leaves some kind of information (e.g.,
a written note) for another user to retrieve later on. Accordingly, a direct
encounter corresponds to two users having resided in the same st-region,
whereas an indirect encounter refers to two users having visited the same
radio cell at some point in time. While there is potentially a high number of
indirect encounters among users, proving the existence of an asynchronous
exchange of information is expected to require physical observation of users.
Since such observations already disclose the co-location of the aﬀected users,
the primary focus of this work is on direct encounters.
Another notion of co-location, which is introduced in this thesis, is the so-
called proximity privacy. Here, an adversary is interested in learning whether
users have been residing within a certain distance to each other. This rep-
resents a more generalized interpretation of co-location where not only the
presence of users within the same place at the same time is presumed to in-
vade their privacy. Since proximity privacy is, however, presumed to be of
less relevance for practical applications, it is beyond the scope of this work.
– Absence privacy: Adversaries must not determine the absence of a speciﬁc
user from an st-region, e.g. by automatically testing whether he or she has
received a message addressed to this region. This knowledge can be harmful
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if a user has not been residing at a speciﬁc st-region although he or she was
supposed to be at the respective area during the given time frame.
– Graceful degradation: The service should be resilient against the disclosure
of the identities or locations of individual users and should be able to provide
graceful degradation in case of the disclosure of this information. Hence,
while for the aﬀected users, the STM service cannot provide the respective
privacy guarantees anymore, it should be able to still protect the privacy of
those users that are not aﬀected by the disclosed information.
– Perfect forward privacy: Finally, it should not be possible for adversaries to
infer the locations of users for st-regions given that the presence of a user
at a certain location at some speciﬁc point in time is known to an attacker.
Given its similarity with perfect forward secrecy in key exchange protocols,
this objective is referred to as perfect forward privacy [SMK09]. However, given
its broad scale, this topic is beyond the scope of this work.
• Message confidentiality: Attackers not having been residing at the destination st-
region of an st-datagram should neither be able to read the information contained
in the st-datagram nor obtain knowledge of the addressed destination region. In
addition, not only should just permitted users (i.e. just users having been residing
at the addressed st-region) be able to read the content of an st-datagram, the re-
spective st-datagram should also only be received by permitted users. Apart from
eﬃciency considerations, this can be important as the sole awareness of the pres-
ence of a message addressing a speciﬁc st-region can already compromise conﬁ-
dential information contained in the message, i.e., that there may be an outbreak
of an infectious or contagious disease in a speciﬁc area (see Section 3.1.4).
• Message authentication and integrity: Users receiving st-datagrams should be
able to verify the integrity of the original st-datagrams dispatched by the corre-
sponding senders. In addition to the integrity of messages, it is also important
for users to detect whether a received st-datagram actually originates from a spe-
ciﬁc sender and that this sender is actually who he or she proclaims to be. This
is important, for example, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks where
adversaries could try to inject false information in the respective st-datagrams.
• Controlled access: Only authorized users should be able to participate in the STM
service, that is, depending on the intended application, only receive or send and
receive st-datagrams. This aspect is, e.g., crucial for billing purposes and to pre-
vent the (potentially malicious) overload of the service infrastructure.
• Spam prevention: Depending on the number of potential senders in an STM ser-
vice, it can be necessary to implement countermeasures against spam among the
exchanged st-datagrams. Potential mechanisms against spamming might include
the ﬁltering of such st-datagrams based on the rate at which the respective mes-
sages are being dispatched by entities.
• Accountability of senders: In order to prevent the abuse of the service and in or-
der to be able to prosecute malicious senders, some of the applications outlined
in Section 3.1 could require mechanisms to hold senders accountable for their ac-
tions, e.g., the content of their distributed st-datagrams. This can be necessary for
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STM services that are vulnerable to false alerts potentially causing signiﬁcant soci-
etal or economic damages. For example, for crime investigation or disease control
services, attackers could try to raise anxiety among the citizens of a region in or-
der to cause a temporal disruption or even the collapse of emergency services due
to the overload of emergency hotlines or a rushed demand for medical services.
For other services like mobile social or advertising services, this objective may
be considered optional, as, in this case, controlled access and spam prevention
techniques are more likely to be of relevance.
• Availability: Like any arbitrary service infrastructure that may be a proﬁtable tar-
get of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, an STM service should provide resilience
against these kinds of attacks. Potential countermeasures against DoS attacks can
be, for example, cookies and client puzzles [ANL01; JB99]. Due to the broad range
of this topic, measures against DoS attacks are beyond the scope of this work.
Given these general objectives and requirements for an STM service, the following sec-
tion discusses the speciﬁc relevance of individual objectives regarding the diﬀerent re-
quirements of the proposed applications of an STM service.
3.2.4 Discussion of Application Requirements
Mobile social services Mobile social services are expected to cover a wide variety of
use cases. Nevertheless, functional, non-functional, privacy and security objectivesmay
be categorized according to their estimated relevance for such services, considering
highly relevant aspects, as well as objectives of moderate and low importance.
Considering the high number of users that are to be expected from social applications,
STM services have to eﬃciently employ resources, allowing services to scale with the
number of participants and st-datagrams to be delivered, as well as an increasing pay-
load size. This includes the ability of STM services to adapt their infrastructure to vary-
ing load conditions resulting from user churn. Furthermore, targeting social applica-
tions which handle personal data, the privacy of receivers as well as the conﬁdentiality
of messages should be ensured. Additionally, in order to allow providers of social ser-
vices to provide billing options, an access control mechanism has to be realized. Also,
since the user experience of social applications is often known to suﬀer from spammes-
sages, it is crucial to incorporate counter-measures against spamming to provide sus-
tainable customer retention.
Apart from the highly relevant aspects outlined above, STM services for mobile social
applications should consider accurate delivery of messages both for eﬃciency and pri-
vacy concerns. Furthermore, while the objective of robustness is of relevance, partici-
pantsmay bewilling to accept rare failureswhich result in the service being temporarily
unavailable. Authentication and integrity of st-datagrams in social applications may be
important, e.g., to protect against social engineering attacks where adversaries try to
obtain passwords or credit card numbers.
Less important aspects of an STM service in the context of social applications are quick
and reliable message delivery. Here, as long as user experience is not severely aﬀected,
participants of a mobile social service are expected to tolerate best-eﬀort messaging.
Furthermore, with destinations of st-datagrams usually addressing smaller st-regions,
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precise addressing, support for range destinations, and scalability with respect to the
size of destination regions may be less relevant here. Note that applications focusing on
large-scale festivals or sporting events could be an exception. Accountability of senders
is probably not required for social services as the infrastructure and maintenance costs
for service providers are expected to exceed the resulting beneﬁts like being able to
legally prosecute authors of messages with illegal content.
Finally, the necessity for long-support strongly depends on the nature of the mobile
social service which is often based on a new, entrepreneurial idea. Accordingly, the
required supported time span may range from minutes, hours, or few days (e.g., for
photo sharing) to multiple days or even weeks (e.g., for dating applications).
In summary, mobile social services are expected to have rather low requirements on
the given objectives. Nevertheless, elasticity, scalability, and privacy protection are still
challenging aspects to be considered for an STM service provider.
Retroactive advertising Among the most relevant objectives for STM services in the
context of retroactive advertising are communication eﬃciency, as well as scalability
with respect to the number of participants and st-datagrams, as well as an increasing
payload size. This is based on the assumption that such advertising services may be
of interest for a large number of enterprises and vendors. Furthermore, due to factors
like seasonality of sales in certain markets or event-based advertising, load conditions
are likely to strongly vary over time. Accordingly, the infrastructure of an STM service
should be able to adapt to these changes. Since potential recipients may not be com-
fortable with their private data being shared with advertising companies, it is crucial
to incorporate privacy protection measures. Also, in order for STM service providers
to be able to bill their messaging services and oﬀer a high service quality to customers,
access control schemes, as well as spam prevention techniques should be established.
In addition to the highly crucial objectives above, an STM service should be able to
reliably deliver messages up to several days “into the past”. The intention here is to
allow advertisers to carefully evaluate whether to carry out marketing campaigns even
after events have passed for some days. Given that large-scale events may present valu-
able customer bases, STM services should support range destinations and scale with
an increasing size of destination regions. In order to ensure a high service quality, it is
important that the multicast service oﬀers accurate datagram delivery, precise region
addressing, as well as robustness against failures. Furthermore, to allow users to verify
received oﬀers, message authentication and integrity are of relevance.
Finally, among the less crucial design objectives are the delivery speed of st-datagrams,
as well as message conﬁdentiality and accountability of senders. Here, for the purpose
of advertising, delays in the delivery or the disclosure of oﬀers may be acceptable. Also,
similar to mobile social services, the costs of providing sender accountability are likely
to surpass the beneﬁt of being able to hold advertisers accountable to their oﬀers.
Crime investigation For the application of crime investigation, it is crucial to consider
the objectives of long-support, reliable and accurate delivery, precise addressing, as
well as robustness in order to be able to ﬁnd and address the witnesses of a crime. Fur-
thermore, privacy of recipients should be ensured to protect witnesses from potential
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retaliations. Message conﬁdentiality, authentication, and integrity are also of great rel-
evance given that requests to witnesses may contain information that should not be
disclosed to the public to protect ongoing investigations. Also, access control and ac-
countability of senders are necessary to ensure that only authorized investigators are
able to send out requests in an auditable manner.
Besides the critical aspects in the previous paragraph, the following objectives should
also be incorporated in the context of crime investigation. Since the area of a crime
may not always be clearly deﬁned, range destinations and scalability with respect to
the size of destinations regions should be supported by an STM service. Furthermore,
messages should be delivered quickly to help identify witnesses and solve the crime
as fast as possible. Also, given that within a city, state, or country, a high number of
witness requests is to be expected, communication should be eﬃcient and the service
should be able to scale with an increasing number of st-datagrams and payload size.
Finally, as the number of users of an STM service in the context of crime investigation
may be tightly coupled with the population in the service area, elasticity of the infras-
tructure, as well as scalability with the number of participants could be considered op-
tional. In addition, based on the access that is limited to investigators, spam prevention
techniques should not be required.
Disease control In the context of disease control, the most relevant objectives are in
the area of long-support, robustness, as well as reliable and accurate delivery of st-
datagrams. This is due to the fact that incubation delays may cover large time spans of
several days orweeks. Furthermore, it should be possible to precisely address st-regions
to distribute datagrams to potentially infected users that may have visited the same lo-
cations as a known carrier of a disease. Regarding the delivery speed, possible carriers
of a disease should receive the issued warnings as soon as possible. With known carri-
ers having resided in many locations over a larger time span, an STMs service should
additionally support range destinations and scale with an increasing size of destination
regions. Since possible recipients may not wish to be identiﬁed by someone else than
his or her trusted physician, the privacy of receivers should be protected. Furthermore,
in order to prevent spreading of rumors about locations that may have exposed visitors
to the disease and to ensure that issued warnings can be considered trustworthy, the
objectives of message conﬁdentiality, authentication and integrity, controlled access, as
well as sender accountability should be consideredmandatory in the context of disease
control in order to ensure that warnings are only issued by legitimate organizations or
governments in an auditable manner.
Aswarnings are not expected to be issued very often and since the size of the population
in the service area is likely to be well predictable, communication eﬃciency, elasticity
of the infrastructure, as well as scalability with an increasing number of participants,
st-datagrams, and payload size are among the less critical objectives for disease control.
Finally, with access to the disease control service being restricted to oﬃcials, it should
not be not necessary to incorporate spam prevention techniques.
Report verification in disasters Considering the application of report veriﬁcation for
large-scale disasters, an STM service should be able to provide reliable and accurate
delivery of veriﬁcation requests to potential witnesses of events. Given that disaster
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situations are characterized by their unpredictability and the resulting risk of infras-
tructure failures, communication eﬃciency, robustness, elasticity of infrastructure, as
well as scalability with an increasing number of participants, st-datagrams, and pay-
load size are very critical. Furthermore, as governmental institutions are likely unable
to protect data privacy of individuals under such circumstances, an STM service has to
be able to technically protect the privacy of receivers. Additionally, access to the service
should be controlled and veriﬁcation requests as well as their corresponding votes are
to be kept conﬁdential, authentic, and of integrity. Furthermore, techniques for spam
prevention must be considered. In order to allow prosecution of users providing false
reports or votes with malicious intent, it should be possible to reveal the identities of
users – with strong restrictions that prevent large-scale violation of receiver privacy.
Apart from the highly crucial objectives given in the previous paragraph, the following
objectives are also of relevance. Since there may be a signiﬁcant delay between issuing
a report and receiving a veriﬁcation request, an STM service should provide long-term
support. Furthermore, destinations should be addressable precisely and over a range of
st-regions to query appropriate potential witnesses of an event. Accordingly, scalability
with respect to the size of destination regions should be provided. Finally, datagrams
should be delivered in a timely manner, but longer delays within the range of several
minutes up to a few hours may be tolerable – depending on the speciﬁc characteristics
of the disaster situation to be dealt with.
Summary Having discussed application requirements, the following section presents
an overview of related research that may be useful in realizing such an STM service.
Furthermore, in this survey of the state of the art, the suitability of each of the respective
approaches for the implementation of such a service is discussed in detail.
3.3 State of the Art
While this thesis is the ﬁrst to describe the concept of a privacy-preserving spatiotem-
poral multicast, a variety of scientiﬁc works can be identiﬁed that share commonali-
ties with the suggested concept. Therefore, this section describes the state of the art of
related research, outlining the key diﬀerences and discussing the applicability of the
outlined concepts and approaches for the realization of an STM service.
3.3.1 Challenges of a Spatiotemporal Multicast
When considering previous research that may be beneﬁcial in the design of an STM
service, several challenges can be identiﬁed that may share similarities with the issues
found in existing ﬁelds of research:
• Multicast communication: Eﬃcient one-to-many delivery of st-datagrams repre-
sents one of the major challenge of an STM service. Hence, existing techniques
for multicast communication may be of interest for the design of an STM scheme.
Furthermore, considering the proposed security objectives, techniques for secure
multicast communication are of interest.
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(a) In a geocast, nodes that are currently re-
siding in the dark gray destination area
receive the message.
Just-in-Time
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(b) In a mobicast, messages are delivered
just-in-time when the nodes enter the
dark gray destination area.
Figure 3.4 Concepts of Geographic Multicast (geocast) and Just-in-Time Multicast (mobicast).
• Discovery of recipients: Another challenge for the realization of an STM service
is the discovery of receivers of an st-datagram. Regarding existing research, this
corresponds to the issue of tracking or predicting themovements of users in order
to be able retrieve users having residing within certain st-regions. When tracking
locations, the spatiotemporal information about the movements of the users has
to be stored in a persistent manner to enable queries on this data.
• Privacy protection: In order to protect the privacy of receivers, existing research
for protecting the identities and whereabouts of users might be useful to realize
a privacy-aware message delivery.
The following sections provide an overview of research areas considering challenges
related to the three aspects outlined above. For each concept or approach, a discussion
of its applicability for the realization of an STM service is discussed in detail.
3.3.2 Geographic Multicast
As depicted in Figure 3.4a, a Geographic Multicast (geocast) is traditionally deﬁned as
amulticast scheme that aims to deliver amessage to all users that are currently residing
within a certain geographic destination area [Mai04; LCL10; AB12].
With the idea of a spatiotemporal multicast being closely related to the concept of a
geocast, the question is whether there may be certain mechanisms employed by geo-
cast schemes that could be used to realize an STM service. Accordingly, this section
provides an overview of existing geocast techniques in order to determine their poten-
tial applicability for an STM service.
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3.3.2.1 Traditional Geocast
Approaches for the traditional geocast concept can be distinguished between the net-
work infrastructures for which they are designed for. Accordingly, the following para-
graphs consider schemes for wired, cellular, wireless ad hoc, and mixed networks.
Wired networks Navas and Imieliński [NI97; IN99] suggest a ﬁrst approach that in-
tegrates geographic routing into ﬁxed networks like the Internet and is speciﬁed in
RFC 2009 [IN96]. Here, the authors propose a GPS-based geographic routing scheme
using so-called GeoHosts and GeoRouters that are aware of their geographic locations,
while GeoRouters are also aware of neighboring GeoRouters and attached GeoHosts.
In addition, the authors introduce GeoNodes as an entry/exit point for their routing
scheme. These nodes are used to buﬀer messages that are about to expire and are re-
sponsible for the periodic multicasting of messages to all respective subnetworks or
wireless cells. For geographic multicasting, the RFC speciﬁes a tree-based approach
with a hierarchical geographic addressing scheme based on state, county, and atoms
within a county. While this does not consider temporal constraints, for an STM service,
it may be a viable approach to address st-regions in a tree-based multicast structure.
Cellular networks In cellular network environments, several general challenges have
to be considered when realizing a geocast service [An+00]: the mapping of geographic
destination areas to the coverage area of radio cells, the formation of multicast groups,
and the continuous maintenance of these groups over time.
First of all, the geocast service provider has to be able to map the boundaries of a des-
tination area to radio cells, informing the corresponding base stations about the multi-
cast sessions that have to be established. For this mapping, several possible realizations
can be imagined. On one hand, the geocast service provider may rely on a centralized
geolocation-aware entity that is able to map the destination area to radio cells while in-
forming the relevant base stations. On the other hand, a map of the cellular layout can
be distributed to the base stations, allowing them to perform themapping themselves.
Being able to map the geographic destination area to the relevant base stations, in the
next stage of the delivery process, geocast groups have to be formed containing the
nodes that are within the destination area. Here, three potential methods may be con-
sidered. For example, base stations might broadcast the geocast message within the
relevant radio cells, allowing the mobile devices of users to test whether they are cur-
rently within the geographic destination area via GPS. The second method demands
that base stations maintain a geolocation table containing the current geolocation coordi-
nates of mobile devices that are within their respective radio cells. With this informa-
tion, base stations are able to decide which nodes should receive a geocast message. In
order to notify base stations about location updates, mobile devices may either proac-
tively provide regular location updates, where the update interval provides a trade-oﬀ
between the delivery accuracy and the channel load, or base stations might reactively
send a location update request to all mobile devices within the radio cells when a geo-
cast message is about to be delivered. A potential third approach for multicast group
formation requires that base stations report the node identiﬁers and geographic coordi-
nates of mobile devices that are currently within its radio cells to the mobile switching
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center. The mobile switching center then can then decide which nodes should be in a
multicast group. Here, according to the second scheme, either regular location updates
or a per-session location update request may be employed.
Another challenge for a geocast in cellular networks concerns the maintenance of ac-
curate, up-to-date memberships of the established geocast groups. While there may be
applications where only an initial snapshot of the geographic destination area is of rele-
vance for nodes to join amulticast group and keep this subscription over time to receive
further content, in a traditional geocast this requires that mobile devices entering the
geographic destination area should join the respective multicast group, while devices
leaving the area should cancel their membership. Again, for group membership main-
tenance, mobile devices may either periodically report their geographic coordinates to
the network infrastructure, or continuously compare their current whereabouts with
the known geographic destination area in order to decide whether they are inside or
outside of the respective boundaries.
In the context of membership maintenance, an interesting aspect for an STM service is
the possibility of extending the approach of using a snapshot of the destination area in
order to deliver further content. Accordingly, in order to realize an STM service, users
could rely on a notion of subscribing to certain geographic areas that have been visited
at speciﬁc points in time in the past in order to be able to deliver st-datagrams later on.
Considering UMTS and LTE networks, several concepts for multicast message delivery
have been speciﬁed. The following paragraphs provide an overview of techniques that
have been considered for realizations in current and future cellular networks.
Regarding UMTS or 3G networks, between 2002 and 2005, there have been eﬀorts for
standardization of broadcast andmulticast features, i.e., theMultimedia BroadcastMulti-
cast Service (MBMS) [Har+10]. Here, the initial focus has been on pure software changes,
that is, multicast or broadcast techniques should be supported by specifying multicast
bearers that support the usual subscription-based content delivery of IP multicast, as
well as through the integration of protocols and codecs formultimedia ﬁles and streams
(see 3GPP TS 26.346 [3GP14c]).
The speciﬁcation of the upcoming LTE or 4G networks extend these initial eﬀorts and
aim to provide support for multicast and broadcast transmissions both in the core and
radio access network by providing a more eﬃcient usage of the available spectrum via
the evolvedMultimedia BroadcastMulticast Service (eMBMS) (see 3GPPTS 36.440 [3GP14a]).
This standard deﬁnes the use of so-called Multicast-Broadcast Single Frequency Network
(MBSFN) areas containing eNBs transmitting the same content synchronously within
this multicast or broadcast area. The MBSFN areas may be overlapping, whereas eNBs
can belong to several diﬀerent MBSFN areas (3GPP TS 36.300 [3GP14b]). In contrast
to the usual approach of improving the spectral eﬃciency by using diﬀerent frequen-
cies in neighboring radio cells, the idea behind these MBSFN areas is to enable eNBs
to broadcast a signal on the same frequency in multiple cells. A challenge here is the
tight synchronization between base stations that is necessary to provide UEs with the
illusion of receiving the same signal with multi-path propagation.
While there has not been any commercial deployment of the speciﬁed multicast tech-
niques for UMTS due to issues regarding the bit-rate performance as well as the inter-
ference caused by the broadcast channels and the degradation of the throughput on the
regular radio channels [Wet09], with the introduction of the enhancements of LTE the
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eﬀorts of deploying this technology have increased. For example, during the Interna-
tional Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in January, 2013, the cellular operator Verizon
announced its intentions to realize this approach in the next few years in collaboration
with Ericsson and Qualcomm [Lew13].
In the currently speciﬁed standards and reports, UMTS and LTE do not provide di-
rect mechanisms for a geocast. However, an example of incorporating a geocast in the
cellular network architecture that is speciﬁed in the UMTS standards has been sug-
gested by Wetterwald [Wet09]. In his work, the author suggests to extend the cellular
network infrastructure, namely the so-called Broadcast-Multicast Service Center (BM-SC),
which is usually responsible for scheduling and labeling multicast sessions with iden-
tiﬁers, with geographic capabilities and awareness of the network topology, allowing it
to map geographic areas to corresponding base stations. When receiving a new ﬂow of
information with geographic coordinates, the BM-SC conducts the necessary steps to
trigger the participation of base stations in the multicast distribution tree. Finally, base
stations broadcast the information within the respective radio cells, allowing UEs that
are equipped with GPS to decide whether they are currently within the addressed area
and should therefore deliver the message to the relevant upper layers on the device.
Apart from academic eﬀorts aiming to extend existing cellular network infrastructures
with geocast mechanisms, recently, there have also been eﬀorts in the industrial envi-
ronment aiming to extend LTE networks with support for geographic networking tech-
niques in order to support geocast in the context of car-to-car communication. Anmore
detailed overview of these mixed approaches between LTE networks and the so-called
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) is provided at the end of this section.
Wireless ad hoc networks When considering wireless ad hoc networks, the most sim-
ple geocast approach is to employ ﬂooding [KV99; Mai04]. In simple ﬂooding, when
a node receives a message, it checks whether it has already received this message. A
message is rebroadcast if and only if a node has not yet received this message. Further-
more, nodes compares their own coordinates with the geographic destination area and
deliver the message only to upper layers if it is within the destination area.
Apart from this simple ﬂooding scheme, a wide variety of ﬂooding and tree-based geo-
cast approaches have been considered in the literature [Mai04; AB12]. Since many of
these schemes are often based on similar techniques, the following paragraphs present
a short overview of these schemes, while a summary of potentially useful mechanisms
is provided at the end of this section.
Ko and Vaidya distinguish between tree-based and ﬂooding-based schemes for loca-
tion-based multicast [KV99; KV02]. For tree-based approaches, which are traditionally
employed in ﬁxed networks, the respectivemulticast tree has to be updatedwhen nodes
enter or leave certain areas. In contrast, for ﬂooding-based approaches, these frequent
updates of group memberships are not necessary. Therefore, the authors conclude that
ﬂooding-based schemes aremore appropriate for highlymobilewireless environments.
In order to reduce the high network load induced by the simple ﬂooding scheme, the
authors suggest to specify a so-called forwarding zone – sometimes also referred to as
Zone of Forwarding (ZOF) – in addition to the geographic destination area. Here, nodes
only rebroadcast messages if they are within the forwarding zone between the sender
and the speciﬁed destination area which is also known as the Zone of Relevance (ZOR).
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The authors suggest two approaches for deﬁning a forwarding zone: using the smallest
rectangular bounding box between the location of the sender and the destination area
(possibly increased by aparameter δ to increase the probability of delivery) and employ-
ing the euclidean distance between the location of a forwarding node and the center of
the destination area. In the second technique, a node only belongs to the forwarding
zone if its distance (possibly decreased by a parameter δ to increase the probability of
delivery) is not larger than the distance stored in the message. When forwarding mes-
sages in this scheme, the node replaces the distance in a message with its distance to
the center of the destination area.
Liao et al. [Lia+00] propose a geocast approach employing the GRID scheme [LST01]
for unicast routing. Here, the geographic area of the MANET is partitioned into a grid,
whereas each node is able to obtain its assigned cell in the grid from its position. In each
cell of the grid, one host is chosen as a cluster head for communication with the heads
of neighboring cells. This cluster head is also referred to as gateway and is chosen as the
node that is nearest to the center of the respective cell. The authors suggest a ﬂooding-
based approach, referred to as GeoGRID, which makes use of a rectangular forwarding
zone according to [KV99]. Furthermore, they suggest a ticket-based scheme which also
relies on a rectangular forwarding zone, while allowing a sender to specify a certain
number of k tickets, where each ticket is supposed to carry one copy of the message. If a
gateway is located inside the destination area, themessage is rebroadcasted. Otherwise,
gateways forward themessage to atmost three neighborswhile distributing the k tickets
evenly among those neighbors.
Another scheme that is based on cluster heads is proposed by Chang, Chang, and Tu
[CCT03]. They suggest the Obstacle-Free Multi-Destination Geocasting Protocol (OFMGP)
which is a short message service for MANETs that are partitioned into hexagonal cel-
lular regions, where the node located closest to the center of the cell is chosen as cluster
head that is responsible for relaying messages between the cells.
Apart from GRID-based schemes, a geocast scheme called GeoTORA is introduced by
Ko and Vaidya [KV00; KV03]. The authors of this approach suggest a combination of
ﬂooding and the unicast routing scheme TORA [PC97], which is based on a directed
acyclic graph that is maintained for each destination.
In addition to approaches that rely on GRID and TORA, several ﬂooding-based geocast
schemes employing mesh-based routing mechanisms like [GM99; LGC99] have been
proposed. Here, a mesh provides redundant paths between the source and the group
members in the destination area. The paths of the mesh usually are discovered by di-
rected ﬂooding, whereas the actual messages are then sent along the discovered paths.
Initially, mesh-based geocast has been proposed by Boleng, Camp, and Tolety [BCT01].
Another scheme, referred to asGeocast AdaptiveMesh Environment for Routing (GAMER),
has been suggested by Camp and Liu [CL03]. This approach, which builds upon on the
initial mesh-based scheme described in [BCT01], dynamically adapts the density of the
mesh to the current network environment. An additional mesh-based approach rely-
ing on cluster heads, the so-called Direction Guided Routing (DGR) approach, has been
suggested by An and Papavassiliou [AP03].
For VANETs, Bachir and Benslimane [BB03] propose Inter-Vehicle Geocast (IVG) which
deﬁnes a dynamic forwarding zone that additionally takes the direction and speed of
vehicles into account. In order to mitigate the problem of the so-called spatial broadcast
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storm in which several vehicles are chosen to rebroadcast messages at almost the same
time, resulting in collisions and channel contention, Ibrahim, Weigle, and Abuelela
[IWA09] suggest a version of IVG that incorporates probabilistic backoﬀs.
In order to avoid the issue of no direct neighbors of a sender residing in the forwarding
zone, Stojmenovic, Ruhil, and Lobiyal [SRL06] propose a greedy Voronoi-based geocast
approach. Here, a node ﬁrst computes the Voronoi diagram of its neighbors, that is,
given k neighbors, the network is divided into k Voronoi partitions. Then, all neighbors
whose partitions intersect with the geographic destination area are considered as a part
of the forwarding zone.
A disadvantage of the approaches outlined above is their inability to handle highly
mobile environments with varying node densities. Therefore, Maihöfer, Eberhardt, and
Schoch [MES04] propose the so-called cached geocast scheme. In their work, the authors
show that by equipping nodes with a local cache that is used to store currently un-
forwardable message during the greedy forwarding phase along the line towards the
destination, the delivery success ratio can be increased signiﬁcantly. However, as high-
lighted by the authors, in this approach, an increasing delivery success ratio also results
in an increasing delivery delay.
Joshi, Sichitiu, and Kihl [JSK07] propose Distributed Robust Geocast (DRG) which em-
ploys distance-based backoﬀs in order to prefer more distant forwarding nodes.
Kihl et al. [Kih+07] suggest Robust Vehicular Routing (ROVER)which incorporates a re-
active route discovery mechanism that builds a multicast tree within the forwarding
zone towards the destination area. According to the mesh-based schemes, in this ap-
proach, only control packets are ﬂooded in the network.
When using ﬂooding-based schemes that are restricted to forwarding zones, message
delivery can become challenging in sparse or irregular network conﬁgurations that
contain obstacles. Therefore, Seada and Helmy [SH06] propose Geographic-Forwarding-
Geocast (GFG) and Geographic-Forwarding-Perimeter-Geocast (GFPG) for reliable message
delivery. Their approaches are based on a variations of greedy routing towards the
nodes that are closest to the destination area and, in case the greedy routing fails, fall
back to perimeter routing schemes like [KK00]. Further examples for reliable geocast
schemes rely on reliability maps specifying reliable routing areas that are estimated
with a function counting the number of nodes in each cell of the reliability map [GR11]
or employ forwarding zones and heuristics for local forwarding decisions in order to
support more complex environments with no direct line of sight between the sender
and the destination area [Hal11; Pan+11].
Another approach for a reliable geocast is suggested by Slot, Bouroche, and Cahill
[SBC10]. They propose a membership service that speciﬁes which nodes could have
been at the destination area at a given time in order to be able to guarantee that no other
nodes might have been at this area. Accordingly, they use the knowledge of member-
ship to ensure that all respective nodes have received the geocast message. However, in
order to obtain and maintain the membership information, the authors, on one hand,
suggest a radar-based approach that requires special hardware and, on the other hand,
propose a physical access control mechanism where nodes have to register to a central
membership authority before entering a speciﬁc service area.
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Finally, apart from schemes outlined above, a wide variety of alternative geographic or
position-based routing schemes might be used to reach the destination area [Bou+11],
distributing themessage in the destination area with controlled ﬂooding. Among those
schemes, there are a variety of approaches focusing on privacy-aware routing.
For example, in order to protect the location privacy of users, in theAnonymous Location-
Aided Routing in MANETs (ALARM) approach, nodes periodically ﬂood so-called Loca-
tion Announcement Messages (LAMs) through the network [ET11a]. These LAMs contain
the location of a node, a timestamp of the current time slot, as well as the temporary
public key of the node for this time slot that is used to provide conﬁdentiality in the
communication among nodes. Nodes sign their own LAMs using a group signature
scheme [CV91] in order to prevent their identities from being linked to several loca-
tions over diﬀerent time slots. However, as noted by the authors, this approach is not
expected to provide very strong guarantees for location privacy as it requires at cer-
tain level of mobility among nodes in order to make nodes indistinguishable from at
least k − 1 other nodes according to the k-anonymity paradigm [Swe02]. In addition to
ALARM, El Defrawy and Tsudik [ET08; ET11b] suggest the Privacy-friendly Routing in
Suspicious MANETs (PRISM) scheme that relies on a reactive routing scheme that does
not require the periodic ﬂooding of the network. Nevertheless, while this may prevent
attackers from easily obtaining the full topology of the network, conceptually, this ap-
proach relies on the same weak mechanism for privacy protection.
Another example of a privacy-aware routing scheme is proposed by Scheuer, Brecht,
and Federrath [SBF10]. Their approach employs two diﬀerent kinds of entities to pre-
vent the tracking of user locations: a central location service (CLS) entity and several local
location service (LLS) entities. The main idea of their approach is that nodes use pseu-
donyms when providing their locations to the LLS entities, whereas the CLS entity is
only aware of themapping of identities to pseudonyms but does not obtain information
about the whereabouts of users. In order to hide the addressing identiﬁers of users, the
authors suggest the use of mix networks [Cha81].
In summary, regarding geocast schemes in wireless ad hoc networks, the vast majority
of approaches for message delivery are based on geographic or position-based routing
schemes where nodes forwardmessages towards the destination areas, as well as a lim-
ited geographic broadcast within the ZOR.While existing mechanisms do not consider
temporal constraints, there are some aspects that may be of relevance for the design
of an STM service. For example, the concept of a membership-based delivery [SBC10]
highlights the possibility of proactively forming multicast groups of users that are cur-
rently residing within the same st-regions. Furthermore, according to [SBF10], the sep-
aration of the knowledge of the identities of users (e.g., in order to implement access
control) and the knowledge of the whereabouts of users, which is necessary to deliver
st-datagrams, seems like a promising mechanism to protect the privacy of receivers.
Mixednetworks In the context of standardization of VANETs, the termGeoNetworking
has been introduced to specify geocast services for vehicular networks. Here, geocast
services, that is,GeoUnicast andGeoBroadcast, are speciﬁed as part of the ETSI TS 102 636
GeoNetworking series for Geocasting andGeoMessaging in VANETs. These techniques
rely on the ITS-G5 standard (ETSI ES 202 663) which is based on IEEE 802.11p. Apart
from this pure wireless ad hoc approach, there have been eﬀorts to incorporate cellular
networks to implement geocast services for car-to-car communication [Ara+13].
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For example, in the context of the CoCarX project (ETSI TR 102 962), the following sys-
tem architecture has been suggested for LTE networks. Here, a so-called GeoMessaging
Enabler, which is a GeoMessaging back-end server that is responsible for the distribu-
tion of certain messages like Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) and Decentralized
Environmental Notiﬁcation Message (DENMs), maintains a list of the geographic service
areas and their coordinates, as well as a list of the identities of vehicles that are in-
side any geographic area at all times. This geographic service area is covered by several
smaller areas in a grid structure,where the size of the cells in the grid depends on the in-
tended application. In order to allow the GeoMessaging Enabler to distribute message
to the vehicles in a geographic destination area, vehicles have to register themselves
when entering new area in order to allow the back end server to know the vehicles and
their IP addresses that are currently present in an area. These location updates can be
delivered to the GeoMessaging Enabler via so-called roadside units or eNBs.
A similar approach that also relies on a corresponding back-end infrastructure has been
suggested by Le et al. [Le+11]. Here, a so-called GeoServer is used to obtain awareness
of the geographic service area and the current whereabouts of vehicles. In their work,
the authors suggest to either place the GeoServer in a PDN network like the Internet,
or directly incorporate it within the cellular core network.
Both approaches, that is, wireless ad hoc communication using the ITS-G5 standard or
a realization that is based on a cellular network infrastructure, yield individual advan-
tages and disadvantages [Fes12]. For example, on one hand, mechanisms that are based
on ITS-G5 are distributed and do not require a central entity for coordination. Further-
more, they do not have to rely on a infrastructure or a cellular operator (although these
infrastructure are still useful in this case). On the other hand, relying on the cellular
network approach requires a centralized back-end server that is aware of the locations
of all vehicles. While this allows to easily and reliably distribute messages to vehicles
and, if necessary, keep geocast messages alive over a certain time, it induces a higher
delivery delay that is inappropriate for time-critical applications like collision avoid-
ance warnings. Based on the requirement of spatial message delivery with low latency
and high reliability, there have been eﬀorts to standardize a hybrid infrastructure that
incorporates the advantages of each approach in diﬀerent situations.
In summary, regarding upcoming geocast services in real-world applications, it seems
beneﬁcial to rely on mixed network infrastructures. Accordingly, when designing STM
services, the advantages and disadvantages of potentially hybrid approaches should be
investigated considering possible privacy, security, and performance implications.
3.3.2.2 Persistent Geocasting
Apart from geocast schemes that aim to deliver a one-time message to a certain geo-
graphic destination area, there are applications that require a time-stable or continuous
delivery of messages to all nodes that are currently within the destination area or will
enter it at some point in time in the future. This section provides a short overview of
such persistent geocast schemes, highlighting potential mechanisms that may be em-
ployed to realize an STM service.
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Time-stable geocast Maihöfer, Leinmüller, and Schoch [MLS05] initially address the
issue of realizing a time-stable geocast, which they refer to as abiding geocast. In their
work, they propose three diﬀerent schemes. For their ﬁrst approach, they suggest the
use of a centralized service infrastructure that relies on a server in order to provide
the necessary persistence of messages and to deliver geocast datagrams. In the second
scheme, one elected node within the destination region stores the messages, handing it
over to another node when leaving the area. Finally, they propose a mechanism where
each node stores all geocast messages that are destined for its location and maintain a
table of neighbors in their vicinity. When detecting a new neighbor (given that nodes
exchange heartbeat messages), a node delivers its messages to this neighbor.
Here, one particular aspect may be of relevance for the design of an STM service. While
nodes are not able to store “future” st-datagrams, they might proactively exchange
some piece of information that may be used to deliver st-datagrams later on.
Heep and Baumgart [HB12] propose a P2P-based, time-stable geocast scheme for smart
traﬃc applications. Their suggested approach is based on the unstructured network
overlay Gia [Cha+03], where each overlay participant maintains a neighborhood ta-
ble of concentric circles of increasing sizes. When choosing neighbors in the overlay,
the proposed scheme additionally considers the direction of travel and the areas of in-
terest of participants. Messages are recursively forwarded to nodes that are closer to
the geographic destination area and are either ﬂooded there or distributed by identi-
fying destination nodes using a lookup procedure similar to iterative lookups in struc-
tured peer-to-peer overlays. A similar approach for peer-to-peer, overlay-based geocast
service in the context of smart traﬃc applications is proposed in [Hee+13]. Here, the
GeoKad [PAZ10] overlay network is incorporated for message persistence and routing.
According to the previous scheme, concentric rings around the respective peers are
used to maintain neighborhood tables to enable the delivery of geocast messages via
geographic unicast or ﬂooding.
Several additional terms beyond the “time-stable” or “abiding geocast” have been intro-
duced in the literature in order to describe the challenge of reliably storing and keeping
a message alive “within” a certain geographic area. Examples for such terms include
ﬂoating content [Ott+11; Hyy+11], hovering information [CSK08; CS08; CS09], cooperative
caching [Zhu+11; KTK12], as well as geocaching [Zan+10]. Generally, these approaches
rely on mechanisms that are similar to the ones described above, focusing on speciﬁc
routing algorithms that aim to provide persistent storage schemes for themessages that
should be kept alive inside the target areas.
Considering the outlined time-stable geocast schemes, when realizing an STM service
with a P2P-based overlay structure, in addition to the spatial dimensions, a temporal
dimension has to be incorporated.Accordingly, for the realization of an STMservice, the
mobile devices of users might keep track of the movements of other devices in order
to provide a privacy-aware, distributed storage structure that allows to discover the
receivers of an st-datagram without revealing the identity, locations, co-locations, or
absence of users from certain regions to the sender or other potential adversaries.
Continuous geocast Atéchian and Brunie [AB08] propose the Direction-based Geocast
Routing Protocol (DG-CastoR) scheme which focuses on infotainment applications in
VANETs. Here, a source node wishes to communicate with nodes traveling into the
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same direction in order to share or exchange certain ﬁles. Their approach relies on so-
called rendezvous regions or rendezvous groupswhich are established by predicting the fu-
ture locations of nodes using a spatiotemporal similarity measure evaluating the simi-
larity of the trajectories of nodes. In order to be able to establish the rendezvous regions,
nodes maintain tables containing the trajectories of their neighbors.
Shiraishi, Takahashi, and Miki [STM10] introduce a persistent geocast scheme which
starts delivering content, e.g., a multimedia stream, to nodes that enter a certain ge-
ographic destination area and continues delivering this content even if the respective
nodes leave the addressed area. In their suggested approach, ﬁrst, a sender uses a geo-
cast scheme to advertise a multicast session. When a node receives such an advertise-
ment, it sends its own ID and location information to the sender to join the multicast
group, and continues to periodically announce this information in order to refresh its
membership in themulticast group. Accordingly, senders collect andmanage the infor-
mation about both identiﬁers and locations of the members of their multicast groups.
Based on this information, a sender is able to construct a multicast tree and to transmit
data packets to the members of the group.
Motivated by the outlined continuous geocast schemes, two aspects can be identiﬁed for
the possible realization of an STM service. On one hand, senders might rely on known
spatiotemporal correlations to estimate the currentwhereabouts of users that have been
residing at the st-region of interest. On the other hand, it may be possible for potential
receivers to proactively subscribe to multicast groups or rendezvous points addressing
speciﬁc st-regions in order to be able to receive st-datagrams for the visited regions.
3.3.2.3 Just-In-TimeMulticast
Apart from the geocast schemes described above, Huang, Lu, and Roman [HLR03a;
HLR03b; HLR04b; HLR04a; Hua+05] introduce the notion of a spatiotemporal geocast,
referred to as Just-in-Time Multicast (mobicast), that considers the future locations of re-
ceivers in the message delivery process. As depicted in Figure 3.4b, the general task of
a mobicast is to deliver geocast messages just-in-time, i.e., immediately once receivers
enter the geographic destination area. Themotivation for thismessage delivery concept
is to enable the energy-eﬃcient tracking ofmobile physical entities withwireless sensor
networks, waking up sensor nodes just shortly before the respective entities enter the
area that is monitored by a sensor node. In order to enable a timely delivery at a speciﬁc
point in time in the future, the delivery of messages to diﬀerent geographic zones that
are likely to be located in the path of the indented receivers is proposed.
Several approaches relying on diﬀerent shapes of forwarding zones have been sug-
gested in order to reduce the communication overhead that is required to notify the
smallest set of sensor nodes that is suited best for tracking the respective entities. For ex-
ample, Chen, Ann, and Lin [CAL08] propose aVariant-Egg-basedMobicast (VE-Mobicast)
which relies on a so-called egg-shaped forwarding zone to better support various speeds
and movement directions of the physical entities that should be tracked by the sensor
network. Chen et al. [Che+09] extend this approach with the cluster-basedHierarchical-
Variant-Egg-based Mobicast (HVE-Mobicast) scheme.
Several additional approaches aiming to improve the energy-eﬃciency of sensor net-
works by accurately predicting the locations of the tracked objects have been proposed:
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Maneuvering Target Tracking Mobicast (MTT-Mobicast) [Wan+08], Simulated Annealing-
basedMobicast (SA-Mobicast) [GHS08],Neighbor-based Routing Protocol (NRP), and Spatial
Neighbour-based Routing Protocol (SNRP) [Ghe+08]. He et al. [He+05] propose SPEED, a
spatiotemporal communication protocol that aims to provide real-time delivery and
Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees, as well as non-greedy routing strategies in order
to support void areas in the sensor network. In summary, when considering the re-
alization of an STM service, the possibility of predicting the current whereabouts of
receivers from their past locations could present a promising approach to deﬁne geo-
graphic destination areas for a traditional geocast.
3.3.3 Location-Based Services
Another related ﬁeld of research sharing the challenge of tracking or predicting the lo-
cations of users while still preserving their privacy is the research area of LBS’s. LBS ap-
plications focus on the integration of location information of amobile device in context-
aware computing in order to provide an added value to the user [SV04]. Accordingly,
these applications have to rely on localization schemes like GPS to enable the mobile
devices to obtain their positions.
LBS applications can be distinguished between push-based and pull-based services [SV04].
In push-based services, users receive information as a result of their whereabouts with-
out an explicit request, while in pull-based schemes, users actively request location-
enhanced information from the network. When considering push-based LBS applica-
tions, an important aspect is the resolution of so-called location-dependent or continuous
queries that aim to trigger certain actions based on the current whereabouts of users
[IMI10]. Accordingly, this way of continuously processing location queries may be of
interest for STM services to keep track and to discover receivers of an st-datagram.
3.3.3.1 Location-Dependent Query Processing
When considering the applicability of location-dependent query processing for the re-
alization of STM services, the underlying storage structures may be of interest in or-
der to retrieve the recipients of an st-datagram. These storage structures can be distin-
guished between centralized and distributed schemes [IMI10]. This sections now pro-
vides a short overview of these approaches.
Regarding centralized storage and indexing structures for location-dependent query
processing, a wide variety of schemes has been proposed [PŠJ06]. Prominent exam-
ples for such spatiotemporal indexing approaches include the RPPF-tree [PŠJ06] and the
TPR-tree [Šal+00]. When applying such structures in an STM service, it becomes neces-
sary that users, at regular intervals, report their locations to a central database system.
However, reporting these locations to a central entity might not be desirable consid-
ering the risk of disclosing the stored information and the high potential reward for
adversaries that are able to compromise the database. A possible approach to protect
the location privacy of users in this case is to incorporate a trusted anonymization proxy
that obfuscates the given coordinates. An example of such a query processing structure
considering the privacy of users is proposed by Ku, Chen, and Zimmermann [KCZ09].
Their approach aims to solve spatial queries for LBS applications while obfuscating
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the whereabouts of mobile devices using the k-anonymity technique. Accordingly, the
anonymization proxy, referred to as location cloaker, uses the structure of the road net-
work to locate suitable regions that contain at least k diﬀerent devices.
Another example of a centralized spatiotemporal indexing structure that considers the
privacy of users is the OST-tree [TDK11a]. This structure builds upon the TPR-tree
[Šal+00] and uses an obfuscation technique that aims to decrease the quality of the
exact location information that is provided by the mobile devices. In this approach,
a user is faced with a trade-oﬀ between the location accuracy and his or her level of
privacy. Therefore, users can deﬁne, via so-called privacy policies, how much informa-
tion should be revealed to a certain LBS provider. This privacy tuple is then attached
to the TPR-tree at diﬀerent levels of the tree depending on the trust of the user in this
service provider. Accordingly, by choosing higher levels of the tree, the LBS providers
receive less accurate location information. Despite the decrease of quality of the loca-
tion data that is presented to a service provider, the centralized indexing structure still
contains the actual locations of users. Thus, the database system itself has to act as a
trusted anonymization entity that is required for each location update and query. Sev-
eral similar examples for such spatiotemporal indexing structures exist, for instance, the
EOST-tree [GLP13], the Bob-tree [TDK11b], the Semantic Bob-tree [LD12], or the PPST-tree
[PD12]. Note that all of these approaches are based on assumptions demanding trusted
database storage providers.
In terms of distributed and P2P database systems [Bon+08; RSS15], several approaches
for spatiotemporal data have been proposed [MS05; HRM08b; HRM08a; Aly+08; Ai+09;
WL09;MR10; LZ11; PAZ10]. This includes the research ﬁeld of data-centric storagewhich
considers the challenge of storing spatiotemporal data at geographic nodes within the
corresponding regions [Rat+02; DMR06]. Examples for such approaches are Geographic
Hashtables (GHTs) that are introduced by Ratnasamy et al. [Rat+02], as well as the data-
centric storage scheme proposed by Dudkowski, Marron, and Rothermel [DMR06].
Their approach is based on so-called rendezvous regions initially namedby [SH04]. There-
fore, similar to GHTs, the geographic area is divided into regions, whereas each region
is responsible for a speciﬁc set of keys. These keys are thenmapped to the regionswith a
hash-table-likemapping schemewhere a few speciﬁcally elected nodes in the respective
region are responsible for storing the data. By employing anycast between the respec-
tive nodes, they are able to retrieve the stored data. Here, the concept of rendezvous
regions presents a promising approach for realizing STM services.
3.3.3.2 Mobile Social Services
An important aspect of LBS applications is the need to protect the privacy of users from
external adversaries or the service provider itself [Wan+92; GG03]. This is especially the
casewhen consideringmobile social serviceswhere users provide personal information
that should only be made available to a speciﬁc set of users.
Social networks Typical examples for mobile social services are mobile social networks
[CH05; EP05; Pie+09; Li+11] and geosocial networks [Fre+10; Rui+11]. E.g., Freni et al.
[Fre+10] consider both location and absence privacy of users in geosocial networks.
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Therefore, they suggest Minimal Uncertainty Regions (MURs) and Absence Privacy Re-
gions (APRs) that users may specify according to their privacy requirements. While, for
MURs, attackers could infer that a users is residing within the MRU region, they must
not be able to determine at which part of the region a user is located. Furthermore, in
terms of APRs, adversaries must not be able to infer location information such that a
certain location inside the APR region can be excluded as the current location of a user.
In order to realize these regions and to enforce both location and absence privacy, the
authors suggest a combination of the standard techniques of generalizing and delaying
the publishing of location data. Other related research ﬁelds in this area have consid-
ered privacy-aware routing and geocast protocols for mobile and geosocial networks
[Avi+12; ZR12]. These approaches also focus on well-knownmeasures for privacy pro-
tection and path obfuscation such as k-anonymity [Swe02]. Regarding the challenges of
user privacy, the concept of participatory sensing (also referred to as people-centric sensing
[Joh+07], opportunistic sensing [KK09], and urban sensing [KFD10]) is also closely related
to mobile social and geosocial networks [Kro11]. Nevertheless, these approaches also
tend to rely on well-established mechanisms like the generalization or perturbation of
data in order to protect the privacy of users [Chr+11a].
In the context of geosocial networks,while not speciﬁcally addressing privacy concerns,
Bostanipour, Garbinato, and Holzer [BGH12] propose the concept of a so-called spot-
cast (where the term “spotcast” refers to a spotlight). The focus of this communication
technique is on mobile social networking applications or proximity-based mobile ap-
plications that enable amobile device to disseminate amessage in a deﬁned areawithin
its proximity for a speciﬁc duration. For this use case, the authors distinguish between
a timely spotcast where the goal is meet a delivery deadline for a message, an eventual
spotcast where the goal is to ultimately deliver a message to all users that have been
residing long enough in the proximity of the sender, and an exhaustive spotcast where
the goal is that a node can receive a message even if the sender is no longer within the
respective area. Note that, while the paradigm of an exhaustive spotcast is similar to
a spatiotemporal multicast, the authors only consider the case where the both senders
and receivers of a message have actually been residing in the respective destination re-
gion and assume that the delivery of the message can only be achieved if senders and
receivers are able to meet again at some later point in time. Accordingly, the authors
suggest a local message cache that enables senders to ultimately deliver messages by
periodically broadcasting and matching the corresponding destination regions.
Furthermore,while the challenges regardingmobile social networks and the realization
of an STM service generally only overlap in terms of issues concerning the protection of
the privacy of users, Christin et al. [Chr+12] suggest the notion of a privacy bubblewhich
represents a sphere around a certain location in space and time that aims to control the
amount of information that is shared with other users of the social networks that have
been residing in the vicinity of this “bubble”. The authors, however, only focus on the
application of the privacy bubbles in the context of a centralized online social network
that is maintained by a (presumably) trustworthy service provider.
Missed connections Finally, in terms of mobile social services, the notion of missed
connections is probably closest to the concept of a spatiotemporal multicast [MSC09;
Moh+10]. The general concept of missed connections refers to the challenge of enabling
users that have met at some point in time in the past to get in contact with each other
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after a mutual missed encounter. While this may seem similar to the concept of a spa-
tiotemporal multicast, several fundamental diﬀerences exist. On one hand, while ap-
proaches realizing a missed connections service usually intend to protect the privacy
of users (e.g., considering a curious service provider), they do not speciﬁcally address
the challenge of protecting the privacy of recipients with respect to the sender. This is
due to the fact that the underlying assumption here is that both the sender and recip-
ient wish to establish a direct, non-anonymous connection for social interactions. On
the other hand, the intention of missed connections services is to allow users to ﬁnd
the other person of interest. In particular, existing research eﬀorts considering missed
encounters focus on a direct one-to-one connection and do not consider the challenge
of multicast message delivery. Therefore, an STM service can be considered as a gener-
alization of a missed connections service that has to incorporate additional objectives
to support multicast message delivery and to protect the receiver privacy.
At the time of this writing, only few realizations of missed connections services exist.
For instance, Manweiler, Scudellari, and Cox [MSC09] propose a missed connections
service named SMILE that relies on so-called Rendezvous Points (RPs) in order to match
users ofmissed encounters. By periodically exchanging symmetric keyswith co-located
participants of the service usingwireless short-range broadcasts, they are able to check,
via the RPs, whether another user intents to establish a social connection. In order to
protect the privacy of participants from the service provider itself, the authors rely on
the concept of k-anonymity [Swe02]. Accordingly, users only provide the preﬁx of the
hash value of the respective key for the spatiotemporal region of interest to the RPs. By
adjusting the length of this preﬁx, collisions among preﬁxes can be induced tomake the
contact requests indistinguishable from preﬁxes of at least k − 1 other symmetric keys.
While this presents a promising direction for STM service realizations, it should be
noted thatMohaisen et al. [Moh+10] suggest that SMILE is vulnerable to several attacks
aiming to breakmessage conﬁdentiality anduser privacy. They emphasize, for example,
that an attacker might eavesdrop on the exchanged keys and later use this information
to impersonate an arbitrary person when communicating with other users.
In summary, existing approaches considering mobile social and geosocial networks
usually rely on well-established mechanisms for privacy protection (e.g., k-anonymi-
ty [Swe02]). Regarding missed connections services, the concept of relying on a proac-
tive key exchange in order to be able to exchange messages via RPs later on presents a
promising technique for the realization of an STM service.
3.3.4 Content-based Publish/Subscribe
Finally, the Content-Based Publish/Subscribe (CBPS) communication paradigm might be
an appropriate technique for the realization of an STM service since it is well known
for the multicast distribution of content [Ban+99; Rat+01b; Cas+02; Eug+03]. In a CBPS
system, users can register for certain events of interest at a centralized broker or at a dis-
tributed overlay network of brokers. These brokers are responsible for distributing the
content that is received from publishers to the interested subscribers via so-called notiﬁ-
cations. Accordingly, in such a system, brokers realize the actual multicast. While there
have been eﬀorts regarding the conﬁdentiality of the distributed content [RR06], the
awareness for the need to protect the privacy of publishers and subscribers in terms of
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their identities and subscriptions for certain events (which is necessary to realize a pri-
vacy-aware STM service) has just emerged in the recent years [SÖM09; CJ09; Dau+13].
Shikfa, Önen, and Molva [SÖM09] propose a CBPS system that aims to provide conﬁ-
dentiality of subscriptions and notiﬁcations using multi-layer commutative encryption
scheme where notiﬁcations and subscriptions are encrypted several times with diﬀer-
ent keys. Due to the commutative property of the encryption scheme, brokers are able
to perform transformations on the encrypted data. Thus, when forwarding encrypted
data, brokers can remove and add one layer of the encryption in any order for a cer-
tain key which enables brokers to match and forward notiﬁcations and subscriptions
without being able to decrypt the actual payload as long as less than a certain ratio of
malicious brokers collude. However, regarding the realization of an STM service, since
brokers can only match exact keys, this scheme does not support the eﬃcient distribu-
tion of st-datagrams for a range of several st-regions.
Chen, Jiang, and Skocik [CJS10] present a CBPS approach named PRIEST in order to
support the private subscription of events in case of untrusted brokers. Here, the au-
thors suggest to employ a cryptographic hash function and a key that is shared between
the publishers and subscribers in order to obtain a keyword that can be matched by the
brokers without revealing the respective keyword. This presents a technique that might
be appropriate for the realization of an STM service. Nevertheless, the PRIEST scheme
does not support eﬃcient subscriptions of a range of keywordwhich is a desirable prop-
erty for an STM scheme.
In order to protect the conﬁdentiality of subscriptions and notiﬁcations, several CBPS
approaches are proposed based on homomorphic encryption. For instance, Nabeel,
Shang, and Bertino [NSB12] as well as Nabeel et al. [Nab+13] suggest CBPS schemes
using the additive homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99]. The basic idea of these
approaches is to rely on the aforementioned homomorphic cryptosystem to enable bro-
kers to compare and match subscriptions and published events without obtaining the
respective attribute values. Again, the proposed schemes do not consider the challenge
of realizing eﬃcient subscriptions to a range of keywords.
Other schemes like [TP10] and [RCT12] rely on the concept of k-anonymity and a trusted
anonymizer in order to protect the identities of subscribers by making them indistin-
guishable from k − 1 other subscribers. According to the previous schemes, these tech-
niques do not consider eﬃcient subscriptions over a range of keywords.
As outlined above, while the previous approaches may provide useful cryptographic
and obfuscation-based techniques for the realization of an STM service, they do not
address the challenge of subscriptions over a range of keywords. In order to support
a range of subscriptions Choi, Ghinita, and Bertino [CGB10] propose the use of Asym-
metric Scalar Product-preserving Encryption (ASPE) [Won+09] which is based on geomet-
ric transformations. Since ASPE focuses on answering queries to retrieve the k-nearest
neighbors, the authors adopt the original APSE approach to incorporate range match-
ing.While the authors highlight the potential use of OPE in this context, they argue that
such an approach requires knowledge of the distribution of the plaintexts. However,
although the authors mention one of the initial works on OPE [Agr+04], they do not
consider later security analyses like [Bol+09]. Accordingly, in order to realize an STM
service, cryptographic techniques like APSE or OPE might present viable mechanisms
that enable eﬃcient subscriptions over a range of st-regions.
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Apart from the outlined cryptographic methods, there exists a wide variety of ap-
proaches for secure two- or multi-party computation (e.g., [Yao82; GMW87]) allowing to
leverage, for instance, zero-knowledge proofs [GMR85] for privacy protection.
In summary, the concept of CBPS could be employed in an STM service. Furthermore,
apart from traditional cryptographic techniques like cryptographic hash functions, an
STM service might rely on various cryptographic methods such as homomorphic or
property-preserving encryption schemes to protect the privacy of users.
3.3.5 Conclusion
Themajor challenges to be consideredwhendesigning an STMservice can be addressed
by leveraging the following techniques from existing literature:
• Multicast communication: In order to distribute st-datagrams to the intended le-
gitimate users, traditional broadcast or multicast mechanisms may be employed.
Such multicast techniques could rely on tree- or graph-based structures to form
multicast groups of users that have visited the same st-regions.
• Discovery of recipients: The recipients of an st-datagram could be discovered,
on one hand, by tracking the locations of users. For instance, a centralized en-
tity could record these locations and decide whether users have been residing
within the addressed st-region. On the other hand, recipients could be discov-
ered by letting devices track their own movements and depositing st-datagrams
at rendezvous points which are responsible for speciﬁc st-regions. Given these
rendezvous points, messages can be delivered by either letting users poll the rele-
vant rendezvous points at regular intervals or by relying on a CBPS schemewhere
messages are delivered to devices that have subscriptions for the addressed st-re-
gions. Finally, it may be possible to determine recipients by estimating their cur-
rent whereabouts from their most likely movement patterns.
• Privacyprotection: In order to protect the privacy of receivers, it is possible to rely
on obfuscation techniques like anonymization proxies or privacy-aware indexing
structures. These approaches can, for instance, leverage the concept of k-anonym-
ity to preserve the location privacy of users. Apart from obfuscation mechanisms,
approaches for data perturbation and cryptographic techniques like homomor-
phic or property-preserving encryption, as well as secure multi-party computa-
tion could be employed to preserve user privacy. Finally, as a general guideline, it
seems reasonable to always separate knowledge about the identities of users from
their location information.
Given these techniques, the next section outlines the design space of STM services.
3.4 Design Space
Based on the survey of the state of the art, this section now introduces and discusses
possible realization options of an STM service. Note that, within this thesis, the given
approaches are only evaluated in the context of a cellular network infrastructure.
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3.4.1 Naïve Broadcast
A straightforward approach to realize an STM service is to rely on a naïve broadcast of
st-datagrams. Here, UEs continuously track their locations via GPS and store the coor-
dinates alongwith a timestamp locally on the device. In order to deliver an st-datagram,
a sender simply broadcasts his or her message containing a description of the destina-
tion st-regions to all registered participants of the STM service (see Figure 3.5). Upon
receiving an st-datagram, each UE performs an intersection test between the recorded
coordinates and the addressed st-regions. If its movement path intersects with the ad-
dressed st-region, the device displays the content of the message to the user, or, in case
of no intersection, discards it without further notice.
DispatcherSender
UE
Message for st-region
UE UE
Figure 3.5 Schematic of publish/subscribe-based naïve broadcast scheme.
In wide-area networks like the Internet, a naïve broadcast requires that users report
their current network addresses to amessage dispatcher, i.e., an entity that is responsible
for distributing st-datagrams to all registered users of the service. Instead of employing
a publish/subscribe-based approach as outlined above, it is also possible to rely on a
polling-based schemewhere users periodically requestmessages from the dispatcher.
Considering the suggested functional, non-functional, as well as privacy and security
objectives, the naïve broadcast scheme is expected to provide the following behavior.
• Long-term support: This functional objective can be realized depending on the
amount of location samples that are recorded by UEs, providing a trade-oﬀ be-
tween the necessary storage on each device and the supported time span.
• Reliable delivery: With st-datagram being sent to all registered users, the delivery
ofmessages can be implemented in a reliablemanner, e.g., by employing acknowl-
edgments that indicate the successful reception. If no acknowledgment is received
within a certain time frame, the dispatcher retransmits the message.
• Accurate delivery: In the naïve broadcast, all users of the STM service receive all
st-datagrams that are dispatched. Accordingly, in terms of the delivery accuracy,
a high number of false positives is to be expected among the received datagrams.
• Precise region addressing: Senders may address regions with an arbitrary preci-
sion. However, the actual precision depends on the precision of the location sam-
ples collected by UEs, that is, the GPS precision as well as the frequency at which
locations are measured.
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• Range destinations: The naïve broadcast scheme supports range destinations ad-
dressing st-regions over a large geographic area and time interval by adjusting the
destination information that is speciﬁed in an st-datagram.
• Delivery speed: Broadcasting is expected to provide the fastest technically feasible
delivery due to the direct distribution of st-datagrams to all users.
• Eﬃciency: The eﬃciency of this broadcast scheme depends on the expected num-
ber of st-datagrams that are to be delivered over time. For low message arrival
rates, forwarding st-datagrams to all users can be an eﬃcient solution. However,
with an increasing number of st-datagrams that have to be distributed, the eﬃ-
ciency of the broadcast approach is expected to degrade rapidly.
• Scalability: A naïve broadcast demands that st-datagrams are delivered to all
users of the service. Hence, with an increasing number of users, the number of
messages to be dispatched to users is expected to also show a linear increase. Fur-
thermore, the broadcast scheme is not expected to scale well with respect to an
increasing number of st-datagrams – assuming that each datagram is dispatched
individually. If, however, messages are sent in batches at the cost of an increased
delivery delay, scalability with the number of st-datagrams could be acceptable.
Note that even with an increasing size of the addressed st-regions, the eﬃciency
of the naïve broadcast should not be aﬀected. Finally, regarding scalabilitywith an
increasing payload size, the eﬃciency of a naïve broadcast is expected to degrade
quickly since all payloads are replicated for each user of the service.
• Elasticity of infrastructure: While the broadcast scheme requires an entity that is
responsible for dispatching st-datagrams to all registered users, the hardware and
network bandwidth of the dispatcher may have to be adapted.
• Robustness: While ﬂooding amessage in awireless network can be considered as
a robust scheme for message delivery, in wired networks such as the Internet, the
need for a dispatcher introduces a single point of failure. Accordingly, in order to
provide robustness against the failure of this entity, the naïve broadcast scheme
has to rely on redundant dispatchers.
• Privacy of receivers: With all users receiving all st-datagrams, the naïve broadcast
approach is able to protect the privacy of receivers, providing anonymity (assum-
ing a suﬃcient number of participants in the service), location privacy, co-location
privacy, as well as absence privacy.
• Message confidentiality: While the naïve broadcast scheme can preserve the pri-
vacy of receivers, it does not protect the conﬁdentiality of st-datagrams. Accord-
ingly, for adversaries, it is easily possible to detect the presence of an st-datagram,
read the contained information, and obtain knowledge of the addressed region.
• Message authentication and integrity: Apublic key infrastructure allows senders
to sign their dispatched st-datagrams, enabling recipients to verify the authentic-
ity and integrity of the obtained messages.
• Controlled access: Due to the need for a dispatcher that delivers messages to all
users, it is possible to control the access to the service by deciding whether or not
to forward messages from a speciﬁc sender. However, as attackers might send st-
datagrams directly to users, it is necessary that the dispatcher signs the forwarded
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st-datagrams in order to enable UEs to decidewhether or not to display a received
message to their users.
• Spam prevention: Similar to the realization of access control, the message dis-
patcher may limit the rate at which st-datagrams can be sent.
• Accountability of senders: In order ensure non-reputation, the broadcast scheme
might rely on standardmechanisms like aTrusted Third Party (TTP) [KMZ02]when
a sender issues an st-datagram to the dispatcher.
3.4.2 Database Management Systems
Apart from a dispatcher distributing messages to all registered users, a dispatcher may
rely on aDatabaseManagement System (DBMS) to retrieve the subset of users that should
actually receive an st-datagram. This requires that UEs report their locations to the
database system periodically. When delivering an st-datagram, the dispatcher queries
the database system for movement paths intersecting with the destination region ad-
dressed in the message. Then, the dispatcher sends the datagram to all UEs matching
the destination shape (see Figure 3.6).
DispatcherSender
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Message for
st-region
UE UE
Query for
receivers
Protected
DBMS
Location updates
Anonymizer
Figure 3.6 Schematic of DBMS-based approaches.
Note that the use of a DBMS demands that either the database provider can be consid-
ered trustworthy or that the STM service incorporates an anonymizer. Such an anonym-
izer is a trustworthy entity that protects the anonymity and location-related privacy of
users, for example, by obfuscating or encrypting the location information that is stored
in a database system. This database can be protected, for instance, by controlling access
to the database system with organizational data protection policies as well as technical
mechanisms such as the Trusted Platform Module [cf. ISO09].
• Long-term support: In general, the DBMS-based is able to support an arbitrary
time span as long as suﬃcient resources are available to the database system to
store the movement paths of users.
• Reliable delivery: According to the broadcast approach, reliable delivery may be
achieved if the dispatcher employs a correspondingprotocol like the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) (see RFC 793 [Pos81b]). This also requires that UEs use
such a protocol when sending location updates to the DBMS.
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• Accurate delivery: Assuming that UEs are able to report correct location updates
in a timely manner, the DBMS-based approach should achieve an near-optimal
delivery accuracy where only users that have been residing in the respective des-
tination st-regions receive the st-datagram. The accuracymight, however, degrade
if the time interval at which UEs report their locations is reduced.
• Precise region addressing: Again, senders can address st-regions up to an arbi-
trary precision. Nevertheless, the actual precision still depends on the accuracy of
the location information that is provided by UEs.
• Range destinations: With database systems supporting range queries over spa-
tiotemporal data, a sender may address a range of st-regions.
• Delivery speed: According to the simple broadcast scheme, the DBMS-based ap-
proach is also expected to provide a low delivery delay that is primarily deﬁned
by the time that is necessary to query the database for the set of receivers and the
transmission delay between the dispatcher and the UEs.
• Eﬃciency: Due to the ability of the dispatcher to retrieve the receivers of an st-
datagram by querying the DBMS, the actual delivery of messages can be consid-
ered an eﬃcient approach as it only involves the aﬀected users. This, however,
requires that UEs provide periodic location updates to the database. Accordingly,
the interval at which devices provide location updates provides a trade-oﬀ be-
tween network load and the accuracy of the stored locations.
• Scalability: With an increasing number of users, the load of the location updates
is expected to increase as well. Hence, the scalability properties of a DBMS-based
approach regarding the number of participants depends, on one hand, on the abil-
ity of the database system to scalewith the increasing load and, on the other hand,
the trusted anonymizer that processes the incoming location updates. In terms of
the scalability with an increasing number of st-datagrams, the dispatcher has to
issue an increasing number of queries to the DBMS and distribute themessages to
the aﬀected users. Accordingly, potential bottlenecks here are the database man-
agement system as well as the trusted anonymizer that are involved in both the
update of locations and the retrieval of the receivers of an st-datagram. Regarding
an increasing size of the destination st-region of a datagram, the DBMS approach
is expected to scale well as an increasing size translates to the resolution of a range
queries with increasing geometric shapes, which is a challenge that current spa-
tiotemporal indexing structures (for instance, [PŠJ06]) should be able to manage.
Finally, by only dispatching datagrams to the relevant users, this approach is ex-
pected to handle increasing payload sizes very well.
• Elasticity of infrastructure: Generally, adapting DBMS-based schemes to varying
loads depends on the ability of the DBMS to adapt to such conditions.
• Robustness: The robustness of a DBMS-based approach is, on one hand, based on
the robustness of the DBMS against failures. On the other hand, potential single
points of failure are the message dispatcher and the trusted anonymizer.
• Privacy of receivers: One of the main disadvantages of DBMS-based schemes is
the need for UEs to transmit their whereabouts to a service provider that collects
this data in a central location. Assuming that the anonymizer is able to protect
the information that is being stored by the database system, the DBMS approach
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should be able to protect the privacy of users. Nevertheless, this approach is still
likely to attract the attention of untrustworthy parties which are interested in this
data. In particular, reporting the locations of users to a traditional database bares
the risk of the collected data being processed for non-intended purposes. Further-
more, with the anonymizer relaying all location updates and queries, this entity
is potentially able of fully violate all privacy objectives.
• Message confidentiality: When relying on a DBMS to realize an STM service,
message conﬁdentiality might be provided using asymmetric cryptography and
privacy-preserving location prooﬁng schemes like [ZC11; KLA13]. Thus, st-data-
grams have to be encrypted with the public keys of the legitimate receivers which
may be retrieved from the available location database. Furthermore, since ma-
licious users might provide false location updates in order to illicitly obtain st-
datagrams, it is necessary to incorporate location veriﬁcation schemes in the STM
service. Since privacy-preserving location veriﬁcation is known to present a chal-
lenging issue which often demands special infrastructure and hardware [BC94;
SSW03], the ability of DBMS-based approaches to provide message conﬁdential-
ity strongly depends on the availability of such location prooﬁng schemes.
• Message authentication and integrity: By relying on a public key infrastructure,
senders can sign datagrams to allow the veriﬁcation of authenticity and integrity.
• Controlled access: Similar to the broadcast scheme, the dispatcher can control the
access to the service by decidingwhether or not to forwardmessages from speciﬁc
senders. Here, again, the dispatcher has to sign the forwarded st-datagrams in
order to enable UEs to decide whether or not to discard a message.
• Spam prevention: Corresponding to a naïve broadcast, the message dispatcher
may limit the rate at which senders may dispatch st-datagrams.
• Accountability of senders: As with a naïve broadcast scheme, a DBMS-based ap-
proach may employ standard techniques like a TTP [KMZ02].
3.4.3 Prediction of Locations
Another approachmotivated by the state of the art is based on the prediction of the cur-
rent whereabouts of users that should be receivers of an st-datagram with high prob-
ability. This requires that a sender is aware of spatiotemporal movement patterns in
order to be able to estimate these geographic regions. Accordingly, one of the primary
challenges of a prediction-based approach is the privacy-aware collection of this in-
formation, for example, using participatory sensing applications. Finally, a traditional
geocast scheme can be used to deliver st-datagrams to the areas in which recipients are
currently expected to reside (see Figure 3.7).
• Long-term support: While estimating the current whereabouts of users that have
been residing at a certain st-regionmay be possible for short-termhistory ofmove-
ments, a prediction-based scheme is not expected to be able to support the deliv-
ery of messages for st-region from several days or weeks ago.
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Figure 3.7 Schematic of prediction-based approaches.
• Reliable delivery: In order to reliably deliver messages, a reliable geocast ap-
proach may be used. However, given the uncertainty of the prediction of the
whereabouts of users, reliably addressing the relevant geographic areas in which
the receivers are currently residing in may not be possible.
• Accurate delivery: In general, the delivery accuracy is deﬁned by the accuracy of
the prediction of the spatiotemporal movement patterns.
• Precise region addressing: While senders may address st-regions with an arbi-
trary precision, the actual precision depends on the limits of the prediction algo-
rithm and the precision of the geocast scheme.
• Rangedestinations: Addressing a range of st-regions is possible; however, it is ex-
pected to result in an increase of the number and size of the predicted geographic
areas that have to the be addressed by the geocast approach.
• Delivery speed: The delivery delay of a prediction-based approach corresponds
to the time that is necessary to predict geographic areas and delivery messages to
them using a geocast scheme.
• Eﬃciency: By addressing only speciﬁc geographic areas, messages are only deliv-
ered to a speciﬁc subset of users. Therefore, depending on the accuracy of the pre-
diction algorithm and the eﬃciency of the geocast scheme, this approach should
be able to deliver messages with only light communication overhead.
• Scalability: In terms of an increasing number of participants, st-datagrams, or
an increasing destination region size, a prediction-based approach should not be
severely aﬀected apart from additional overhead that might be induced by the
employed geocast mechanism and multiple geographic destination areas.
• Elasticity of infrastructure: By only relying on geographic multicast, a prediction-
based approach is expected to provide an adaptable infrastructure based on the
assumption of a geocast schemes that is able to adapt to varying loads.
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• Robustness: Since the computational task of estimating the current whereabouts
of users can be divided among several entities, a prediction-based scheme should
be robust against failures. Note that this demands a robust geocast approach.
• Privacy of receivers: In order to protect the privacy of users, on one hand, a pri-
vacy-aware geocast scheme is required. Furthermore, the process of collecting
movement data and retrieving correlations and pattern in a privacy-preserving
manner requires speciﬁc participatory sensing approaches. However, due to the
applicability of data aggregation and generalization, participatory sensing appli-
cations might already provide the necessary privacy protection measures.
• Message confidentiality: Similar to a DBMS-based scheme, due to the lack of
a proactive key exchange, it is impossible to provide conﬁdentiality at a crypto-
graphic level. Furthermore, while a prediction-based schememight be able to par-
tially achieve a weaker notion of conﬁdentiality (i.e., only delivering st-datagrams
to legitimate receivers), it may be diﬃcult to provide any guarantees for message
conﬁdentiality given the uncertainties of a probabilistic prediction algorithm.
• Message authentication and integrity: According to the previous schemes, this
objective can also be fulﬁlled using public key signatures.
• Controlled access: Given a centralized entity that is responsible for message de-
livery, an access control scheme can be incorporated in the geocast protocol.
• Spamprevention: Corresponding to the objective of controlled access, spam pre-
vention techniques may be implemented in the geocast approach.
• Accountability of senders: In order to realize the accountability of senders, a TTP
may be employed [KMZ02].
3.4.4 Negotiation of Rendezvous Points
Finally, STM services can be realized with an approach that is based on Rendezvous
Points (RPs). The basic idea of this scheme is to employ RPs as “mailboxes” where
senders store messages which address certain st-region. Since RPs are responsible for
speciﬁc st-regions, UEs can later retrieve the depositedmessages by periodically polling
certain RPs. In particular, a UE only sends polling messages to those RPs that are re-
sponsible for the st-regions that have been visited by the respectiveUE (see Figure 3.8).
While it might be possible to rely on a ﬁxed assignment of st-regions to RPs, this could
enable adversaries to infer the whereabouts of users by observing the RPs that are be-
ing polled by a UE. Accordingly, for the sake of the privacy of receivers, RPs should
not be aware of the st-regions for which they are responsible. However, in order to still
enable the delivery of st-datagrams, it is necessary to establish some common knowl-
edge of the responsibilities of RP between senders and receivers. Therefore, RP-based
approaches rely on a proactive key exchange using tokenswhich are announced to UEs
via eNBs. These tokens are changed at regular intervals in order to provide unique
keys for speciﬁc st-regions. UEs store the received tokens according to the recording of
movements in the naïve broadcast approach. A token should only be made available to
UEs that have been residing within a certain st-region, providing these UEs with the
secret information that is necessary to obtain knowledge of the RP that is used for the
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Figure 3.8 Schematic of Rendezvous Point-based approaches.
delivery of messages to this st-region. Since tokens cannot be made generally available
to all participants of the service, a trusted entity is required that is aware of the tokens
corresponding to the addressed st-regions. This trusted entity, referred to as Token Plan-
ning Server (TPS), is responsible for the assignment of tokens to st-regions as well as for
the deposition of the st-datagrams dispatched by senders at the respective RPs.
It should be mentioned here that, apart from relying on a polling-based approach, it
might also be possible to use a publish-subscribe-based scheme, i.e., UEsmight register
at speciﬁc RPs using the received tokens. This, however, requires that UEs inform RPs
about their current network addresses. In contrast, when relying on a polling-based
approach, UEs may use diﬀerent network addresses as pseudonyms.
• Long-term support: With UEs storing received tokens, the supported time span
of RP-based approaches is limited by storage sizes of UEs and the polling load
on RPs. Here, it is possible to control the polling interval, providing a trade-oﬀ
between the delivery speed and the maximum supported time span.
• Reliable delivery: Similar to the previous schemes, RP-based approaches may
provide reliable message delivery by using a protocol like TCP when exchanging
messages between UEs and RPs. Furthermore, while GPS is not required in an
RP-based scheme, in case this functional objective is mandatory, eNBs should also
rely on a protocol for reliable message delivery when announcing tokens.
• Accurate delivery: In RP-based schemes, only legitimate receivers should receive
the respective st-datagrams. However, in order to reduce the polling load on RPs,
it might be possible to rely on techniques for token aggregation that provide a
trade-oﬀ between the polling load and the delivery accuracy.
• Precise region addressing: Again, senders may specify destination regions with
an arbitrary precision. However, with tokens addressing speciﬁc st-regions, the
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precision of a RP-based scheme is limited to the size of the geographic region that
is addressed by tokens, i.e., in this case, the size of the coverage area of radio cells.
• Range destinations: According to the approaches discussed above, an RP-based
scheme is also able to address a range of st-region as destination of an st-datagram.
• Delivery speed: When relying on RPs, delivery speed is primarily deﬁned by
the polling interval of UEs. This may be adjusted to provide a trade-oﬀ between
delivery speed and the number of polling messages to be processed by RPs.
• Eﬃciency: Due to the use of tokens as identiﬁers for st-regions, only legitimate
receivers should receive the respective st-datagrams. This demands that polling
messages are sent to speciﬁc RPs at regular intervals. Thus, an RP-based approach
is only expected to provide an advantage over the naïve broadcast if a large num-
ber of st-datagrams are dispatched at a high rate.
• Scalability: With an increasing number of participants of the STM service, the
polling load is expected to increase as well. Accordingly, in this case, it is either
necessary to degrade the general delivery speed by reducing the polling interval
or to increase the number of available RPs. Considering an increasing number of
st-datagrams, the TPS may become a bottleneck. Furthermore, when addressing
a increasing range of st-regions in an st-datagram, the necessary number of mes-
sages that has to be distributed to diﬀerent RPs is expected to increase as well.
Finally, an RP-based approach is expected to provide scalability with increasing
payload sizes – presuming that RPs prevent duplicate deliveries by caching times-
tamps of the last timewhen a datagram has been deposited for a certain st-regions
which is served by the RP. Given that UEs include a rough time interval of their
previous poll for an st-region within their polling message, RPs are then able to
decide whether they need to deliver a datagram to a speciﬁc UE.
• Elasticity of infrastructure: Elasticity of an RP-based approach depends on the
ability to dynamically adapt the number of RPs to varying load conditions.
• Robustness: With RPs realizing the delivery of st-datagrams, the robustness of an
RP-based scheme depends, on one hand, on the ability of the approach to handle
the failure of RPs. On the other hand, similar to the trusted entities described in
the previous schemes, the TPS presents a potential single point of failure. Never-
theless, since the TPS is only actively involved in the distribution of tokens during
the deployment of random seeds, a failure of the TPS only temporarily aﬀects the
ability of a sender to dispatch a message. Once the TPS is again available, st-data-
grams can be delivered to st-region without further problems.
• Privacy of receivers: The ability of an RP-based scheme to protect the privacy of
receivers depends on its ability to obfuscate the responsibilities of RPs for cer-
tain st-regions. Furthermore, it is important that contacting speciﬁc RPs does not
reveal information about the whereabouts of UEs.
• Message confidentiality: In RP-based approaches, tokens enable a proactive key
exchange that should be able to protect the conﬁdentiality of st-datagrams.
• Message authentication and integrity: Corresponding to the schemes outlined
above, this objective can be fulﬁlled, for example, using public key signatures.
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• Controlled access: As in the naïve broadcast and DBMS-based schemes, the TPS
may be used to control the access to the service by deciding whether or not to
forward messages from speciﬁc senders to the RPs. Here, it is also necessary that
TPS signs the forwarded st-datagrams in order to enable both RPs as well as UEs
to decide whether or not to accept a received message.
• Spamprevention: Similar to themessage dispatcher in a naïve broadcast, the TPS
can limit the rate at which senders are allowed to send st-datagrams.
• Accountability of senders: According to the aforementioned approaches, an RP-
based scheme may rely on a TTP [KMZ02] to provide accountability.
3.4.5 Qualitative Comparison of Approaches
Based on the outlined design space, this section discusses the applicability of the sug-
gested service realizations under the givenuse cases. Regarding the application require-
ments that have been discussed in Section 3.2.4, the expected strengths andweaknesses
of the proposed service realizations are summarized in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9 Qualitative comparison of STM service realizations. Here, “+” indicates that an ap-
proach is expected to fulﬁll the respective objective, while “–” denotes that it is not.
In case of “?”, further studies are required to provide a profound statement.
68 Problem Analysis
Given the demanded objectives of the described use case scenarios, the functional, non-
functional, as well as privacy and security objectives, which are expected to be sup-
ported by an STM service, can now be ranked against each other. Figure 3.10 summa-
rizes the discussed requirements of the application scenarios, ranking the potential can-
didate realizations for each combination of objective and scenario. Finally, applicable
STM realizations are summarized at the end of the table, highlighting the approaches
that may be best applicable to diﬀerent use cases.
This table shows that among the naïve broadcast (“Bcast”), theDBMS-based (“DB”) and
prediction-based approaches (“Predict”), as well as the RP-based scheme (“RP”), the
DBMS- and RP-based schemes represent the most generally applicable ones. Despite
the promising nature of DBMS-based realizations, this work focuses primarily on RPs-
based approaches in order to provide a deeper understanding of the objectives thatmay
be provided by this class of STM service realizations. This is due to the assumption that
DBMS-based schemes are more likely to evoke interests in abusing the collected data
in ways that were not intended by users at the time of service subscription. It should
be stressed here, however, that depending on the protection measures, compared to
RP-based approaches, DBMS-based schemes may be equally or even better suited to
realize an STM service for a speciﬁc use case. Nevertheless, an extensive evaluation
and comparison of DBMS-based approaches with other possible realization options is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.5 Conclusion
In summary, there exists a wide variety of relevant use cases of an STM service for real-
world applications. While as of this writing, no realization of an STM service has been
considered, the state of the art of related research areas provides several techniques
to meet the challenges of realizing such a service. Inspired by existing mechanisms
and considering functional, non-functional, as well as privacy and security objectives,
four diﬀerent classes of STM service realizations have been proposed in this chapter.
Given the promising nature of RP-based schemes, this thesis focuses on this class of
approaches. The following chapter now introduces two STM service realizations which
rely on Rendezvous Points for a privacy-preserving delivery of st-datagrams.
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Figure 3.10 Overview of expected qualitative requirements of application scenarios. Here,
“•”, “••”, and “•••” indicate the increasing relevance of a given objective for
a scenario. Below each rating, applicable service realizations are listed for each
objective. Finally, applicable STM schemes are summarized for each scenario.

4 Rendezvous Point-based Approaches
Given the functional, non-functional, privacy, and security objectives, as well as the
potential design space for an STM service, this thesis focuses on schemes relying on
Rendezvous Points (RPs) to deliver multicast messages by employing a polling-based
delivery strategy that is similar to thewell-knownpublish-subscribe paradigm.Accord-
ingly, this chapter proposes two novel RP-based schemes that can be used to implement
an STMservice.While the ﬁrst approach focuses on a cluster-based structurewith a spe-
ciﬁc number of RP servers that is able to provide strong privacy and security properties,
the second scheme aims to provide a distributed realization that is more scalable and
eﬃcient considering an increasing number of users as well as an increasing size of the
respective service region.
4.1 Models and Assumptions
Before describing each of the suggested schemes in detail, this section ﬁrst motivates
general assumptions and establishes a common network and attacker model.
4.1.1 Network Model
As outlined in Section 3.1, a primary focus of the envisioned applications for STM ser-
vices is on mobile information services. Since such services usually require a cellular
network infrastructure that enables connectivity to web-based service components, the
primary focus of this thesis is on cellular networks. Nevertheless, apart from a purely
cellular network infrastructure, Section 4.4 provides a case study regarding the applica-
tion of the ﬁrst approach to witness-based veriﬁcation in disasters (Section 3.1.5). This
case study considers a mixed network infrastructure which not only enables access to
relevant service components on the Internet, but also allows wireless ad hoc commu-
nication among users in a geographic area.
According to the description of cellular network architectures in Section 2.1, real-world
setups of cellular networks typically incorporate a hierarchical radio cell structure that
allows to reduce the number of relocations – or handovers in case of ongoing phone
calls or data transmissions – between the respective cells. Radio cells at the higher lev-
els of this hierarchy (i.e., macrocells) are usually used to serve an increased number of
users in a geographic area by assigning relatively static users to the smaller micro- and
picocells and relocating highly mobile users to macrocells with a larger coverage area.
While this is a suitable approach for increasing the capacity of the network, macrocells
with a large coverage area are not able to provide additional precisionwhen addressing
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geographic areas. Therefore, this work assumes simpliﬁed, ﬂat cellular network infras-
tructure where only microcells (or picocells, respectively) are employed by the STM
service in order to be able to address geographic areas as precisely as possible.
Finally, this work assumes that the STM service only aims to address destination st-
regions at the spatial granularity of the coverage area of picocells and microcells, that
is, senders may address st-regions with a precision of several tens of meters up to a
few hundred meters. Note that, in order to be able to distinguish an st-region spanning
over an area consisting of multiple radio cells and a larger time interval from a speciﬁc,
discrete point in space and time, this work refers to a spatiotemporal cell (st-cell)when ad-
dressing a certain radio cell during a speciﬁc time slot. Accordingly, an st-region always
consists of at least one or more st-cells.
4.1.2 Attacker Model
This section now presents the assumed attacker model, that is, the goals and abilities of
adversaries, as well as an overview of possible attacks against RP-based approaches.
4.1.2.1 Goals of Adversaries
Considering the privacy and security objectives outlined in Section 3.2.3, this work as-
sumes that adversaries are motivated by one or more of the following goals.
Privacy-related goals Attackers targeting the privacy of users may be motivated by
one or more of the following aspects:
• Inferring identities of users: Attackers may be interested in learning about the
identity of a few speciﬁc or all users of the STM service.
• Inferring locations of users: Apart from inferring the identities of users directly,
attackers may try to obtain the locations of users in order to learn about their
identities. Furthermore, adversaries may be interested in obtaining knowledge of
the whereabouts of users in order to infer their home or job locations, frequently
visited places and corresponding personal interests, or the presence at a certain
one-time event like a political demonstration.
• Inferring co-locations of users: In addition, attackers may be interested in obtain-
ing knowledge of the co-location of two speciﬁc users whose identities are known
to the adversaries. Furthermore, attackers may try to infer social connections be-
tween unknown users to infer social graphs of users once one or more identities
are revealed to adversaries at a later point in time.
• Inferring absence of users from st-cells: Attackers may try to infer the absence of
speciﬁc users that are known to the adversaries from certain st-cells. Also, accord-
ing to the co-location of users, knowledge of the absence of unknown users from
speciﬁc st-cells may be considered valuable to adversaries. The latter, however,
requires that attackers are also able to learn about the identities of users for this
information to reveal any useful information.
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Security-related goals Attackers targeting the outlined security objectives might con-
sider one or more of the following aspects:
• Obtaining knowledge of st-datagrams: Since st-datagram are likely to contain
personal or conﬁdential information, adversaries may be interested in retrieving
the content or the intended destination region of st-datagrams. Furthermore, de-
pending on the application, attackers may also be interested in detecting that an
st-datagram has been dispatched by a sender to a known or unknown st-cell, for
example, to learn about the outbreak of an infectious or contagious disease.
• Modifying st-datagrams: Attackers might be interested in modifying the content
of existing st-datagrams of benign senders or in creating falsiﬁed st-datagrams
under the identity of a benign sender.
• Unauthorized sending of st-datagrams: Since it is likely that the access to an STM
service will be controlled, e.g., for billing purposes, attackers may aim at sending
st-datagrams without the proper authorization.
• Sending of spam messages: Apart from sending st-datagrams without the nec-
essary authorization, adversaries may try to exploit mobile devices of authorized
users to dispatch and distribute spam or scareware messages.
• Hidden sending of st-datagrams: Finally, depending on whether accountability
of senders is considered mandatory, adversaries may try to send st-datagrams
without being held accountable for their consequences.
As already indicated in Section 3.2.3, while the availability of an STM service is an im-
portant security feature, it is beyond the scope of this work.
4.1.2.2 Abilities of Attackers
Before describing the abilities of adversaries in detail, ﬁrst a short overview is provided
over the assumptions of what attackers are not capable of.
Assumed limitations of the capabilities of adversaries While the security and privacy
features of cellular networks are an important aspect for the privacy of users, this re-
search area is beyond the scope of this work (for security and privacy implications in
cellular networks, refer to [For+07; PP07; BJH10]). Accordingly, since this thesis focuses
on the security and privacy implications of STM services, it is assumed that the cellu-
lar operators are honest and trustworthy and that attackers are not able to compromise
components of the cellular core network, i.e., adversaries cannot access core compo-
nents like the HSS, MME, or PGWs. Nevertheless, despite the presumably benign op-
erator, this work incorporates the assumption that parts of the radio access network
infrastructure, which are more exposed to external attackers, may be compromised.
In case the operator cannot be trusted, extensive modiﬁcations of the cellular network
infrastructure of existing mobile communication systems are required [cf. Rec+11].
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Presumedabilitiesof attackers In order to achieve the goals outlined in Section 4.1.2.1,
it is assumed that adversaries are able to perform the following actions:
• Manipulate PDUs: According to [Sch03], it is assumed that attackers are able to
manipulate Protocol Data Units (PDUs) as follows:
– Insert PDUs: Attackers can insert fabricated PDUs into the network.
– Modify PDUs: Attackers are able to modify PDUs within the network.
– Delete PDUs: Attackers may intercept and delete PDUs between entities.
– Delay PDUs: Attackers can intercept and delay the transmission of PDUs.
– Replay PDUs: Attackers are able to replay previously transmitted PDUs.
• Observe the communication between entities: Passive attackers may observe the
communication between the entities of the service, i.e., between senders and the
TPS, between the TPS and eNBs, between eNBs and UEs, between UEs and RPs,
as well as between RPs and the TPS.
• Participate as sender: Apart frompassive attackers, it is assumed that adversaries
can actively participate in the STM service. Hence, attackers may send st-data-
gram with arbitrary content to any possible st-region.
• Participate as receiver: Furthermore, adversaries can participate in the service as
potential receivers, i.e., they may employ UEs and actively move around in the
geographic service area. Note that this requires multiple malicious users moving
around inside the service area.
Additionally, sophisticated adversaries may compromise a certain fraction of the
UEs of benign users. However, if attackers are able to compromise the UE of users
(either remotely or by physical tampering), they are usually also able to directly
track the whereabouts of users via GPS, control sensors like microphones or cam-
eras that are built into the mobile devices, or infer personal information from
email or text messages that are stored on them [Sha+10]. Therefore, in this work,
it is assumed that adversaries are only able to compromise a rather small frac-
tion of UEs and, using the information obtained from these devices, try to obtain
knowledge about a larger fraction of the group of users.
• Compromise RPs: More sophisticated attackers may be able to compromise one
or more RPs. While external attackers may not be able to compromise more than
a few RPs, internal adversaries as well as benign-but-curious providers of the RP
infrastructure, may very well able to compromise and control all available RPs.
• Compromise eNBs: Finally, it is assumed that sophisticated attackers may com-
promise one ormore eNBs. Similar to the assumptions regarding the compromise
of UEs, while adversaries controlling eNBs are able to detect the presence of users
in the coverage areas of the compromised base stations andmight therefore obtain
information about the whereabouts and identities of users, it is assumed that they
only intend to compromise a few eNBs with the intention of inferring additional
information about other st-cells and users currently not within the coverage area
of the radio cells. This is a legitimate assumption considering that a large-scale
compromise of base stations is more likely to be detected by the cellular operator.
Models and Assumptions 75
4.1.2.3 Overview of Potential Attacks
Given the abilities of attackers outlined above, this section now presents potential at-
tacks of increasing strength that aim to achieve the goals described in Section 4.1.2.1.
Observation attack In the ﬁrst potential attack, adversaries observe the communica-
tion between service entities, i.e., between eNBs and UEs, UEs and RPs, the TPS and
RPs, as well as between senders and the TPS.With this attack, adversariesmay try to in-
fer information about the identities of potential receivers from their IP addresses, their
past or present whereabouts, whether two users have been residing at the same place at
some time, i.e., whether they have been co-located, or whether a speciﬁc user has been
absent from a certain st-cell. Furthermore, attackers may try to obtain knowledge of the
presence, content, or destination region of dispatched st-datagrams.
Probing attack In the probing attack, adversaries aim to learn the mapping of st-cells
to RPs, as well as the identities, locations, co-locations, or absence of potential receivers.
Therefore, in order to infer themapping of an st-cell to a RP, they observe the communi-
cation between the TPS and RPs and send an st-datagram to the respective regionwhile
trying to recognize this st-datagram among the messages that are exchanged between
the TPS and RPs. Then, given themapping of one ormore st-cells and their correspond-
ing RPs, adversaries try to obtain information about users which poll the RPs that are
responsible for the probed st-cells by leveraging the observation attack.
Movement attack In the movement attack, adversaries participate in the STM service
by moving through the service area with UEs and collecting tokens that are distributed
in the visited st-cells. Based on the secret information that is included in the received
tokens, attackers then try to extrapolate the collected information in order to infer the
identities of users in other st-cells, as well as their locations, co-locations, or absence
from a certain st-cell. This might be achieved, e.g., by uncovering the responsibilities of
RPs for certain st-cells. Furthermore, adversaries could use the collected information to
infer existence, content, or destination region of an st-datagram.
Compromising RPs More sophisticated attackers may try to compromise one or more
RPs in order to learn about the identities, locations, co-locations, or absence of potential
receivers. Furthermore, they may aim to obtain knowledge of st-datagrams, modify the
st-datagrams that are stored on the compromised RPs, deposit st-datagrams (possibly
spam) without the proper authorization, and, in case the accountability of senders is
considered mandatory in the indented application of the service, send st-datagrams
without the possibility of being held accountable for the respective content. This work
assumes that attackers might either compromise randomly chosen RPs or, in case of
very powerful attackers, speciﬁc ones based on prior knowledge that could have been
obtained, e.g. via the movement attack.
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Compromising eNBs Finally, sophisticated attackers may aim to compromise one or
more eNBs in the cellular network in order to obtain information about the identities,
locations, co-locations, or absence of potential receivers, to obtain knowledge of st-data-
grams, modify st-datagrams that are relayed through these base stations, deliver falsi-
ﬁed st-datagrams without the proper authorization, and, assuming the accountability
of senders is mandatory in the service, send st-datagrams without the possibility of be-
ing held accountable for the content of the messages. In this thesis, it is assumed that
adversaries could be capable of either compromising an arbitrary (random) eNB or, in
case of very sophisticated attackers, select a speciﬁc eNB to be compromised.
Having established a common network and attacker model, the following sections de-
scribe two novel schemes for possible realizations of an STM service.
4.2 Cluster-based Spatiotemporal Multicast (CSTM)
The ﬁrst proposed STM service scheme, which is referred to as Cluster-based Spatiotem-
poral Multicast (CSTM), is based on a decentralized RP structure with a ﬁxed number
of dedicated RP servers that may be operated by diﬀerent service providers. Before de-
scribing the phases of this approach in more detail, the following sections ﬁrst provide
an overview of the general idea of the approach, as well as a short description of the
intentions and design decisions that have been made in order to realize speciﬁc func-
tional, non-functional, as well as speciﬁc privacy and security objectives.
4.2.1 Synopsis of Approach
The deﬁning idea of RP-based approaches is to employ Rendezvous Points to deliver
messages to the corresponding receivers (see Section 3.4.4). These RPs act as “mail-
boxes” where st-datagrams can be deposited and which allow UEs to later retrieve the
depositedmessages by regularly polling the RPs that are responsible for the st-cells that
have been visited by the users. Here, RPs should not be aware of the st-cells for which
they are responsible for in order to protect the privacy of the potential receivers from
compromised RPs or benign-but-curious service providers.
Using a polling-based approach yields several advantages over a subscription-based
mechanism as it allows users to reliably retrieve messages even if their UEs have not
been connected to the cellular network for some time. This mechanism also allows
users to retrieve messages in case polling requests or the respective st-datagrams con-
tained in the responses are lost during the transmission. Furthermore, such a polling-
based scheme enables users to change their IP addresses over time without notifying
the corresponding RPs of this change. The latter aspect is especially interesting when
employing obfuscation techniques like anonymization proxies or privacy-enhancing
techniques like mix networks [Cha81] or onion routing [GRS96] that aim to hide the
actual IP addresses of users.
In order to be able to conﬁdentially exchange information between a sender and the
receivers in the addressed st-regions, a key exchange is required. Establishing such a
key reactively when a sender intends to send an st-datagrammay be a challenging task
considering, on one hand, the objective of message conﬁdentiality which demands that
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only potential receivers should be aware and be able to read the message, and, on the
other hand, the need to hide the identities and locations of receivers from possibly ma-
licious entities performing the matching between the destination regions and potential
receivers. Therefore, the suggested CSTM scheme relies on a proactive approach where
keys are negotiated with users that could become potential receivers of st-datagrams
in the future. Accordingly, it is assumed that eNBs are able to randomly generate and
deliver symmetric keys contained in tokens to all users that are within the coverage area
of the respective radio cells. The keys contained in these tokens are generated from an
initial random seed using a CPRNG and are announced at regular time intervals which
deﬁne the smallest time span that may be addressed by senders.
In order to enable senders to encrypt st-datagrams with the symmetric keys that have
been distributed as part of tokens in the destination st-regions, the CSTM approach
relies on a trusted entity, i.e., the Token Planning Server. The TPS is responsible for
generating the initial random seeds and distributing these seeds to the eNBs in the
service area. As base stations generate keys at ﬁxed time intervals which are known to
the TPS, this entity is able to generate symmetric keys of all served st-cells, enabling the
conﬁdential delivery of st-datagram to users having visited the destination regions.
Finally, in order to determine the responsibilities of RPs for certain st-cells while not
revealing this information to the RPs themselves, a cryptographic hash function h(⋅)
is applied to the exchanged tokens. This value, which is referred to as st-cell identiﬁer,
represents a unique pseudonym for an st-cell that is used to deposit encrypted st-data-
gram at the RPs, allowing an RP to perform a lookup for st-datagrams that are to be
delivered to UEs polling the RP with this speciﬁc st-cell identiﬁer. Apart from the st-
cell identiﬁer allowing RPs to deliver messages without being able to infer the underly-
ing st-cells, this identiﬁer is used to deﬁne the responsibilities of RPs for speciﬁc st-cells.
Therefore, the cryptographic hash function is applied to the st-cell identiﬁer in order
to obtain a so-called RP identiﬁer. With the knowledge of the total number N of RPs,
messages addressing a speciﬁc st-cell are deposited at the RP, for which the RP identi-
ﬁer modulo N appended to a predetermined string preﬁx corresponds to the Domain
Name System (DNS) name of the RP.
A potential disadvantage of the CSTM approach is that the polling load, which has to
be handled by the RPs, is expected to increase over time as UEs gather more tokens by
visiting various st-cells. For each key that is obtained by a UE via a token, the corre-
sponding RP has to be polled periodically for st-datagrams. Hence, the polling load is
directly related to the number of keys that a UE has accumulated over time.
In order to reduce and limit the number of polling messages between UEs and RPs, the
CSTM approach relies on a hierarchical token aggregation scheme. The basic idea of
this mechanism is to provide a trade-oﬀ between the polling load on the RPs and the
delivery accuracy that is provided by the STM service. Here, the underlying assump-
tion is that st-datagrams addressing st-regions from a long time ago are less stringent
in their delivery accuracy requirements, while the delivery of st-datagram addressing
more recent st-regions should be more accurate. Using a so-called token hierarchy, UEs
are able to aggregate tokens both spatially and temporally by using the same symmetric
key which is shared among the respective cells or time slots (see Figure 4.2). This token
hierarchy is realized via the TPS, which is able to deploy shared initial random seeds to
diﬀerent eNBs, allowing UEs to obtain the same key for diﬀerent st-cells. Shared keys
are expected to degrade the delivery accuracywith users not having been residing in the
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respective regions receiving st-datagrams. Therefore, UEs employ the keys provided by
the levels of the hierarchy based on the time that has passed since the reception of the
respective token when polling RPs. Accordingly, messages addressing more recent st-
cells are able to achieve a high delivery accuracy, while st-cells from a longer time ago
require less polling messages at the cost of a reduced delivery accuracy. In case a token
does not share its keys with any other token that has been received at levels l > 0, UEs
use the symmetric key of level 0 instead of the keys of the higher levels. Otherwise,
UEs would receive st-datagrams for regions in which they have not been residing in.
This would decrease delivery accuracy without the beneﬁt of being able to reduce the
required number of polling messages.
While this hierarchical structure may seem similar to a tree where the leaves of the tree
represent the individual symmetric keys of the atomic st-cells and the internal nodes
correspond to the respective shared keys, a token hierarchy may also implement an
aggregation scheme where each level provides an aggregation of st-cells that is inde-
pendent of the other levels. For example, as shown in Figure 4.2a, level 2 of the spatial
token hierarchy does not have to consider the st-cells sharing the same keys in level 1.
In the following, a short qualitative discussion of the design goals of the CSTM ap-
proach is given with respect to the objectives presented in Section 3.2.
4.2.2 Design Objectives
Regarding the functional objectives outlined in Section 3.2.1, the CSTM approach con-
siders the following aspects:
• Long-termsupport: CSTMusesCPRNGs to generate tokens that are storedwithin
UEs for their visited st-cells.While therefore, over time, the polling load on theRPs
is expected to increase, the hierarchical token aggregation strategy introduced in
the previous section is supposed tomitigate the increasing loadwith a decreasing
delivery accuracy for st-cells that lie further in the past.
• Reliable delivery: Due to the employed polling-based delivery approach, UEs
should be able to obtain st-datagrams in case of lost PDUs that are exchanged
between UEs and RPs. It also allows UEs to receive messages for the visited st-
cells if the device has not been available for some time – as long as the STM service
is available, the STM application has been running on a UE, and the UE has been
connected to the cellular network during its visit of the addressed st-cells.
• Accurate delivery: While there should be no false positives among the received
st-datagrams, i.e., only users that have been residing in a certain area at some time
actually receive a correspondingmessage, the ratio of false positives may increase
due to the hierarchical token aggregation.
• Precise region addressing: As already mentioned in the network model, within
this work, the assumed spatial precision is limited to coverage area of radio cells.
However, in the CSTM approach, eNBs could increase this precision by announc-
ing several diﬀerent tokens for diﬀerent geographic partitions within their radio
cells. Here, the tokens could either be sent to all UEs within a cell, allowing them
to ﬁlter tokens that are not relevant for their current location, or eNBs could only
announce the respective tokens to those UEs which are currently residing in the
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corresponding partitions of the cells. While the ﬁrst technique might enable ad-
versaries to obtain information about other partitions inside the visited cell, the
second approach requires that UEs, at regular time intervals, report their geo-
graphic coordinates to the eNBs. Accordingly, the ﬁrst mechanism should be pre-
ferred as the regular reporting of the geographic coordinates of UEs to a poten-
tially compromised entity is not desirable in order to ensure user privacy.
Finally, considering the temporal precision, the service provider is able to increase
the temporal granularity by letting eNBs generate tokens in shorter time intervals.
Nevertheless, the trade-oﬀ between the increased number of tokens which result
in a higher polling load on the RPs and the temporal precision that may be ad-
dressed by senders should be considered in this case.
• Range destinations: In the CSTM approach, senders are able to address multiple
st-cells ranging over several radio cells and time slots.However,with an increasing
size of the addressed st-region, the overhead of distributing copies of a message
to multiple RPs (one for each st-cell identiﬁer) is expected to increase as well.
In terms of the non-functional objectives (Section 3.2.2), the CSTM approach considers
the following properties:
• Delivery speed: In the suggested scheme, the delivery delay of st-datagrams is
deﬁned primarily by the polling interval that is employed by UEs. Accordingly,
with an increasing polling interval, the delivery delay can be decreased at the cost
of an increasing polling load on the RPs.
• Eﬃciency: In order to reduce the potentially high load of users polling the RPs,
the hierarchical token aggregation strategy is proposed in Section 4.2.3 that aims
to provide a trade-oﬀ between the delivery accuracy and the number of polling
messages that have to be dispatched by UEs.
• Robustness: In order to provide robustness against the failure of RPs, the CSTM
approach incorporates a replication strategy that distributes a conﬁgurable num-
ber of copies of an st-datagram to diﬀerent servers. Here, this replication strategy
allows the service provider to weight the overhead of depositing several copies of
an st-datagram to diﬀerent RPs with the achievable level of robustness against a
certain number of RPs that may fail simultaneously.
Finally, considering the privacy and security objectives described in Section 3.2.3, the
CSTM approach aims to incorporate the following aspects:
• Privacy of receivers: The CSTM approach aims to protect the privacy of receivers
by negotiating RPs that are not aware of the st-cell for which they are responsible
for, allowing users to retrieve st-datagram without revealing their past or present
whereabouts. Furthermore, by employing a polling-based approach, users are
able to rely on anonymization proxies [Shi07] or privacy-enhancing routing tech-
niques like mix networks [Cha81] and onion routing [GRS96].
• Message confidentiality: Due to the exchanged symmetric keys, senders can en-
crypt st-datagrams, enabling only legitimate receivers that have been residing at
the respective st-cells to decrypt the messages. Furthermore, in order to prevent
adversaries from learning about the presence of a dispatched st-datagram, the
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Figure 4.1 Overview of the phases of the CSTM approach: (A) token planning, (B) token dis-
tribution, (C) message deposition, and (D) message delivery. Messages exchanged
between entities are protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.
CSTM approach allows to incorporate countermeasures against traﬃc analysis,
e.g., by periodically exchanging dummy messages [Ray01] between entities.
• Message authentication and integrity: In order to ensure the authenticity and in-
tegrity of st-datagrams, the TPS may sign the symmetrically encrypted messages
with his private key, enabling users to verify the content of the message with the
known public key of the TPS.
• Controlled access: With the CSTM approach relying on the trusted TPS to dis-
patch st-datagrams, this entity may perform access control by only distributing
the messages of authorized senders to the RPs.
• Spam prevention: According to the access control, the TPS can implement coun-
termeasures against spamming, e.g., by introducing a billing system or incorpo-
rating a rate limitation that only admits messages of a sender after a minimum
time span has passed between the sending of two consecutive st-datagrams.
The next section now describes the four phases of the CSTM approach in detail.
4.2.3 Detailed Overview of CSTM
According to the architecture of RP-based STM schemes proposed in Section 3.4.4,
CSTM consists of the following four phases (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.2 Examples of token hierarchies using spatial and temporal token aggregation.
4.2.3.1 Initial Token Planning
In the ﬁrst phase, the TPS generates initial random seeds sc,l for each cell c ∈ C, where C
is the set of all radio cells, and level l of the token hierarchy by using its knowledge of the
layout of the radio cells in the cellular network. As mentioned earlier, eNBs use these
random seeds to generate the symmetric keys within the respective cells during the
speciﬁc time slots. For example, given 3 levels, eNBs will receive 3 initial seeds from the
TPS, allowing them to generate (shared) keys for each level. Here, spatial and temporal
token aggregation can be achieved bydistributing the same sc,l to diﬀerent radio cells for
higher levels of the hierarchy, allowing eNBs to generate the same keys at the respective
levels (see Figure 4.2). Finally, the TPS sends the initial random seeds to the eNBs using
a cryptographic protocol that provides conﬁdentiality, data integrity, as well as entity
authentication. Accordingly, such a protocol might be, for example, the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol.
4.2.3.2 Token Generation and Distribution
As outlined above, in order to enable the conﬁdentiality of st-datagrams, a proactive
exchange of keys is required. Therefore, tokens τc,t are distributed to all UEs that are
residing within a radio cell c ∈ C during a time slot t. Within its radio cell c, an eNB cre-
ates the token τc,t = {(tvl ,Kc,t,l) ∣ 0 ≤ l < λ} at the beginning of time slot t by generating
the symmetric keys Kc,t,l using the respective Cryptographic Pseudo-RandomNumber
Generator of level l (CPRNGl) which is initialized with random seed sc,l. Here, the fre-
quency of key generation for a level l depends on the time slot tsl used at this level. For
example, in Figure 4.2b, an eNB would generate a new key every 1, 2, and 4 hours at
level 0, 1, and 2, respectively. Having generated the respective token, an eNB announces
τc,t = {(tv0,K0), (tv1,K1), (tv2,K2)} to all UEs residing in its cell c during t = [2h, 3h).
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4.2.3.3 Message Deposition
When authenticated senders intend to send st-datagrams to speciﬁc st-cells, they send
their messages to the TPS which encrypts and distributes the messages to the relevant
RPs. Here, the connections between the senders and the TPS, as well as between the
RPs and the TPS must be secured by a cryptographic protocol like TLS. The message of
the sender contains a description of the destination st-region, for example a rectangular
area over a time interval. If the sender can be authenticated and is authorized to send
st-datagrams, the TPS performs a lookup up for the initial random seeds for the radio
cells that are spatially overlapping with the given destination area. Using these seeds
and the known time spans tsl at which keys are generated by the eNBs, the TPS is able
to calculate the corresponding tokens for the respective st-cells.
As a speciﬁc token τc,t contains several diﬀerent keys Kc,t,l, the TPS has to distribute
st-datagrams to all levels of the token hierarchy. In order to enable UEs to retrieve st-
datagrams independently of the level l that UEs use for polling, the TPS encrypts the
respective st-datagram with each of the symmetric keys K of all levels. For example, let
L be a token hierarchy, where UEs rely on level 0 during the ﬁrst day (0 to 24 hours)
after token reception, level 1 during the following 2 days (24 to 72 hours), and level 2
during the rest of the month (72 to 720 hours):
L = {(0, 1h, [0h, 24h)), (1, 2h, [24h, 72h)), (2, 4h, [72h, 720h))}
The TPS will encrypt and deposit the st-datagram using the symmetric keys of levels 0,
1, and 2, respectively. Note that the intervals at which new keys are generated corre-
sponds to the values illustrated in Figure 4.2b. Here, a new symmetric key is generated
by each eNB every 1, 2, and 4 hours at levels 0, 1, and 2, respectively.
Since the TPS is aware of the initial random seeds and the time at which new keys have
been generated by eNBs at the diﬀerent levels, the TPS is able to obtain the RP identi-
ﬁer idrp,K = h(h(K)) and the st-cell identiﬁer idst,K = h(K) for each key K. As mentioned
earlier, the cryptographic hash function h(⋅) is necessary to enable the lookup of st-data-
grams via idst,K while not revealing the symmetric key K. Applying the cryptographic
hash function again to h(K) provides a RP identiﬁer idrp,K which allows a random uni-
form distribution of the responsibilities of RPs for certain st-cells. In order to deposit st-
datagrams, the TPS ﬁrst obtains the addresses of the corresponding RPs by resolving
idrp,K mod N via DNS, where N is the known (ﬁxed) number of RPs. Then, for each
symmetric key K, the TPS encrypts and sends one st-datagram along with the st-cell
identiﬁer idrp,K to each of the RPs that are responsible for the destination region. Fi-
nally, RPs store the received st-datagrams, allowing UEs to retrieve them using idst,K.
In order to provide robustness against the failure of RPs, an operator may optionally in-
corporate amessage replication strategy in this approach aswell. Therefore, the TPS de-
posits several copies of a message at diﬀerent RPs. Here, the addresses of these RPs are
obtained by recursively applying the cryptographic hash function h(⋅) to the RP identi-
ﬁer idrp,K. For example, the ﬁrst replicate of an st-datagram is stored at h(idrp,K)mod N,
while the second replicate is deposited at h(h(idrp,K))mod N. Accordingly, the k-th
replicate of an st-datagram is stored at hk(idrp,K)mod N, where hk(⋅) corresponds to
the k-times consecutive application of h(⋅) to the previously obtained RP identiﬁer. This
approach allowsUEs to still retrievemessages even if up to k−1RPs fail simultaneously
by polling a diﬀerent RP that should also hold the respective st-datagram.
Overlay-based Spatiotemporal Multicast (OSTM) 83
4.2.3.4 Message Delivery
In order to be able to retrieve messages, UEs store the tokens received from the eNBs
during their visits in the respective radio cells. With this trail of tokens, UEs are able to
poll RPs for new st-datagrams at regular time intervals. When polling for messages, for
each token τc,t, aUEﬁrst chooses the symmetric keyK based on the level that is currently
valid according to the validity periods tv of the deployed token hierarchy. If, for a token,
the corresponding key at this level is not shared with the key of another received token
at the level that is used by this token, the UE falls back to the symmetric key of level 0
to prevent a decrease of the delivery accuracy without the beneﬁt of being able to save
a polling message. Furthermore, it obtains the st-cell identiﬁer idst,K = h(K) from the
symmetric key K and the address of the RP idrp,K = h(idst,K)mod N, where N is the
known number of RPs. Then, for each key K, the UE sends a pollingmessage containing
the st-cell identiﬁer idst,K to the RP idrp,K mod N. RPs receiving such a polling message
perform a lookup for the given st-cell identiﬁer idst,K and respondwith all st-datagrams
that have been stored under idst,K. Here, the connections between the UEs and the RPs
must also be protected by a cryptographic protocol like TLS. Finally, theUEs candecrypt
the received st-datagrams using the respective symmetric key K.
4.3 Overlay-based Spatiotemporal Multicast (OSTM)
A potential shortcoming of the CSTM scheme is the implementation of the multicast
message delivery procedure. In the CSTM approach, an st-datagram has to be delivered
to several RPs, i.e., a copy of the message has to be deposited for each st-cell that is part
of the destination region. Therefore, this scheme may not scale well with an increasing
number of st-datagrams or an increasing size of the destination region. Furthermore,
the CSTM approach relies on a ﬁxed number of RPs, which may result in scalability
issues regarding the size of the covered service area. In addition, an STM service that
relies on the CSTM scheme may be less adaptable to varying load conditions, leading
to complex procedures when increasing or reducing the number of RPs.
Therefore, this work proposes another possible realization for an STM service, the so-
calledOverlay-based Spatiotemporal Multicast (OSTM) scheme. This approach is based on
the CSTM scheme; however, instead of a cluster-based RP infrastructure that relies on
cryptographic hashing to obfuscate the responsibilities of RPs, the OSTM approach em-
ploys a distributed RP infrastructure that allows to incorporate the advantages of a P2P-
based overlay network. Accordingly, within this network structure, RPs store st-data-
grams at the given multi-dimensional spatiotemporal coordinates (x, y, t). Then, UEs
are able to retrieve these messages by polling the overlay network with one or multiple
path segments containing the coordinates of the visited st-cells (see Figure 4.3). While
in the overlay network, RPs could consist of a dedicated server cluster according to
the CSTM scheme, it might also be desirable to employ existing parts of the infrastruc-
ture for improved scalability with an increasing number of users. In particular, eNBs
and UEs could (fully or partially) take over the role of RPs in the Peer-to-Peer network.
However, the detailed analysis of such schemes is beyond the scope of this thesis. Ac-
cordingly, RPs are assumed to be implemented as dedicated servers only.
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Figure 4.3 Overview of the phases of the OSTM approach: (A) token planning, (B) token dis-
tribution, (C) message deposition, and (D) message delivery.
Usually, in multi-dimensional Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs), data that should be
queried (i.e., path segments) is stored in the overlay network. In this case, a sender (or
TPS, respectively), could resolve receivers of an st-datagram by querying the overlay
network with the destination region of the message. This would require that RPs store
a unique identiﬁer for each path in order to be able to determine the corresponding
UEs, which is not desirable considering the privacy objectives in Section 3.2.3. In con-
trast, when storing st-datagrams along with their destination regions in the DHT, UEs
are able to change their network identiﬁers, that is, IP addresses, between consecutive
polls and employ obfuscation techniques like mix networks [Cha81] or onion routing
[GRS96]. Furthermore, when polling RPs with path segments, UEs are able to control
the amount of information that is provided to the overlay network at a time by limit-
ing the lengths of the polled paths. This allows to incorporate a trade-oﬀ between the
number of path segments that have to be polled by a UE with the amount of location
information that is revealed in a polling message.
Finally, while OSTM does not support message conﬁdentiality, it is possible to incor-
porate this objective by relying on the same mechanism for generating symmetric keys
as in CSTM. In this case, eNBs have to generate symmetric keys using a CPRNG and
distribute them in addition to the encrypted coordinate vectors. In order to deliver an
st-datagram, the TPS ﬁrst resolves the symmetric keys of the st-cells that are part of the
destination region. Then, the TPS creates and encrypts a copy of the datagram for each
of the resolved keys and distributes the resulting ciphertexts to the RPs in the overlay.
Note that this leads to additional computation and communication overhead which is
strongly deﬁned by the size of the destination region of the st-datagram. In case UEs
poll for the region addressed in the st-datagram, RPs deliver the full batch of ciphertexts
to each UE. For the received ciphertexts, UEs perform a linear search to determine the
symmetric key that can be used for decryption. Here, each ciphertext has to be tested
against each of the symmetric keys that belong to the path of coordinate vectors that
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have been used for polling the RP overlay. However, due to the expected ineﬃciency of
this mechanism, this work assumes that OSTM does not support message conﬁdential-
ity, leaving an in-depth investigation for future work.
4.3.1 P2P-based Rendezvous Point Structures
This section now provides an overview of possible candidates for P2P-based RP struc-
tures and the necessary adaptations for the OSTM approach.
4.3.1.1 Discussion of Possible Overlay Structures
Regarding the selection of an appropriate Peer-to-Peer network structure, there exists a
wide variety of possible DHT schemes that support multi-dimensional range queries.
These approaches can be classiﬁed as follows [Zha+11; TSS11]:
• Multipleone-dimensionaloverlays: Astraightforward approach to indexingmulti-
dimensional attributes is to employ multiple overlays and resolve range queries
independently for each dimension. An well-known example of such a scheme
is the Mercury [BAS04] Peer-to-Peer network which uses multiple Chord [Sto+01]
overlays to support queries on multi-dimensional data. However, this approach
induces high overhead due to its need to maintain multiple overlays.
• Mapping to a one-dimensional space: Another approach supporting multi-di-
mensional attributes is to map the high-dimensional data to a conventional, one-
dimensional overlay structure. This may be achieved, for instance, using Space-
Filling Curves (SFCs) like the Hilbert [Hil91] or Z-order curve [Mor66]. Prominent
examples of such schemes include MAAN [Cai+04], SCRAP [GYG04], and ZNet
[Shu+05] which is based on skip graphs [AS03; Har+03]. The main disadvantage
of SFC-based schemes is that, due to the partially order-preserving mapping of
a high-dimensional to a single-dimensional space, they tend to perform worse
compared to native multi-dimensional overlays [BS07].
• Adaptation of tree-based structures: With traditional database schemes usually
relying on tree-based indexing techniques, there have been eﬀorts regarding the
adaptation of these structures to Peer-to-Peer networks. The challenge here is to
balance the load among the peers at the diﬀerent levels of the tree in order to not
overload nodes that are closer to the root of the tree [Abe01]. A wide variety of
mechanisms has been suggested for the adaptation of centralized indexing struc-
tures to Peer-to-Peer networks, including, for instance:
– P-Grid [Abe01; Dat+05] which is based on the trie structure [Fre60],
– MURK [GYG04] andMIDAS [TSS11] which employ kd-trees [Ben75],
– BATON [JOV05] and BATON⋆ [Jag+06a] which rely on B-trees [Bay70],
– VBI-tree [Jag+06b] which is based on BATON and allows to employ diﬀerent
tree structures like R-trees [Gut84] orM-trees [CPZ97],
– as well as distributed adaptations [THS07] of a quad tree [FB74].
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Considering the application in the OSTM approach, the major concern regarding
these structures is that they typically require several links among neighboring
peers at the same level of the tree that range over the whole indexing space in
order to be able to uniformly distribute the load among the nodes. For OSTM,
such mandatory long links are not desirable as this is likely to enable malicious
RPs to infer their approximate position in the indexing space, allowing them to
estimate their responsibilities for certain st-cells.
• Multi-dimensional P2Pnetworks: In order to enablemulti-attribute range queries,
it is also possible to rely on nativemulti-dimensional P2P structures. A prominent
example in this category is the Content-Addressable Network (CAN) proposed by
Ratnasamy et al. [Rat+01a]. In principle, a CAN is similar to a (distributed) hash
table in that it provides a data structure which maps keys onto values, allowing
eﬃcient storage, retrieval, and deletion of values by speciﬁc keys. A CAN ismain-
tained by several nodes, where each peer is responsible for a certain partition (also
referred to as zone) of the virtual d-dimensional torus space of the overlay network.
In order to operate on this structure, keys are represented as d-dimensional points
and deterministically mapped onto the virtual coordinate space using a uniform
hash function. This hash function is used to uniformly distribute load among the
nodes in the network.
When creating, modifying, or accessing a value, the peer that owns the partition
in which the corresponding point of the key resides is responsible for storing and
retrieving the respective value. In order to organize the overlay structure, nodes
maintain direct links to peers which are responsible for adjacent zones. These
links represent a routing table and allow peers to distribute messages in a CAN
using a greedy forwarding approachwhich selects the next hop based on the zone
that is closest to the destination point. Note that in case no such neighbor is found,
a node may resort to an expanding ring search until the repair mechanisms of the
CAN have rebuilt the network structure.
When joining the overlay, a peer chooses a random destination point and requests
to enter the overlay via a gateway peer that is selected from a list of known boot-
strap nodes. The join message is then forwarded to the node that is responsible
for the chosen destination. This node then splits its zone into two halves along one
of the d coordinate axes and assigns one half to the joining node. Furthermore, it
notiﬁes the neighbors that are now adjacent to the new zone about the change so
that they can update their direct links. Note that the split axis is chosen by simply
selecting the next axis along all dimensions, i.e., splits of each node are performed
in the following order: x1, x2, x3, etc.
In case a peer fails, the CAN ensures that one of the neighbors of the failed node
takes over the zone. Here, neighbors rely on a random back-oﬀ scheme to ensure
that only one neighbor takes over the zone. In order to detect the departure of a
peer, nodes periodically exchange heartbeatmessages with their zone and a list of
their neighbors, allowing them to detect failures from the prolonged absence of a
heartbeat. To ensure a consistent network state under various circumstances such
as simultaneous nodes failures, a CAN employs further repair mechanisms for
which the interested reader is referred to [Rat02].
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Since a CAN is based on a lookup key space that resides on a d-dimensional
torus, it provides a natural structure for range queries with multiple attributes
[XZ02]. However, as the original implementation of a CAN requires the use of a
uniform hash function to equally distribute the load among peers in the logical
overlay space, locality among lookup keys is not preserved. While keys may also
be stored directly within a CAN without the application of a uniform hash func-
tion, this typically leads to unbalanced load among peers [Sah+05]. Furthermore,
the lookup complexity in a CAN is O(n1/d) (where d is the dimensionality of the
CAN) in contrast to, for example, O(logn) in a Chord network [Sto+01]. Hence,
there have been several approaches that aim to enhance both the routing perfor-
mance based on shortcut links which are also referred to as long links, as well as
the load balancing among peers to enable eﬃcient range queries in a CAN. Exam-
ples for such improvement schemes include SCAN [Sun07], RCAN [BK08; BK09],
PRoBe [Sah+05], SONAR [SSR07], and express ways in the CAN [XZ02].
While there exists a wide variety of possible Peer-to-Peer structures that support multi-
attribute range queries and could therefore be appropriate candidates for OSTM, this
work focuses on the multi-dimensional network overlay CAN. On one hand, this deci-
sion is based on to the fact, that this overlay is a well-known network structure that na-
tively supports range queries in higher dimensionswhile only requiring a small amount
of information about peers in the network. Limiting the global knowledge about the
network is beneﬁcial considering potentially compromised RPs that aim to infer the st-
cells for which speciﬁc RPs are responsible for. On the other hand, while the CAN is
known to only achieve a lookup performance of O(n1/d), several extensions have been
proposed that aim to reduce the routing complexity by introducing long links [cf. XZ02;
Sun07; BK08; BK09; Sah+05; SSR07]. These long links, however, might enable malicious
RPs to obtain a more detailed overview of the structure of the network. Accordingly, a
CAN allows to consider the trade-oﬀ between a peer’s knowledge about the network
structure with the lookup performance of the overlay.
Finally, regarding the failure of RPs in the overlay, in should be noted that the OSTM
scheme could rely on existingmechanisms that provide fault-tolerance in aCAN [Rat02].
This includes, e.g., the replication of st-datagrams to neighboring nodes or a soft-state
scheme where the TPS refreshes st-datagrams regularly or once a failure is detected.
4.3.2 Space Obfuscation using Order-Preserving Encryption
In order to be able to eﬃciently perform range queries over multi-dimensional spa-
tiotemporal coordinates, OSTM has to rely on a DHT structure that provides an order-
preserving space. This limits the applicability of traditional encryption schemes that,
while being able to achieve the security notion of IND-CPA, are not capable of pre-
serving the locality of plaintexts among resulting ciphertexts. In order to employ an
overlay-based RP network while still being able to protect the privacy of users, OSTM
employs Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) (see Section 2.4) to encrypt the spatiotem-
poral coordinates of UEs. Therefore, eNBs announce encrypted coordinates of their st-
cells, i.e., their actual locations (or a random location within their radio cell) that they
have obtained from the TPS for the current time slot. These coordinates might either
be encrypted by a multi-dimensional space obfuscation scheme like [CKG11] or by en-
crypting the coordinates individually for each coordinate axis using a traditional one-
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dimensional OPE approach like [Bol+09] or [XY12a] (see Section 2.4). Finally, UEs can
poll RPs with a polyline of the received encrypted coordinates according to the polling
procedure in CSTM (see Section 4.2.3.4).
A potential weakness of OSTM is that a malicious RP can, over time, collect several
ciphertexts that may ultimately allow an attacker to break the encryption. Furthermore,
with users traveling through the service area and ciphertexts being announced by eNBs,
UEs could retrieve a plaintext roughly corresponding to the underlying plaintext, e.g.,
using GPS coordinates. Hence, UEs are able to accumulate plaintext-ciphertext pairs
over time which weakens the OPE by subdividing the ciphertext space (or remaining
ciphertext subspaces) with each disclosed plaintext-ciphertext pair.
In order to prevent this, the TPS implements a rekeying procedure changing the key that
is used to encrypt the coordinates of the eNBs at regular time intervals, hence limiting
the validity of an OPE key to a speciﬁc number of time slots (and thus st-cells). In order
to be able to correctly store and retrieve st-datagrams despite the changing encryption
keys, OSTM relies on an identiﬁer allowing RPs to distinguish ciphertexts that have
been encrypted using the same or a diﬀerent encryption key. Furthermore, in order
to be able to build routing tables and forward messages, the overlay network has to
be able to simultaneously operate on multiple realities. In this context, the term reality
refers to a partitioning of the virtual coordinate space independent of the partitioning of
other realities. All realities are simultaneously embedded into the same set of physical
overlay nodes (i.e., RPs). Therefore, each RP is aware of the ciphertext coordinate space
it is responsible for in each reality. Note that despite the correspondence of the notion
of realities as diﬀerent, independent space partitionings in [Rat+01a], Ratnasamy et
al. only consider realities as a means of providing additional fault tolerance. The TPS
has to generate a network layout in the overlay for each new reality that emerges over
time and broadcast this information to all RPs. Here, the actual number of realities that
the overlay network has to process remains the same since, using a sliding window
approach, the oldest existing reality may be discarded once a new reality is generated.
This eﬀectively limits themaximum supported time span of the STM service. In order to
prevent adversaries from learning the st-cells that RPs are responsible for over multiple
realities, the TPS randomly shuﬄes responsibilities of RPs for certain partitions of the
overlay space for each new reality. Thus, when depositing st-datagrams, the TPS has to
storemessages addressing st-cells spanningmultiple time slots in all aﬀected realities.
Although the rekeying procedure is expected to limit the number of ciphertexts and
plaintext-ciphertext pairs that attackers can collect, it also introduces some disadvan-
tages. First of all, when employing GOPE [XY12a], it is not possible to use diﬀerent
OPE keys simultaneously in order to store and retrieve st-datagram from speciﬁc en-
crypted coordinates, as the comparison operation between ciphertexts that have been
encrypted with diﬀerent keys is not deﬁned.While it is possible to compare ciphertexts
that have been generated from diﬀerent keys in the common numeric space ofNwhen
relying on an OPF-based OPE scheme like [Bol+09], this introduces the issue of an am-
biguous ciphertexts space. For instance, considering two ciphertexts c1 and c2 that have
been generated from plaintexts p1 < p2 using two diﬀerent OPE keys, c1 could then
be smaller, larger, or equal to c2. In other words, the order-preserving property that is
necessary to store and deliver st-datagrams in the overlay network can no longer be
guaranteed. Secondly, the size of the rekeying interval limits the lengths of the paths
that UEs employ in their polling messages and requires that st-datagrams addressing
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multiple realities have to be duplicated and distributed in each of the relevant realities.
Since this overhead increases with a decreasing rekeying interval, it is necessary to ﬁnd
an optimal trade-oﬀ between eﬃcient service operation and protection of user privacy.
In particular, the rekeying interval used by the TPSs should be as large as possible but
small enough to prevent adversaries from collecting a critical number of ciphertexts or
plaintext-ciphertext pairs which allows to break the encryption.
4.3.2.1 OPE-Specific Requirements
Before investigating realizations in terms of the employed OPE scheme, it is necessary
to consider the requirements for such encryption techniques in the context of OSTM.
• Disclosure-resilience: Due to the inherent exposure of ciphertexts via RPs and
plaintext-ciphertext pairs via UEs, an OPE scheme should be able to provide re-
silience against the disclosure of such information. Furthermore, while the disclo-
sure of such information improves the ability of adversaries to estimate the un-
derlying plaintexts of a given challenge ciphertext, an OPE approach should still
be able to maintain its security properties regarding the undisclosed ciphertexts.
• Comparable distances: An OPE scheme should allow the comparison of the dis-
tances between encrypted coordinates to enable an eﬃcient operation of the over-
lay network. For example, in the greedy routing scheme of the CAN structure,
peers need to compare the distances between the destination point and their re-
spective zones to determine the next hop.
• Computation of partitions: Finally, in order to be able to split zones when new
peers join or leave the overlay, an OPE scheme should provide the ability to com-
pute ciphertexts that partition the subrange between two known ciphertexts.
In order to be able to operate an overlay network in a Peer-to-Peer fashion, an OPE
scheme should provide all of the properties outlined above. This, however, may not al-
ways be possible depending on the employed OPE approach. For example, the ability
to compare distances between ciphertexts conﬂicts with the property of disclosure-re-
silience as information about distances provides attackers with additional knowledge
beyond the plain order of ciphertexts that might be used to improve the ability of ad-
versaries to infer plaintexts for a given ciphertext. Therefore, in order to decide which
order-preserving encryption schemes might be appropriate for the realization of the
OSTM approach, the following sections provide an overview of possible realizations.
4.3.2.2 Possible Realizations of OSTM
This thesis considers the following potential realizations of the OSTM approach that
focus on one-dimensional OPE schemes:
• OPF-based OPE: In order to encrypt coordinates, the OSTM approach could rely
on an OPF-based OPE scheme. Such a scheme is, for example, the so-called “ideal
object” [Bol+09] which corresponds to anOPF that is chosen randomly at uniform
from the set OPFD,R. With this kind of encryption technique relying on a strictly
monotonically increasing function f (p) = c to encrypt a plaintext p and the inverse
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function f −1(c) = p to decrypt the corresponding ciphertext c, the ciphertexts ci
that are used by the encryption function are natural numbers. Hence, ci ∈ N (or,
depending on the deﬁnition, ci ∈N0) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M (or 0 ≤ i ≤ M−1, respectively)
for M = ∣D∣ and D = {1, . . . ,M} (or D = {0, . . . ,M − 1}).
Themain advantage of OPF-basedOPE schemes is that they rely on a range of nat-
ural numbers which enables the operation of P2P-based overlay structures with-
out any restrictions, i.e., distances can be compared among ciphertexts and the
zones can be partitioned by peers. However, with attackers being able to retrieve
information about the distances among ciphertexts and possessing the ability to
fabricate (valid or invalid) ciphertexts, a potential shortcoming of such an OPE
scheme may be its limited ability to provide resistance against the disclosure of
ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
• GOPE: Another possible realization of OSTM is based on theGOPE schemewhich
is able to provide IND-OCPA [XY12a]. The main diﬀerence compared to OPF-
basedOPE schemes is the use of sets as ciphertexts instead of natural numbers (see
Section 2.4). Accordingly, in contrast to OPF-based approaches, RPs in the overlay
network are not able to compare distances among ciphertexts which may lead to
a decrease in the lookup performance of the network. Furthermore, when peers
join or leave the overlay, since RPs are not able to split the zones they are responsi-
ble for, a TTP is required to perform this task.While this limits the self-organizing
properties of a P2P-based overlay network regarding robustness against failures,
the OSTM approach may still beneﬁt from this network structure in terms of scal-
ability with respect to an increasing size of the covered service area and an in-
creasing size of the destination regions of the st-datagrams.
• Index Tagging Schemes: In addition to the GOPE scheme, several OPE schemes
that are based on assigning index tags to ciphertexts that have been encrypted
with traditional, strong encryption schemes, have been proposed.
For example, Boldyreva, Chenette, and O’Neill [BCO11] suggest CEOE for static
and pre-determined domains. In order to analyze this scheme, the authors in-
troduce the security notion of IND-CCPA. Similar to IND-OCPA, an adversary
chooses two challenge vectors of the same size and order before key generation,
allowing the key generation algorithm to consider them as input. Then, the ad-
vantage of an adversary is given by her ability to correctly guess whether she
is given encryptions of the ﬁrst or second challenge vector. For the encryption
scheme itself, the authors propose a combination of traditional encryption and
an index tagging scheme that uses a key and the domain as input, and constructs
a monotone minimal perfect hash function mapping the i-th largest plaintext of
the domain to the tag value i. While this scheme provides IND-CCPA, it demands
that attackers are not aware of the underlying domain. Otherwise, attackersmight
directly infer plaintexts from the index tags of ciphertexts.
Another tagging scheme that is capable of achieving IND-OCPA has been pro-
posed by Popa, Li, and Zeldovich [PLZ13]. This scheme, which is referred to as
mOPE, enables the use of variable domains using amutable search tree that stores
the index information. Nevertheless, due to the use of index tags, attackers can in-
fer the underlying plaintexts of ciphertexts from the knowledge of the domain.
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In summary, the use of index tagging schemes is not appropriate for OSTM as
adversaries can be aware of the plaintext space, i.e., the coordinates of eNBs.
Note that, while the CAN overlay usually relies on the ﬂoating point range of [0, 1],
OPE schemes are only able to operate on integer numbers. Therefore, without loss of
generality, it is assumed that the CAN operates in N and that the domain has been
up-scaled in such a way that coordinates of split-up zones always remain inN.
In terms of the possible realizations, OPF-based schemes are better suited to beneﬁt
from the self-organizing properties of a Peer-to-Peer overlay network. Nevertheless, it
remains to be analyzed whether such schemes are suﬃciently resilient against the dis-
closure of ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Therefore, the following sections
ﬁrst outline the well-known OPF-based scheme, the so-called “ideal object” approach.
Apart from discussing the weaknesses of this scheme that have been discovered in the
recent literature, several encryption schemes are proposed that aim to improve the dis-
closure-resilience properties of OPF-based OPE.
4.3.2.3 Weaknesses of the “Ideal Object”
When considering the OPE schemes that are based on OPFs, currently, only the so-
called “ideal object”, that is, an OPF that is chosen uniformly at random from OPFD,R,
has been proposed in the literature. However, despite its name, the “ideal object” may
not be an optimal choice regarding the speciﬁc requirements of the OSTM approach. In
their work, Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] show that when drawing functions from OPFD,R
uniformly at random, the plaintexts that are assigned to a speciﬁc ciphertext follow a
negative hypergeometric distribution. As outlined in Section 2.4, the maximum of this
distribution is referred to as the most likely plaintext (m.l.p.) of the respective ciphertext.
Since, in case of the “ideal object”, this m.l.p. features a prominent peak at one speciﬁc
plaintext, an adversary is likely to infer the underlying plaintext of a ciphertext.
An example of the formation of these prominent peaks in the frequency distribution
of plaintext-ciphertext assigments is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Here, while the depicted
functions are drawn uniformly at random, the plaintext-ciphertext assignments are
non-uniformly distributed. For instance, the assignment of plaintext p1 to one of the
possible ciphertexts c1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} shows a non-uniform frequency distribution.
In order to visualize this issue of a very dominantm.l.p. for the “ideal object”, Figure 4.5
shows the empirically obtained frequency distribution of the plaintexts that have been
assigned to speciﬁc ciphertexts, namely c = 250 (Figure 4.5a) and c = 2500 (Figure 4.5b).
These results have been obtained by generating 108 OPFs for ∣D∣ = 500 and ∣R∣ = 5000 us-
ing the following scheme initially proposed byAgrawal et al. [Agr+04] and later termed
“ideal object” by Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09]:
1. Draw M = ∣D∣ numbers uniformly at random from R = {1, . . . ,N}.
2. Sort these ciphertexts in ascending order, resulting in sequence c1, . . . , cM.
3. Finally, the encryption function f (p) is deﬁned as f (i) ∶= ci for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M.
Accordingly, the decryption function is f −1(ci) = i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M.
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Figure 4.4 Example for the formation of dominant peaks in the frequency distribution of
plaintext-ciphertext assignments in the “ideal object”.While the depicted functions
f ∈ OPFD=[3],R=[6] are chosen uniformly at random, the individual plaintext-cipher-
text assignments yield varying frequencies.
From the depicted frequency distributions, it becomes obvious that the underlying
plaintext of a speciﬁc ciphertext is probably quite easy to predict. This rather intuitive
observation of theweaknesses of the “ideal object” is also conﬁrmed by the results from
following, existing research eﬀorts.
As outlined in Section 2.4, the initial analysis of the security properties of the “ideal
object” focused on the notion of Indistinguishability under Ordered Chosen-Plaintext At-
tack (IND-OCPA), which is the natural adaptation of Indistinguishability under Chosen-
Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) to OPE. The basic idea of IND-CPA is that an adversarymust
not be able to distinguish which one of two chosen plaintexts has been encrypted by
the left-right oracle LR. Since an adversary may perform several queries {(pul , pur )}hu=1
to LR, she could easily determine whether the chosen plaintexts from the “left” or the
“right” world have been encrypted. In order to achieve this, an adversary might, for
example, issue two queries {(p1l , p1r)} and {(p2l , p2r)}, where p1l < p2l and p1r ≥ p2r , and
compare the resulting ciphertexts c1 and c2 of both queries. If c1 < c2, the “left” plain-
texts have been encrypted, whereas in case of c1 ≥ c2, the “right” plaintexts have been
used. Hence, with ciphertexts inherently leaking the order of the underlying plaintexts,
the security notion of IND-CPA cannot be directly applied to OPE.
Thus, Boldyreva et al. [Bol+09] introduce the weakened notion of IND-OCPA, where
the adversary is only allowed to present pairs (p1l , p1r), . . . , (pql , pqr) of plaintexts to theLR oracle such that pil < pjl ⇐⇒ pir < pjr for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q. Using the so-called big jump attack
(see Section 2.4), the authors show that any OPE scheme may only achieve IND-OCPA
if the size of the range R is exponential in the size of the domain D.
While a range size that is exponential in the size of the domain is a necessary condi-
tion, it is not suﬃcient for an approach to achieve IND-OCPA. Accordingly, Xiao and
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Figure 4.5 Empiric frequency distribution of plaintexts that have been assigned to a speciﬁc
ciphertext by the “ideal object” (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
Yen [XY12a] showed that the “ideal object” is not even able to achieve IND-OCPA for a
range size ∣R∣ that is exponential in the size of ∣D∣ = 2. Moreover, in order to emphasize
their statement that the “ideal object” should be consideredmore carefully in the analy-
sis of OPE schemes, the authors construct a scheme that is indeed capable of achieving
IND-OCPA in this case. Finally, Xiao and Yen introduce the notion of Indistinguishabil-
ity under Ordered and Local Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-OLCPA) as a further weakened
version of IND-OCPA that can prevent big jump attacks by restricting queries to the LR
oracle to a plaintext interval that is at most polylogarithmic in ∣R∣. Here, they show that
adversaries may achieve a higher advantage against the “ideal object” than against the
GOPE scheme using small-jump attacks.
With the “ideal object” not being able to provide IND-OCPA or IND-OLCPA, the ex-
pected number of bits zh of a plaintext that remain secret against a known plaintext
attack is estimated in [XY12b]. Given that the ciphertexts of h chosen plaintexts are dis-
closed, the authors retrieve the security bounds of zh = Θ (log ∣D∣−hh+1 ) for a challenge
ciphertext that is chosen uniformly at random from the range. They conclude that for∣R∣ ≥ ∣D∣3 and h = o(∣D∣e), where 0 < e < 1, a ROPF generated by the “ideal object”
scheme is able to achieve one-wayness. However, their analysis only applies for tradi-
tional one-wayness that aims to recover the exact plaintext of a given challenge cipher-
text, not the ability of an adversary to accurately estimate a plaintext that is close to the
actually underlying plaintext. Hence, although considering the disclosure of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs, their results are not applicable when investigating the impact of plain-
text-ciphertext pair disclosure on the ability of an adversary to infer information about
a given challenge ciphertext.
In order to consider the ability of attackers to estimate the underlying plaintext of a
ciphertext in the analysis of the one-wayness of the “ideal object”, the advantage of
an adversary in term of Window One-Wayness (WOW) and Window Distance One-Way-
ness (WDOW) are considered in [BCO11]. Here, given a challenge set of z ciphertexts
that are chosen uniformly at random, the advantage of an adversary is her ability to
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correctly guess a window of size r in which at least one of the underlying plaintexts, re-
spectively at least one of the distances between two plaintexts of the given ciphertexts,
is within. Considering the advantage of an adversary in determining a plaintext inter-
val instead of an exact plaintext, these one-wayness notions are capable of providing
a more generalized version of one-wayness that incorporates the fuzziness of informa-
tion leakage. In their article, the authors show that, given z challenge ciphertexts and the
smallest possible window size of r = 1, the “ideal object” is able to achieve both WOW
andWDOW. However, for larger windows of size r ≈ z/√∣D∣, the “ideal object” does no
longer able to provide WOW or WDOW. Although, apart from the disclosure of chal-
lenge ciphertexts, the authors incorporate the disclosure of a few plaintext-ciphertext
pairs, they only provide a rough suggestion for the size of the range ∣R∣ ≥ 7 ∣D∣ for their
analysis to hold in this case. Therefore, it remains unclear how an increasing number
of disclosed ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs will actually aﬀect the accuracy of
the estimation that attackers might achieve.
In order to obtain a notion that considers one-wayness, partial indistinguishability, and
the disclosure of additional ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Malkin, Teran-
ishi, and Yung [MTY13] introduce (X , θ, q)-indistinguishability which is considered as a
generalization of WOW. Here, an adversary is presented plaintexts m∗1 ,m∗2 that satisfy∣m∗1 −m∗2 ∣ ≤ θ aswell as q observed plaintext-ciphertext pairs whose plaintexts have been
sampled using certain distributionsX = (Xi)i=1..q. Then, the attacker is presented a chal-
lenge ciphertext resulting from the encryption of either m∗1 or m∗2 with a probability of
0.5. Subsequently, the advantage of the adversary is deﬁned by her ability to correctly
guess whetherm∗1 orm∗2 has been encrypted. Furthermore, the authors propose a novel
OPE scheme, that is able to provide indistinguishability of plaintexts m∗1 ,m∗2 diﬀering
only in their ⌊log θ⌋ lower-order bits. Hence, in contrast to the “ideal object”, while the
higher-order plaintext bits are exposed, while a limited number of lower-order bits can
be made indistinguishable when choosing an appropriate scheme. Despite their eﬀorts
to introduce a notion that clariﬁes the partial indistinguishability of plaintexts, due to
the use of theoretical, weakened security notions, it is still not clear how well attackers
may actually be able to infer the underlying plaintexts of certain challenge ciphertexts.
In summary, based on the results of existing security analyses, it is obvious that, apart
from the general limitations in the security of OPE schemes, the “ideal object” is not
the most secure way of realizing OPE. Therefore, in order to be able to beneﬁt from the
ability of an OPE scheme to compute the distances between ciphertexts and to allow
peers in an overlay network to partition the overlay space without a TTP, this thesis
investigates ways of improving one-wayness and disclosure-resilience properties for
OPF-based OPE schemes. The intention here is to lower the probability of successfully
guessing a plaintext (or a set of plaintexts) whose encryption creates (respectively con-
tains) a given ciphertext. Within this work, three such alternative approaches for draw-
ing functions from the set OPFD,R are proposed in the following sections. Please note
that, in order to be able to achieve IND-OCPA, these schemes will still have to rely on a
range size R that is exponential in the size of the domain D.
4.3.2.4 Adversary Model for OPF-based OPE
Similar to the notion of one-wayness (see Section 2.4), for OPE schemes that are to be
employed in theOSTMapproach, thiswork considers an adversary that tries to estimate
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the plaintext that is responsible for producing an observed ciphertext. In addition, ad-
versaries are assumed to have knowledge of the OPF construction scheme and possibly
a set of previously observed ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Since attackers
might not only be able to passively observe certain ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext
pairs, the suggested attacker model also incorporates the case where an adversary is
allowed to see the ciphertexts of a set of chosen plaintexts before she is presented the
challenge ciphertext for decryption.
In terms of attacks that consider the disclosure of information, the assumption in the
literature is generally that plaintexts are picked uniformly at random from D and that
all ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs have the same probability of being dis-
closed to an adversary [Bol+09; BCO11; XY12b; XY12a]. While this thesis follows this
assumption regarding plaintexts, it is assumed that the probability for a ciphertext or
plaintext-ciphertext pair to be disclosed not only depends on the distribution of plain-
texts, but also on the probability of a speciﬁc ciphertext or plaintext-ciphertext pair
being produced by the chosen OPFs. Therefore, in this attacker model, the probability
that a ciphertext or plaintext-ciphertext pair is observed by an adversary depends on
the probability that the OPFs that have been chosen by the used construction scheme
have a corresponding plaintext-ciphertext mapping.
Ideally, an OPF construction scheme should be able to return OPFs f such that, given
any challenge ciphertext c, all potential plaintexts p have approximately the same prob-
ability of satisfying f (p) = c. Note that if c lies in an interval of size ∣D∣ at the edge ofR, some plaintexts cannot produce c. A construction scheme fulﬁlling this property is
referred to as disclosure-resilient. For all functions produced by a scheme, this property
enforces that a high number of plaintexts is mapped to any given challenge ciphertext
with a signiﬁcant probability in order to prevent adversaries from accurately guess-
ing the underlying plaintext. This condition should also hold for adversaries acquiring
additional knowledge before issuing their guess. Hence, this model incorporates the
random observation of a limited set of ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs, as well
as the ability to query the ciphertext of a limited number of chosen plaintexts. While,
for a challenge ciphertext, this additional information reduces the number of poten-
tially underlying plaintexts, the probability of having been assigned to this ciphertext
should be distributed as uniformly as possible over the remaining subspaces.
4.3.3 Alternative OPF Construction Schemes
Motivated by the weaknesses of the “ideal object”, this work considers three novel con-
struction schemes for OPFs. First, the so-called random oﬀset addition scheme is intro-
duced as an example for an OPF construction scheme that is able to achieve a perfect
uniform distribution of potentially underlying plaintexts for each ciphertext. However,
despite presenting an interesting case of a perfect uniform distribution, it will be shown
later that this scheme is vulnerable to known plaintext-ciphertext attacks. Therefore, it
cannot be considered as an encryption scheme that should be used in an actual imple-
mentation of the OSTM approach. Apart from the academic example of random oﬀset
addition, this work proposes two additional OPE schemes that aim to improve the one-
wayness properties of the “ideal object”: the random subrange selection and the random
uniform sampling schemes. The following sections describe all three approaches in detail,
while the security properties of the last two will be evaluated in Section 5.5.1.
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Random oﬀset addition The random oﬀset addition approach is an OPF construction
mechanisms that generalizes the scheme proposed by Xiao and Yen [XY12a]. In their
approach, which is deﬁned for the speciﬁc domainD = {1, 2}, the plaintext 1 is assigned
to a random element r ∈ [1,N − 1]while 2 is always encrypted to r + 1. With the authors
only employing this scheme to show that the “ideal object” is not the most secure OPE
scheme, in this work, a simple, straightforward extension of this approach is provided
for domains of arbitrary size M = ∣D∣. Therefore, in the random oﬀset addition scheme,
an OPF is generated in two steps:
1. First, choose a random oﬀset r ∈ [1,N −M + 1].
2. Then, for each plaintext p, the corresponding ciphertext can be obtained using
encryption function f (p) = p + r.
When an OPF is constructed by the random oﬀset addition approach, each ciphertext c
is produced by all potentially underlying plaintexts p ∈ [max(1,M + c −N),min(c,M)]
with equal probability. This property is expected to enable the random oﬀset addition
to achieve a near-optimal disclosure-resilience in situations when only the challenge
ciphertext is known to an adversary. Nevertheless, as soon as additional information,
i.e., ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs, are available to an adversary, its security
properties are expected to break down. In particular, once only a single plaintext-ci-
phertext pair has been disclosed, an attacker is able to obtain the random oﬀset r and
can therefore decrypt all ciphertexts. Additionally, with an increasing number of known
ciphertexts, an attacker may be able to narrow down the potential range that is used by
the OPF, eventually allowing her to reverse the encryption by inferring unknown ci-
phertexts that lie between the known ones.
Please note that due to the vulnerabilities outlined above, the random oﬀset approach
should not be considered as an encryption scheme for the actual implementation of the
OSTM approach. Nevertheless, despite its obvious vulnerability for known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs, the random oﬀset addition approach might still enable interesting in-
sights in the security features of OPF-based OPE schemes considering the resilience it
may provide against known ciphertext attacks.
Random uniform sampling In order to obtain an OPF construction scheme that is
more resilient against attacks based on the knowledge of additional ciphertexts and
plaintext-ciphertext pairs, this work suggests the random uniform sampling scheme out-
lined in Algorithm 1. The concept of this approach is similar to that of the NHGD
scheme proposed in [Bol+09]. However, instead of choosing ciphertexts based on a
negative hypergeometric distribution (which leads to the “ideal object”) it employs a
uniform distribution to prevent the formation of dominant peaks in the distribution of
the plaintexts that are assigned to each ciphertext.
Here, the rand-unif-sample procedure ﬁrst initializes the OPF f with the empty set {}
and invokes the initial call to the sample procedure with f , the minimum and max-
imum element of D (dmin = 1 and dmax = M), as well as the minimum and maximum
element of R (rmin = 1 and rmax = N). Then, the sample procedure picks a plaintext p
from [dmin, dmax] as a splitting element (see line 7). When choosing a splitting element,
the random uniform sampling scheme may rely on one of two possible splitting strate-
gies, namely choosing p uniformly at random as shown in Algorithm 1, or using the
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Algorithm 1 Random Uniform Sampling
1: function rand-unif-sample(M, N)
2: f ← {}
3: sample( f , 1, M, 1, N)
4: return f
5: end function
6: procedure sample( f , dmin, dmax, rmin, rmax)
7: p $←Ð [dmin, dmax] ▷ select random splitting element p
8: mS ← p − dmin ▷ number of plaintexts p′ < p
9: mL ← dmax − p ▷ number of plaintexts p′ > p
10: c $←Ð [rmin +mS, rmax −mL] ▷ randomly select ciphertext c
11: f ← f ∪ {(p, c)} ▷ add (p, c) to OPF f
12: ▷ recursively sample lower subspace
13: if p > dmin then
14: sample( f , dmin, p − 1, rmin, c − 1)
15: end if
16: ▷ recursively sample upper subspace
17: if p < dmax then
18: sample( f , p + 1, dmax, c + 1, rmax)
19: end if
20: end procedure
median, i.e., the middle element of [dmin, dmax] (or one of the two middle elements cho-
sen uniformly at random in case of an even number of plaintexts). Having selected a
splitting element p, the corresponding ciphertext c is drawn uniformly at random from[rmin +mS, rmax −mL], where mS = p − dmin and mL = dmax − p are the numbers of plain-
texts smaller and larger than p. Then, the resulting pair (p, c) is added to f (see line
11), dividing both the domain and the range into subspaces, where each subspace with
a non-empty domain is recursively sampled using the sample procedure (see lines 14
and 18). In these subsequent recursive calls to rand-unif-sample, the lower subspace
has domain [dmin, p−1] and range [rmin, c−1], whereas the upper subspace has domain[p+1, dmax] and range [c+1, rmax]. Finally, once all calls to sample have ﬁnished and thus
all plaintexts have been assigned to a ciphertext, rand-unif-sample returns the OPF f .
Random subrange selection Finally, this work introduces the so-called random sub-
range selection scheme which builds on choosing an OPF from a randomly chosen sub-
rangeN′ of the original rangeN = ∣D∣. Then, given this subrange, for the actual sampling
of an OPF, the random subrange selection approach relies on an alternative OPF con-
struction scheme. The intention here is that, while the OPFs that is constructed for a
speciﬁc subrange N′ may still feature prominent most likely plaintexts for each cipher-
text, the randomization step should spread the most likely plaintexts of the subranges
over the full domain. Accordingly, this should reduce the overall probability of themost
likely plaintexts of each ciphertext. In order to construct an OPF, the random subrange
selection scheme performs the following procedure:
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1. Randomly decide (with an equal probability of 0.5) whether to choose a lower
bound or an upper bound ﬁrst.
2. According to the choice of the previous step, select the upper and lower bounds
uniformly at random as follows:
a) If a lower bound is to be chosen ﬁrst, draw the lower bound rmin ∈ [1,N−M+1].
Then, draw the upper bound rmax ∈ [rmin +M − 1,N].
b) Otherwise, ﬁrst choose the upper bound rmax ∈ [M,N] and then the lower
bound rmin ∈ [1, rmax −M + 1].
3. Sample an OPF from the domain [1,M] and the range [1, rmax − rmin + 1] using an
alternative construction scheme. In this work, the following construction schemes
are considered for this: the “ideal object” and both variants of the randomuniform
sampling scheme proposed in Section 4.3.3.
4. Finally, adjust the range of the OPF that is returned by the alternative construction
scheme by adding rmin − 1 to all ciphertexts and return the resulting OPF.
Note that the expected size of the used subrange remains linear in N and that the ex-
pected subrange interval lies symmetrically around N+12 .
4.3.4 Adaptation of CAN
In order to operate a CANwithOPE, some slightmodiﬁcations of the original approach
are required inOSTM. This sectionmotivates and outlines these adaptations in detail.
Mapping st-cells into the overlay In OSTM, in order to distribute responsibilities for
st-cells to RPs, the TPS distributes tokens containing encrypted overlay coordinates to
RPs along with information about the corresponding st-cells. This also allows the TPS
to control the size and use of a rekeying interval at which OPE keys are switched. In
this context, given the ability of a CAN to operate in d dimensions, the question arises
how st-cells are mapped into the overlay space. As Ratnasamy [Rat02] have shown that,
for increasing d, the routing complexity can be reduced at the cost of a larger number
of links to be maintained with neighboring nodes, it seems preferable to rely on higher
dimensionality. Nevertheless, this requires mapping strategies that can transform the
natural three-dimensional space of geographic coordinates over time into a higher di-
mensional space by adding additional (random) information. While this represents a
promising aspect for further investigation, this thesis only considers the set of d = {2, 3},
leaving an in-depth analysis of the impact of higher dimensions to future research. This
allows to employ two simple strategies for assigning st-cells to RPs. For d = 3, the spa-
tiotemporal coordinate (x, y, z) is directly encrypted into overlay coordinate (u, v,w)
where u = (Enc(Kx, x), v = Enc(Ky, y), and w = Enc(Kz, z)). In case of d = 2, this work
relies on a simple mapping strategy which transforms (x, y, z) into (u, v,w) while w is
simply ignored by the CAN. Hence, for d = 2, overlay coordinates (u, v,w) sharing both
u and v are always assigned to the same RP.
Overlay-based Spatiotemporal Multicast (OSTM) 99
Joining and departure of RPs When relying on OPF-based OPE schemes, no modiﬁ-
cations of CAN are required apart from up-scaling the ﬂoating point space of [0, 1] to a
natural number that is suﬃciently large for coordinates of zones to remain inN. In case
of GOPE, with RPs being unable to generate ciphertexts from existing zone coordinates
themselves, it is assumed that the TPS distributes zone coordinates to RPs once a node
joins, leaves, or has failed. Note that in order to prevent malicious nodes from request-
ing arbitrary coordinates and thus obtaining ciphertexts, the TPSs only handles join
and takeover requests from authorized and authenticated RPs. Furthermore, the TPS
demands that RPs provide the identiﬁer of the failed RP, allowing it to check whether
this node has actually failed by requesting conﬁrmation from the allegedly failed node
and, for further veriﬁcation, from RPs linking to the failed node.
Routing in the overlay CAN relies on a greedy routing scheme where messages are
forwarded to the neighbor whose zone, i.e., any of the zone’s edge coordinates, is clos-
est to the destination point [Rat02]. While this distance-based approach can also be used
in case of OPF-based OPE, it is not applicable in the context of GOPE which prevents
the computation of the distance among ciphertexts. Accordingly, a modiﬁed routing
algorithm is required in this case. Since only the “<”, “>”, and “=” relationship may be
determined in GOPE, OSTM relies on a greedy direction-based approach where a mes-
sage is forwarded to a neighborwhich lies in the direction of the destination point. First,
messages are forwarded to neighbors along the u-axis until the destination coordinate
is within the projection of the zone of the forwarding RP onto the u-axis. Then, mes-
sages are forwarded accordingly along the v-axis, and, in case of d = 3, ﬁnally along the
w-axis until the destination point is fully within the zone of the destined RP.
Use of long links In order to reduce the routing complexity from O( d√N) in CAN toO(logN), OSTM provides the option to rely on long links based on the RCAN scheme
[BK08; BK09]. Corresponding to CAN, RCAN maintains short links, i.e., links to the
direct neighbors of a zone into each direction along all d axes. In addition, for each
dimension, RCAN relies on long links pointing to nodes that are responsible for a more
distant zone. This allows nodes to ﬁrst checkwhether a long linkmay be used instead of
a short linkwhen forwardingmessages along an axis in order to bridge a larger distance
towards the destination point in the overlay space with fewer hops.
Long links are constructed individually for each axis in clock-wise direction by com-
puting distant destination points and sending requests to these points to determine the
RPs that are responsible for the zones in which these distant points are located in. In
order to quickly reach a destination point and to achieve logarithmic routing complex-
ity, RCAN creates long links at distances 2j ⋅wi from the smaller edge of a zone along
axis i = 1, . . . , d where wi is the width of the zone along dimension i and j = 1, . . . , lmax
is the corresponding number of long links along i. Here, j = 0 is not considered as the
long link at distance 20 ⋅wi = wi corresponds to the existing short link. Note that for each
long link, an RP has to be aware of the corresponding ciphertext of the smaller edge of
the RP’s zone that is associated with the long link. When forwarding a message, an RP
uses the most distant long link where the zone’s smaller edge is larger or equal to the
destination point and (in case there is a next, i.e., more distant long link), the smaller
edge of the next long link’s zone is smaller than the destination point. If there is no such
long link, an RP falls back to the respective short link.
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When relying on GOPE, the TPS has to handle the construction of long and short links
since RPs are not able to compute a ciphertext which is at a certain distance from the
zone of the RP. Here, it is obvious that each link provides an additional advantage to an
adversary as it reveals distance-related information between ciphertexts. Accordingly,
it is necessary to consider the ability to limit the maximum number of long links to
0 ≤ l ≤ lmax contrary to the original RCAN approach in order to provide a trade-oﬀ
between the routing eﬃciency and the intended privacy properties of OSTM.
Storage of st-datagrams Generally, in order to store a value in a CAN, a unique key is
required. However, as st-datagrams address an st-region, the overlay network has to be
able to store a d-dimensional hyperrectangle. To achieve this, messages are ﬁrst routed
to a so-called representative point, i.e., the centroid of the destination region. During the
forwarding of a message to this representative point, RPs check for an intersection of
their zones with the destination region. If there is no intersection, the st-datagram is
simply forwarded to the next neighbor along the route to the representative point. Oth-
erwise, the RP stores the st-datagram and triggers the controlled ﬂooding procedure
described in [Rat+01b]. Here, the node being responsible for the representative point
forwards the message to all of its neighbors (excluding the link from which the data-
gram has initially been received). Then, a node receiving the datagram from a neighbor
in dimension i forwards it to all neighbors into the opposite direction in this dimension,
as well as to all neighbors along dimensions 1, . . . , (i − 1). In order to limit the number
of ﬂooding messages, RPs maintain a transient cache holding the identiﬁers of data-
grams that have already been forwarded. RPs receiving a ﬂooding message store the
datagram if their zone intersects with the destination region and forward the datagram
to all neighbors intersecting with the addressed st-region – given that no cache entry
exists for the respective datagram identiﬁer. Finally, if no appropriate neighbor can be
found to forward the datagram, themessage is discarded in order to stop the ﬂooding.
Handling of polling messages With a CAN traditionally operating on key and value
pairs, the polylines of movement paths that UEs provide in their polling messages de-
mand amodiﬁcation of the original routing scheme. In particular, according to the stor-
age of st-datagrams, nodes route a polling message to its representative point, i.e., the
median point of the polyline (if there are two such points, the smaller one is chosen
as representative). Once this point is reached, the controlled ﬂooding procedure out-
lined in the previous paragraph is triggered.While forwarding amessage, RPs perform
an intersection test between their zones and the included polyline. In case there is no
intersection, the message is simply forwarded towards the destination. If there is an
intersection, the RPs checks whether it holds st-datagrams that should be delivered to
the corresponding UE by testing the stored destination regions for intersectionwith the
polyline. Given one or more matches, a response holding the st-datagrams is sent to the
UE. Finally, when further forwarding the polling message, RPs include the identiﬁers
of the delivered st-datagrams to avoid duplicate deliveries.
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4.4 Case Study of Report Verification in Disasters
A potential use case of an STM service is the veriﬁcation of reports in large-scale disas-
ters (see Section 3.1.5). In order to highlight the applicability of an STM service as well
as the feasibility of such a report veriﬁcation scheme, this section provides a case study
based on one of the proposed RP-based schemes considering the speciﬁc design ob-
jectives and details of a possible realization of a report veriﬁcation service. While both
CSTM and OSTM are good candidates for this evaluation, CSTM was chosen in this
work since it presents a slightly less complex approach in comparison to OSTM and
should therefore enable an easier analysis of the report veriﬁcation scheme. In particu-
lar, CSTM is expected to allow a relatively easy and straight-forward implementation in
real-world situations that yields a more predictable behavior in comparison to OSTM
which is based on amore complex CAN infrastructure. Note that althoughOSTM could
provide better elasticity and scalability properties, adjusting the number of RPs of an
STM service in response to a disaster situation can be mitigated with an initial over-
provisioning (e.g., using an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provider). Since this over-
provisioning is expected to only incur costs over a rather short time frame of several
days or weeks, this is considered to be acceptable.
4.4.1 Design Objectives
4.4.1.1 Functional Objectives
• Proximity restriction: Only users that have been close to an event should be able
to vote for corresponding reports about the event.
• Deferring of votes: Users should be able to defer their votes and submit them at
a later point in time in order to be capable of responding appropriately to urgent
situations like the need to provide ﬁrst aid to another victim.
4.4.1.2 Non-functional Objectives
• Verification delay: Reports should be veriﬁed quickly to enable a fast decision-
making based on trustworthy information.
• Robustness: As a result of the disaster, parts of the infrastructure may fail. There-
fore, a veriﬁcation approach must be able to operate in a delay- and disruption-
tolerant manner. In addition, the scheme should be robust against false reports
and votes that are issued without malicious intent.
• Scalability: The given objectives should not be severely degraded by an increasing
number of users or reports.
• Eﬃciency: The veriﬁcation scheme should be eﬃcient regarding the computation,
memory, and communication overhead.
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4.4.1.3 Security Objectives
• Secure communication: Reports and votes have to be delivered conﬁdentially,
authentically, and with integrity protection.
• Resilient decision-making: The report veriﬁcation scheme should provide resil-
ience against malicious reports and votes. Consequently, users must only be able
to issue one report about an event and vote once for each report. Accordingly,
adversaries must also not be capable of performing Sybil attacks [Dou02].
• Accountability: In order to prevent the abuse of the veriﬁcation scheme and to be
able to prosecute crimes that have been committed due to the abuse of the report
veriﬁcation service, oﬃcial authorities should be able to obtain the identity of a
reporter or witness. Nevertheless, restrictions have to apply for the access to this
information in order to prevent the misuse of this data.
• Availability: The veriﬁcation service should provide resistance against DoS at-
tacks, as well as countermeasures against spamming of reports and votes.
4.4.1.4 Privacy Objectives
• Anonymity: Attackers must not be able to infer the identities of users that have
issued reports and votes.
• Location privacy: Attackers must not learn about the locations of users. Other-
wise, by tracking their movements, attackers could be able to infer the identities
of reporters or witnesses.
• Co-locationprivacy: Attackers should not be capable of determiningwhether two
users have been residing within the same st-cell.
• Absence privacy: Attackers must not learn about the absence of users from a spe-
ciﬁc location during a certain time.
A discussion of the ability of the report veriﬁcation scheme to fulﬁll the functional and
non-functional objectives will be presented in the feasibility study in Section 4.4.3. Fur-
thermore, a detailed discussion of the ability of the report veriﬁcation scheme to fulﬁll
the privacy and security objectives is provided later on after the analysis of the CSTM
approach in Chapter 5. Please note that the discussion of the privacy and security ob-
jectives is deferred to the next chapter as the veriﬁcation scheme is based on the CSTM
approach and therefore inherits several of its privacy and security properties.
4.4.2 Overview of Approach
As outlined in section 3.1.4, the suggested veriﬁcation approach allows users to report
events to one of potentiallymany veriﬁer nodes via theirmobile devices (see Figure 3.3).
Then, in order to verify the received reports, the veriﬁer sends several conﬁrmation re-
quests to all users that have been residing close to the respective event at the time at
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which a report has been issued. An STM scheme is required here to deliver conﬁrma-
tion requests in a privacy-aware manner supporting both delay-tolerant communica-
tion and deferring of votes. Building upon CSTM, the veriﬁcation service relies on RPs
to deliver conﬁrmation requests while preserving the privacy of users. Accordingly, the
UEs of users poll speciﬁc RPs at regular time intervals using the tokens τ containing
the symmetric keys K that have been negotiated proactively for the visited st-cells.
Since, infrastructure failures often occur after disasters, the continuous announcement
of tokens via eNBs may not be possible. Therefore, tokens are negotiated in a Peer-to-
Peer fashion between nearby users in a cryptographically secure manner. Accordingly,
at regular time intervals, each UE initiates the negotiation of a group key K with all
nearby users that are in communication range. UEmay also forward the key negotiation
requests over several hops in order to increase the number of UEs within each group
and therefore the number of potential witnesses for some event that might occur. The
established tokens are considered valid for a certain time after reception. Then, when
issuing a report to a veriﬁer, a UE includes the current set of valid tokens in themessage
that is sent to the veriﬁer to enable it to deposit the corresponding conﬁrmation requests
at the respective RPs, enabling potentialwitnesses of the event to retrieve the requests.
Finally, witnesses having retrieved a conﬁrmation request can issue their vote to the
veriﬁer which is then able to decide whether a report can be considered trustworthy
based on the majority of votes. In order to prevent adversaries from performing a Sybil
attack and in order to enable users to issue only one report or vote per event, the sug-
gested veriﬁcation schemes relies on a so-called Identity Server (IS)which is required to
authenticate the identity of UEs. Hence, before being able to issue a report or vote, a
UE has to contact the IS and request a voting ticket λ containing a vote identiﬁer υ that
is unique for each combination of a user and report. In order to protect the privacy of
users, the IS must not obtain the actual reports when issuing voting tickets. Therefore,
the IS does not issue a voting ticket λ for the message M of a report itself, but instead
provides a ticket for h(M)which is provided by the UE requesting a voting ticket. Here,
h(⋅) again represents a cryptographic hash function.
The following sections provide a detailed overview of the four phases of the proposed
witness-based report veriﬁcation approach.
• Tokennegotiation: In the ﬁrst phase,UEs initiate a secure protocol for a group key
exchange in order to negotiate a common symmetric key K in speciﬁc, randomly
distributed time intervalswithin their k-hop neighborhood. Such a protocolmight
be, for example, the Group Diﬃe-Hellman (GDH) protocol [STW96]). When the
group key exchange protocol is ﬁnished, UEs have negotiated a speciﬁc group key
K. By applying a cryptographic hash function to this key,UEs obtain the respective
token τ = h(K) for the st-cell the user is currently residing in. In order to be able
to poll RPs for conﬁrmation requests later on, UEs store a pair (τ,K) containing
both the token τ and the symmetric group key K.
• Event reporting: When issuing a report about an event, a UE has to interact
with both the IS and the veriﬁer (see Figure 4.6). Therefore, the UE establishes
a secure connection to the IS using a protocol providing conﬁdentiality, data in-
tegrity, and entity authentication (e.g., the TLS protocol), and sends h(M) to the
IS. Then, the IS authenticates the identity of the UE and responds with a vot-
ing ticket λ = (υ,{h(M), υ}IS) which contains the unique vote identiﬁer υ. Here,
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Figure 4.6 Event reporting in the witness-based veriﬁcation scheme.
υ = h(id, h(M),KIS)where id represents an identiﬁer for the identity of a UE, e.g.
the GUTI. Furthermore, {}IS is the public-key signature of the IS and KIS is a se-
cret that is only known to the IS. The key KIS allows to prevent the guessing of υ
for a known identity and report message.
Please note that in order to prevent duplicate reports, the reporting application
on the UE should provide users with information about reports that are already
being issued in their surroundings. If another report has already been issued re-
garding a certain event, the application does not send a report, but instead re-
quests users to proactively conﬁrm the respective report. This enables the UE to
respond to conﬁrmation requests that are received later on without requiring fur-
ther interaction from the user.
Then, the UE establishes a secure TLS connection to the veriﬁer node and trans-
mits the report ρ = (λ,M,α1, . . . ,αl) containing message M = (r, x, y, t,m) which
consists of the geographic coordinates (x, y), a time stamp t, the message descrip-
tionm, and a randomnumber r that is included to prevent the IS fromguessing the
hash value h(M) of the message. Additionally, αi = (τi,EKi(M)) represents the to-
kens τ and reportmessagesMwhich are symmetrically encryptedwith the group
key K for all tokens that are currently valid at time t. Finally, the veriﬁer calculates
h(M) to verify the signature of the IS and checks whether a vote or report has
already been issued for the given vote identiﬁer υ. If not, the veriﬁer accepts the
report and initiates the veriﬁcation procedure described below.
Note that it is possible to operate more than one veriﬁer node, e.g., for load bal-
ancing purposes, in order to provide resistance against DoS attacks, or to ﬁlter
reports. Accordingly, diﬀerent organizational units like police, ﬁre, or ambulance
could operate individual veriﬁer nodes.
• Confirmation request: In order to be able to decide whether a report can be con-
sidered trustworthy, the veriﬁer sends conﬁrmation requests to speciﬁcRPs,where
potential witnesses of the event are able to retrieve them. Hence, for each αi con-
tained in the report, the veriﬁer computes a RP identiﬁer rpτi = h(τi). According
to the CSTM approach, this identiﬁer is used to retrieve the DNS name of the RP
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Figure 4.7 Witness feedback in the report veriﬁcation approach.
where the request should be stored. By appending the number rpτi mod N to a
known preﬁx (N again is the number of RPs), the veriﬁer can resolve the IP ad-
dresses of the RPs. Finally, after having established a secure connection using TLS,
the veriﬁer sends (τi,EKi(M)) to the respective RP, which deposits the encrypted
report message EKi(M) for lookup with τi.
• Witness feedback: Corresponding toCSTM,UEspoll RPs at regular time intervals
in order to retrieve conﬁrmation requests concerning their stored tokens τ (see
Figure 4.7). The addresses of the RPs are again derived from rpτ.
Once a UE receives the encrypted report message EK(M) for a token τ, it de-
crypts the message with the stored group key K and asks the user to decide about
the trustworthiness of M. Having obtained a decision δ ∈ {true, false,unsure,defer}
from the user, the UE establishes a secure TLS connection to the IS and requests
a voting ticket λ as described in the event reporting phase.
Finally, it establishes a secure TLS connection to the veriﬁer and sends the vote
V = (λ, δ) of the user to the veriﬁer node. Here, in order to allow the postponing of
votes, if the UE does not receive an input from the user within a certain time limit,
it may auto-reply with a “defer” notiﬁcation. This enables the veriﬁer to detect
pending votes from legitimate witnesses, allowing it to postpone its ﬁnal decision
in case a signiﬁcant number of votes that are still missing.
Once the veriﬁer has received several votes that yield a clear majority conﬁrming
the trustworthiness of a report, the event is considered true. Subsequently, event-
related information can be incorporated in the incident action planning process
and may be distributed to other information services relying on this data.
4.4.3 Feasibility Study
This section evaluates the feasibility of witness-based report veriﬁcation in disasters.
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4.4.3.1 Research Questions
When considering the proposed report veriﬁcation scheme, several research questions
are of interest. A ﬁrst aspect that is relevant for the suggested approach is the number of
witnesses that may be available for the veriﬁcation of an event. Here, a higher number
of witnesses is expected to provide more reliable results regarding the trustworthiness
of a report. Accordingly, this translates to the following research questions:
• How does mobility of users aﬀect the number of available witnesses?
• How does node density influence the number of potential witnesses?
These aspects are of importance considering the unpredictability of the mobility of
users after a large-scale disaster. Since users are likely to move in groups of various
sizes, it is crucial to understand the impact of diﬀerent kinds of mobility patterns and
node densities on the potential number of witnesses.
Apart from the impact of the mobility of users on the number of witnesses, with the
number of tokens that are used to verify reports inﬂuencing the number of available
witnesses, the parameters of the token negotiation procedure are also of interest. Ac-
cordingly, the following research questions are investigated in this thesis:
• How does multi-hop token negotiation impact the potential number of witnesses?
• How does the validity period of tokens aﬀect the potential number of witnesses?
In addition to the number of potential witnesses of an event, it is important to consider
the subset of witnesses that is actually sure about the correctness of an event. Here,
it is assumed that witnesses are sure about the correctness of an event if they have
been residingwithin a certain distance in close proximity of the event (considering their
movements over time). Since themobility and the parameters regarding the negotiation
of tokens are expected to aﬀect the uncertainty of witnesses about reports due to the
varying distance of users from the locations of diﬀerent events over time, the following
research questions are of interest:
• How does mobility of users influence the number of unsure witnesses?
• How does node density aﬀect the number of unsure witnesses?
• What is the impact of multi-hop token negotiation on the number of unsure witnesses?
• How does the validity period of tokens aﬀect the uncertainty of witnesses?
The next section discusses the conducted experiments and the obtained results.
4.4.3.2 Simulation Setup
In order to investigate the given research questions by conducting a simulation study
for the parameters shown in Table 4.1, the report veriﬁcation scheme has been imple-
mented in the event-based network simulatorOMNeT++ [Var01] and theMiXiM frame-
work for realistic wireless communication [KW09].
In order to model the presence of events in the disaster area, random coordinates were
chosen on the ﬁeld to represent the locations of events. Furthermore, a circlewas used to
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Table 4.1 Simulation parameters (report veriﬁcation scheme).
Parameter Value
Number of repetitions 50 (avg. with 99% conﬁdence level)
Simulated time 120 min (+ 60min mobility warm-up)
Field size 5× 5 km2
Number of nodes 1000, 2000
Ratio of malicious nodes 0 ... 0.4 in steps of 0.05
Number of events 100 randomly placed on ﬁeld
Event radius U(25 m, 250 m)
Token negotiation interval U(15 min, 30 min)
Negotiation hop limit 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Token validity period 5 min, 10 min (starting at reception)
Mobility Models RWP, RPGM, NC, SLAW
Movement speed U(0.5 m/s, 1.5 m/s)
Max. pause duration 60 s (RWP, RPGM), 15 min (NC)
Group size (RPGM, NC) N (µ = 4, σ2 = 4)
Max. group/ roaming radius 5 m (RWP), 25 m (NC)
Group change probability (RPGM) 0.1
SL
AW
Waypoints (number, ratio) 1000, 5
Hurst parameter self-similarity 0.75
Cluster (range, ratio) 50, 5
Pause time (min., max., Levy exp.) 10 min, 50 min, 1
Distance alpha 3
Radio Model IEEE 802.11 (2.4 GHz, 54 Mbit/s)
Transmit power 17 dBm (max. comm. range ≈ 100 m)
Receiver sensitivity -65 dBm
Signal attenuation threshold -84 dBm
Thermal noise -100 dBm
Path loss model log-distance, log-normal shadowing
Path loss coeﬃcients n = 3.0, σ = 9.5 dB
Fast fading model Jakes’ Rayleigh fading
Payload length 1024 bytes
represent the impact area of an event which caused users to issue reports once they en-
tered this area.When considering the potential uncertainty ofwitnesses about an event,
it was assumed that benign users were only sure about the validity of a reported event
if they had been residing within the radius of the event. In addition, for the evaluation
of the impact of the mobility of users at walking speed, the following mobility models
were chosen to provide a variety of speciﬁcmovement patterns. Note that the respective
movement traces were created using the BonnMotion scenario generator [Asc+10].
• RandomWaypoint (RWP): First, the RWPmodel [JM96]was chosen to incorporate
a well-known mobility model for the sake of comparability. While this model is
not expected to provide very realistic results as pure randommovement does not
reﬂect actual human mobility, it should yield a sustainable number of witnesses
issuing votes for all events on the ﬁeld.
• Reference Point Group Mobility (RPGM): Apart from individual user movement,
a group mobility model was incorporated to consider the inﬂuence of users trav-
eling in the same or similar direction. The RPGMmodel considers groupmobility
by clustering nodes in groups that randomly select a destination point and mov-
ing directly towards this point [Hon+99]. Once the destination is reached, a new
point is chosen uniformly at random on the ﬁeld. Here, the grouping of users is
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expected to increase the potential number ofwitnesses as usersmoving in a group
are likely to always be in mutual communication range.
• Nomadic Community (NC): While the RPGM model considers group mobility, it
does not incorporate the inﬂuence of users residing at certain locations for some
time which may be a likely scenario after large-scale disasters where a group of
users may take a rest or provide help to other victims. Therefore, the NC model
was included in the simulation study to evaluate the impact of periods of rest and
mobility [SM01]. While this model basically corresponds to a random group mo-
bility model, it incorporates the respective pause times. For pauses, it is expected
that they result in a reduced number of potential witnesses as users are less likely
to travel large distances and visit only a small fraction of the ﬁeld.
• Self-similar Least-Action Walk (SLAW): Finally, a realistic mobility model for hu-
man walks was chosen to represent typical mobility patterns for such human
walks including groupmobility, pause times, as well as self-similar waypoints re-
sulting from speciﬁc, routinely performed tasks [Lee+12]. While this model was
not speciﬁcally designed for mobility that is found in disaster areas, it still allows
to incorporate more realistic human walking patterns.
Figure 4.8 depicts the simulation environment for speciﬁc runs with the distribution of
users yielding the expected patterns of clustered nodes.
4.4.3.3 Results and Discussion
This section now presents and discusses the obtained results.
Before considering the number and uncertainty of witnesses, Figure 4.9 considers the
question of how many users can be expected to form a token group, i.e., the average
number of users negotiating and sharing a common token. Here, for 1000 nodes and a
token negotiation interval of 5min. (Figure 4.9a), the results for the RWP model reﬂect
the lack of users in the close vicinity of users. Please note that the number of users shar-
ing a token is only depicted for a token validity period of 5min. as the duration of the
validity period of tokens does not aﬀect the number of users negotiating a token. Ac-
cordingly, the average number of users in the token negotiation groups is only slightly
above 1. In contrast, the group mobility models show a considerably higher number of
users due to the movement of users in groups. Note that for an increasing number of
hops in the token negotiation procedure, while the RPGM and NC models yield just a
slight increase of the number of users (presumably due to the limited number of other
groups in communication range), only the SLAWmodel shows a strong increase in the
number of users in the token negotiation groups which may be the result of larger clus-
ters of users in this case. Furthermore, as expected, the nomadic mobility model yields
a lower number of users in the negotiation groups due to pause times of nodes.
Considering a higher node density of 2000 users (Figure 4.9b), while the RWP, RPGM,
and the NC model only show a slight increase of the average number of users sharing
a token, the SLAW model beneﬁts from the increased number of users with a strong
increase of the average number of users sharing a token. This is a promising result for
the veriﬁcation of reports as, for the more realistic group mobility models, tokens are
shared among moderately sized groups of users. Accordingly, tokens are negotiated
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(a) RandomWaypoint (b) Reference Point Group Mobility
(c)Nomadic Community (d) Self-similar Least-Action Walk
Figure 4.8 Examples for the usedmobility models (1000 nodes). The depicted ﬁeld has an area
of 5× 5 km2. Events and their corresponding awareness areas are shown as circles.
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Figure 4.9 Average number of users sharing a token.
among approximately 2.5 to 3 users for the NC model, 5.5 to 6.5 nodes for RPGM, and
about 2.5 to 12 users in case of the SLAWmodel.
Figure 4.10 highlights the average number of witnesses per report. Here for densities of
both 1000 and 2000 nodes, as well as token validity periods of 5 and 10min., the RWP
model only yields an average number of slightly above 1witness. While this behavior is
contrary to the initial expectations, it is reasonable considering the randomdistribution
of users which would probably require a considerably higher node density or transmit
power to obtain a suﬃciently large number of other users in communication range. In
contrast, while RPGM, as expected, yields a higher number of witnesses than the NC
model in all four depicted cases due to the reduced mobility of users in this model,
it is also obvious from the given results that an increase of the token validity period
from 5 to 10min. does not indicate a clear increase of the number of witnesses for nei-
ther RPGM nor the NC model in case of both 1000 (Figure 4.10a and Figure 4.10b) and
2000 nodes (Figure 4.10c and Figure 4.10d). This behaviormay be a result of the random
movement of users in those cases which results in only a limited number of groups vis-
iting the same event areas. In contrast, SLAW, as the most realistic of the investigated
models, clearly beneﬁts from the increase of the number of users, the increase of the to-
ken validity period, as well as a negotiation of tokens over multiple hops. Accordingly,
for 1000 nodes, the increase of the token validity period from 5 to 10min. results in the
expected increase of the average number of witnesses from about 13 to 16witnesses in
case of 6 hops. Despite the increase with the number of hops for 1000 nodes, in case of
2000 users, the impact of an increased number of hops and an increased token validity
period is evenmore dominant for SLAW.Accordingly, the average number of witnesses
increases from about 12witnesses (1 hop) to 53witnesses (6 hops) for a validity period
of 5min. (Figure 4.10c) and from 15witnesses (1 hop) to even 70witnesses (6 hops) for
a validity period of 10min. (Figure 4.10d).
As indicated by the previous results, the number of witnesses of an event can be in-
creased by relying on multi-hop token negotiation. This, however, should lead to an in-
crease of the number ofwitnesses that are unsure about the correctness of the respective
event. Figure 4.11 conﬁrms this expectation for both densities of 1000 and 2000 nodes.
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Figure 4.10 Average number of witnesses per report.
While the ratio of unsure witnesses in case of the RWP model only slightly increases
from about 0.12 for a token validity period of 5min. in Figure 4.11a to 0.125 for a va-
lidity period of 10min. in Figure 4.11b, the NC model yields only a slight increase of
the ratio of unsure witnesses for both validity periods. This, again, may be the result
of the pause times of users in this model. In terms of the RPGM model, the random
movement of groups of users results in a clear increase of the ratio of unsure witnesses.
Accordingly, for single-hop token negotiation, the ratio of unsure witnesses increases
from approximately 0.11 for a token validity period of 5min. (Figure 4.11a) to 0.16 for
a validity period of 10min. (Figure 4.11b). Furthermore, in case of multi-hop negoti-
ation, while an increasing number of hops only slightly increases the ratio of unsure
witnesses, its value still increases by approximately 0.03 for a token validity period of
5min. and 0.05 for a validity period of 10min. for this model.
In case of SLAW for a density of 1000 nodes, the ratio of unsure witnesses shows a
strong increase of up to 40% of witnesses. This highlights the disadvantage of SLAW
that, while it is able to provide a high number of witnesses, due to the potentially wide-
spread distribution of nodes in this model, a large fraction of witnesses is unsure about
an event. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that in real world scenarios, witnesses
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Figure 4.11 Ratio of benign witnesses who are uncertain about their decision.
are unlikely to only be sure about events if they have been in the close vicinity of an
event (50 to 250m). Hence, the obtained results are rather conservative in their esti-
mation of the uncertainty of witnesses. Furthermore, in an actual disaster area, unsure
witnesses might be able to move back to the area of the reported event for conﬁrmation
(although such a behavior might not always be reasonable considering the potential
risk of unknown threats in this area).
Finally, for 2000 nodes, while the absolute ratio of unsure witnesses slightly increases
with the higher node density leading to an increasing number of witnesses, the results
depicted in Figure 4.11c and 4.11d basically conﬁrm the previous observations.
Summarizing these results, the initial research questions can be answered as follows:
• How does mobility of users aﬀect the number of (unsure) witnesses?
Contrary to the initial expectations, the RWP model is not able to provide a suﬃcient
number of witnesses for moderate node densities. In contrast, group-based mobility
models like RPGM andNC, as well as the more realistic SLAWmodel, in particular, are
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able to provide a reasonable number of witnesses at a relatively small ratio of uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, in case of SLAW, a more wide-spread distribution of nodes leads
to an increase of witnesses that are unsure about the reported events.
• How does node density influence the number of (unsure) witnesses?
As expected, while increasing the node density results in a noticeable increase of the
number ofwitnesses for allmobilitymodels, the uncertainty amongwitnesses increases
as well. Nevertheless, the increase of the ratio of uncertain witnesses is rather moder-
ate, indicating the applicability of a witness-based report veriﬁcation scheme in both
moderately and densely populated areas.
• How does multi-hop token negotiation impact the number of (unsure) witnesses?
While for the RWP, the RPGM, and the NCmobility models, an increase of the number
of hops only yields a slight increase of the number of witnesses with only a small rise in
their uncertainty, the beneﬁt of multi-hop token negotiation becomes even more obvi-
ous in the SLAWmodel. Here, while an increasing number of hops drastically increases
the number of witnesses, their uncertainty about events shows only a slight increase in
all considered scenarios. Accordingly, considering the distribution of nodes formore re-
alistic movement patterns, a report veriﬁcation scheme should aim to negotiate tokens
over a limited number of a few hops.
• How does the validity period of tokens aﬀect the number of (unsure) witnesses?
While an increased validity period of tokens can mitigate the issue of a small number
of witnesses in case of less densely populated environments at the cost of a potentially
increased uncertainty of witnesses, in case of higher node densities, shorter validity
periods are preferable to achieve a lower ratio of unsure witnesses.
In summary, the proposed witness-based report veriﬁcation approach presents a feasi-
ble application of an STM service in large-scale disaster situations.
4.5 Summary
In this section, two RP-based STM approaches have been presented. CSTM is based
on assigning the responsibility of RPs for certain st-cells uniformly at random using a
cryptographic hash function. However, shortcomings of CSTMmay be, for instance, its
rather static infrastructure as well as a potential lack of scalability with respect to, e.g.,
an increasing number of participants or st-datagrams.
Therefore, the OSTM scheme relies on the CAN overlay and OPE to realize an STM
service. Here, the ability to protect the privacy of users strongly depends on the one-
wayness properties of the employed OPE scheme. Additionally, since the window one-
wayness properties of the “ideal object” are not expected to provide a suﬃcient level of
resilience against adversaries with additional knowledge (such as locations of eNBs),
alternative construction schemes for OPFs have been proposed.
Finally, in order to highlight the applicability of an RP-based scheme in the context of a
real-world application, a case study evaluating the feasibility of a witness-based report
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veriﬁcation scheme for disasters has been conducted using CSTM. The following chap-
ter provides an in-depth analysis of these schemes, along with an evaluation of privacy
and security properties of CSTM, OSTM, and the report veriﬁcation approach.
5 Privacy and Security Analysis
This chapter evaluates the privacy and security properties of the proposed CSTM and
OSTM schemes with respect to the objectives outlined in Section 3.2. Furthermore, as a
feasibility study of CSTM, the proposed report veriﬁcation scheme for large-scale dis-
asters is evaluated according to its privacy and security objectives. For both CSTM and
OSTM, the respective objectives are investigated using diﬀerent analytical models as
well as an extensive simulation study which is based on a realistic large-scale mobility
scenario of the traﬃc of the city of Cologne over a full day. Finally, this chapter con-
cludes by comparing both approaches in detail, highlighting individual strengths and
weaknesses in the context of various possible application scenarios.
5.1 Research Questions
Given the privacy and security objectives outlined in Section 3.2, this work aims to an-
alyze the ability of both CSTM and OSTM to fulﬁll these objectives. Here, in particular,
this chapter focuses on providing answers to the following research questions.
• How does the served number of st-cells aﬀect user privacy in CSTM and OSTM?
For an STM service, the served number of st-cells, i.e., the service area size as well as the
supported time span, are key to the achievable level of user privacy (and precision of st-
region addressing). This is due to the fact that an increasing number of st-cells increases
the possible search space of an adversary being interested in inferring location-related
information. Accordingly, this work investigates the impact of the served number of st-
cells and the resulting privacy implications for the given objectives.
• How does the number of RPs aﬀect user privacy in CSTM and OSTM?
With the served number of st-cells being assigned to diﬀerent RPs, an increasing num-
ber of RPs is expected to decrease the number of st-cells that are mapped to each RP.
This may, on one hand, allow adversaries to obtain an increasing advantage as the pos-
sible search space for visited st-cells is reduced for each RP. On the other hand, a small
number of RPs represents a greater risk of violating user privacy if an attacker is able
to compromise an RPs that serves a higher number of st-cells. Accordingly, this chapter
evaluates the trade-oﬀ and constraints that should be considered when deciding on a
number of RPs that is appropriate to fulﬁll the given privacy objectives.
In addition, for OSTM, the following research questions are of interest:
• Are OPF-based OPE schemes an appropriate mechanism to protect user privacy?
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Due to the knownweaknesses of the “ideal object” (see Section 4.3.2.3), this chapter ﬁrst
studies the ability of the proposed OPF-based OPE schemes to fulﬁll the required one-
wayness properties. Finally, assuming a “perfect” OPE scheme that only leaks the order
among ciphertexts, OSTM is evaluated with regards to the given privacy objectives.
• Can rekeying mitigate the disclosure of ciphertexts / plaintext-ciphertext pairs in OPE?
Based on the observation that any OPE in OSTM will ultimately break due to the pro-
gressive disclosure of ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the suggested coun-
termeasure of exchanging OPE keys and shuﬄing the responsibilities of RPs over time
(see Section 4.3.2) is investigated under the given privacy objectives.
• What is the impact of the dimensionality of the CAN on user privacy?
With thiswork focusing a two- and three-dimensional CANstructure (see Section 4.3.4),
this chapter analyzes the ability of OSTM to achieve the intended privacy properties in
both cases. On one hand, for d = 2, zones are expected to be smaller on the spatial uv-
plane in comparison to d = 3 for an equal number of RPs. On the other hand, in case
of d = 3, st-cells are distributed to RPs according to their (u, v,w) coordinates, while,
given d = 2, st-cells are mapped to RPs using (u, v). Accordingly, both strategies are
expected to have positive and negative privacy implications given the diﬀerent abilities
of adversaries under various attack schemes.
• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect user privacy?
As highlighted in Section 4.3.1.1, long links are expected to provide a trade-oﬀ between
the knowledge of RPs about the overlay network structurewith the lookupperformance
of the CAN. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the impact of the use and number of long
links on user privacy, while the performance implications are evaluated in Chapter 6.
5.2 Simulation Scenario
In order to investigate the research questions outlined above in a realistic environment,
extensive simulation studies have been conducted based on an enhanced version of
the so-called TAPAS Cologne scenario [VW06; UF11] using the vehicular traﬃc simula-
tor SUMO [Beh+11], as well as the OMNeT++ network simulator [Var01]. The TAPAS
Cologne scenario models the traﬃc of cars according to the daily activities and routines
of drivers based on statistical information about the population of the city of Cologne
in Germany over the course of 24 hours [VW06]. This scenario was chosen since it is the
only large-scale traﬃc scenario that is, at the time of this writing, freely available in the
research community, providing a traﬃc environment with highly mobile users which
is considered to represent a high-load situation for an STM service.
While this scenario provides the mobility of users, it does not consider the coordinates
of base stations in the cellular network. Since cellular network operators are generally
unwilling to provide any detailed information about the locations of eNBs in order to
protect their infrastructure, thisworks relied on free information about the approximate
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(a) The road network of the scenario.
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Figure 5.1 Overview of the TAPAS Cologne scenario in the SUMO simulator [VW06; UF11].
The depicted Voronoi diagram shows a realistic approximation of an actual cellu-
lar network with varying cell densities that correspond to the density of the road
network and a notable increase of the cell density at the city core.
locations of base stations from a web-service that is dedicated to collecting such infor-
mation for certain areas within Germany1. Here, street addresses of base stations are
reported by a community of volunteers sharing a common interest in mobile commu-
nications. Given the addresses of the coordinates of base stations in the city of Cologne,
the Nominatim service2 was used to obtain the geo-coordinates of eNBs. Finally, the
geo-coordinates were adjusted to the (x, y)-coordinates of the Cologne scenario.
In order to obtain a mobility trace of users with respect to cell switches, SUMO was
extended as follows. First, at the beginning of the traﬃc simulation, a Voronoi diagram
was generated using the coordinates of the eNBs. Then, during simulation, SUMO cal-
culated a trace of cell switches when vehicles changed cells of the Voronoi diagram.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of both the road network and the Voronoi diagram
that was used to approximate the coverage area of base stations. Note that while the re-
sulting cellular network is not likely to exactly correspond to the actual infrastructure,
it is able to reﬂect the varying densities of radio cells in more or less densely populated
areas of the city (see Figure 5.1b). Finally, while a Voronoi diagram may only approxi-
mate relocation and handover procedures, it allows to obtain the basicmobility patterns
which are of interest for the evaluation of STM services in a realistic environment.
1http://www.senderliste.de
2http://nominatim.openstreetmap.org
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5.3 Analysis and Discussion of CSTM
In order to evaluate the privacy and security properties of the Cluster-based Spatiotem-
poral Multicast (CSTM) approach, the following sections consider the privacy and se-
curity objectives proposed in Section 3.2.3.
5.3.1 Privacy Aspects
When considering the ability of CSTM to fulﬁll the given privacy objectives, the follow-
ing research questions are considered:
• How does the number of RPs aﬀect user privacy?
• What is the impact of the served number of st-cells?
5.3.1.1 Location Privacy
In order to infer the locations of receivers, attackers might rely on the observation or
probing attack, the compromise of RPs or eNBs, or a combination of these attacks (see
Section 4.1.2.3 for a description of the attacks). The following sections now discuss the
implications of each of the possible attacks regarding the location privacy of users.
Observation attack In the observation attack, adversaries observe the communication
between entities, i.e., between eNBs and UEs, UEs and RPs, the TPS and RPs, as well
as between the sender and the TPS. Due to the employed TLS protocol, in the CSTM
approach, attackers are only able to infer the locations of users by observing them di-
rectly in the respective st-cells. This, however, is an issue that is not related to the STM
service as the direct observation of a few speciﬁc users is always possible. Accordingly,
location privacy cannot be violated by adversaries relying on the observation attack.
Probingattack In the probing attack, adversaries observe the communication between
UEs and RPs, as well as between RPs and the TPS. By sending an st-datagram to a spe-
ciﬁc region, the attacker tries to infer the RP that is responsible for a certain st-cell. Then,
she tries to identify users that have been residing in this st-cell by observing which UEs
poll the respective RP. To be successful, an adversary has to be capable of recognizing
her probing message among the other messages that are exchanged between RPs and
the TPS. This, however, is only possible if she is the only one who is sending an st-data-
gram to a certain region as the employed TLS protocol does not allow her to decrypt the
messages that are exchanged between the TPS and the RPs. Here, the TPS and the RPs
could rely on dummy traﬃc [Ray01] to prevent the analysis of the traﬃc between each
other. Nevertheless, even if an adversary can retrieve the corresponding RP identiﬁer
idrp,K for the speciﬁc st-cell, she is not able to deduce the st-cell identiﬁer idst,K from this
due to the pre-image resistance of the cryptographic hash function h(⋅). Thus, K cannot
be obtained without having visited the respective st-cell.
In order to be able to infer the locations of users, an attacker has to be able to infer the st-
cells forwhichRPs are responsible for.However, adversaries are only able to retrieve the
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RP identiﬁers idrp,K for speciﬁc st-cells. Since RPs are responsible for an unpredictable,
large number of diﬀerent st-cells according to idrp,K = h(idst,K), adversaries cannot vio-
late the objective of location privacy by solely relying on the probing attack.
An RP is expected to be responsible for a randomly drawn fraction of 1/N of all st-
cells, where N is the total number of RPs. Therefore, the location privacy of users might
be at risk of being violated if N exceeds the total number of st-cells that are served
simultaneously by CSTM. This is due to the fact that an RP is likely to be assigned to a
single or only a few st-cells in this case. Hence, for an RP to be responsible for at least k
diﬀerent st-cells according to the concept of k-anonymity, the following equation should
be considered when assessing the total number of RPs:
N ≤ ∣C∣ ⋅ tmaxts0
k
Here, ∣C∣ represents the number of radio cells in the service area, tmax the maximum
time span up to which st-datagrams can be delivered into the past, and ts0 the duration
of the used time slots at level 0 of the employed token hierarchy.
Movement attack In order to infer the locations of UEs, adversaries might rely on the
movement attack. Here, attackers employ one or more UEs to collect tokens containing
the symmetric keys K, thus revealing the responsibilities of RPs in terms of the visited
st-cells. However, due to the initialization of the CPRNGs of the eNBs with random
seeds and the unpredictable distribution of responsibilities according to h(h(K))mod
N, adversaries are not able to infer the keys (or st-cell identiﬁers) of the unvisited st-cells.
Nevertheless, attackers may obtain the symmetric keys of the higher levels of the token
hierarchy that are shared among st-cells.While thismight enable adversaries to roughly
estimate the whereabouts of users once they rely on these shared keys for polling, this
is only possible if the attackers are actually able to obtain the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K
that are employed by UEs. This, however, is not possible due to the use of the TLS
protocol between UEs and RPs. Accordingly, adversaries cannot violate the objective of
location privacy by only relying on the movement attack. Please note that the resilience
against this attack also holds if adversaries are able to deploy UEs in all radio cells of
the network due to the k-anonymity that is provided by RPs.
Compromising RPs Apart from observing communication between entities, sending
probing messages, or employing UEs to infer the responsibilities of RPs, more sophis-
ticated attackers might be capable of compromising one or more RPs. Having compro-
mised an RP, an adversary obtains access to the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that are mapped
to this RP. Nevertheless, in this case, an attacker is still not able to retrieve the respective
st-cells due to the pre-image resistance of the cryptographic hash function h(⋅). There-
fore, in order to infer the mapping of idst,K → st-cell, in addition to compromising RPs,
adversaries have to rely on either the probing or the movement attack.
Regarding the probing attack, it should be noted that guessing an st-cell requires that at-
tackers actually send probing messages to diﬀerent st-cells via the TPS. This is based to
the fact that, due to the pre-image resistance of h(⋅), an adversary cannot simply guess a
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key K for an st-cell that results in an identiﬁer idst,K = h(K) being located on the compro-
mised RP. Furthermore, in their probing messages, attackers have to address a speciﬁc
radio cell c and a certain time slot ts to retrieve a unique mapping of idst,K → st-cell.
Depending on the number of st-cells that are served by the CSTM scheme, this can re-
sult in a potentially large number of probing messages which address very diﬀerent st-
cells. Therefore, with the authentication of senders preventing Sybil attacks [Dou02], the
TPS can further impede probing by implementing mechanisms that limit the amount
of probing messages that an adversary may dispatch.
In terms of the movement attack, it should be noted that adversaries can only infer the
locations of users if they both have been present at the same st-cells or, considering the
hierarchical token aggregation, the symmetric keys K have been shared between the
visited st-cells at some level l > 0.
Therefore, having compromised one or more RPs, attackers may be able to partially vi-
olate the location privacy of receivers, provided they can obtain themapping of idst,K →
st-cell for the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that are stored on the compromised RPs. Never-
theless, they are unable to continuously track the movements of UEs as st-cells will be
stored at random RPs according on h(idst,K)mod N. Having compromised z = γ ⋅ N
RPs, where γ represents the ratio of compromised RPs, the ratio of st-cells that adver-
saries might obtain among all visited st-cells of a UE is also γ. Thus, increasing the total
number N of RPs reduces themaximumnumber of st-cells samples that adversaries are
able to retrieve when compromising RPs. Assuming that an RP should be responsible
for at least k st-cells and that adversaries are only able to compromise up to z RPs and
obtain a maximum fraction of up to γ of all visited st-cells of a UE, the total number N
of RPs should be chosen according to the following equation:
z
γ
≤ N ≤ ∣C∣ ⋅ tmaxts0
k
For example, let ∣C∣ = 50000, tmax = 7 days, and ts0 = 10min. Furthermore, let z = 10,
γ = 0.05, and k = 10000. Then, the number of RPs can be chosen as follows:
10
0.05
≤ N ≤ 50000
10000
⋅ 7 ⋅ 24 ⋅ 3600 s
600 s
200 ≤ N ≤ 5040
Compromising eNBs Finally, if adversaries are able to compromise one or more eNBs,
they can, on one hand, directly observe UEs in the respective radio cells. On the other
hand, attackers are able to gain access to the current state of the CPRNG, allowing them
to infer the whereabouts of UEs that are or will be residing within the corresponding
radio cells. Accordingly, by compromising eNBs, adversaries can violate the objective
of location privacy. Nevertheless, the CSTM approach is still able to provide graceful
degradation in this case by limiting the violation of the location privacy to the radio
cells of the compromised eNBs and by only aﬀecting st-cells after the compromise.
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5.3.1.2 Co-location Privacy
When trying to determine whether two users have been co-located at some st-cell, at-
tackers may again rely on the four basic attacks. The following sections now provide a
detailed discussion of the potential impact of each of these attacks considering the co-
location privacy of users.
Observationattack While, in this attack, adversaries are able to observe the communi-
cation between entities, they are not able to decrypt the exchangedmessages due to the
use of the TLS protocol. Accordingly, they are not able to retrieve the st-cell identiﬁers
idst,K that are included in these messages. Nevertheless, attackers could at least deter-
mine whether two UEs contact the same RP which is a necessary (but not suﬃcient)
condition to infer the co-location of these two users. However, with UEs exchanging
polling messages with all RPs over time due to h(⋅)mod N distributing the responsi-
bilities for st-cells uniformly at random over all RPs, adversaries are not even able to
obtain such an indicator for the co-location of two users. Therefore, the objective of co-
location privacy cannot be violated using the observation attack.
Probing attack With the probing attack, adversaries might be able to infer which RPs
are responsible for certain st-cells. However, since the conﬁdentiality of polling mes-
sages is protected by TLS, attackers cannot retrieve the respective st-cell identiﬁer idst,K
that are contained in these messages. Hence, even if an adversary is able to infer the
RP that is responsible for a certain st-cell, this RP is still responsible for ki statistically
independent st-cells (1 ≤ i ≤ N). To gain deeper insight into the achievable level of co-
location privacy that can be provided by CSTM, this work relies on the so-called co-
location probability. This probability measures the likelihood that two UEs – polling the
same RP – have actually been residing in the same st-cell. The following section now
derives and discusses the co-location probability in CSTM.
Let Pri(A) denote the probability that UEA, which polls RPi, has been residing in a
speciﬁc st-cell. Furthermore, let Pri(A ∩ B) = Pri(AB) denote the probability that two
devices UEA and UEB, which poll the same RPi, have been residing in the same st-cell.
Assuming that events A and B are statistically independent, Pr(AB ∣ X = ki) equals to:
Pr(AB ∣ X = ki) = ki ⋅ 1k2i = 1ki
where X represents the event that RPi is responsible for exactly ki st-cells. Note that
Pri(AB ∣ X = ki) corresponds to the probability of getting a doublet in the simple ran-
dom experiment of a single throw of two fair dice with ki faces.
To obtain the overall co-location probability, it is further necessary to consider the ran-
dom assignment of st-cells to RPs. Here, due to the distribution of α = ∣C∣ ⋅ tmax/ts0 st-
cells to N RPs uniformly at random, the assignment procedure can be interpreted as a
process of randomly distributing α distinguishable balls into N distinguishable boxes,
which has Nα possible outcomes. Since UEs only poll RPs being responsible for st-cells
that they have visited, the co-location probability is considered under the condition
that RPs are responsible for at least one st-cell, i.e., each box contains at least one ball.
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Table 5.1 Simulation parameters for co-location frequency in CSTM.
Parameter Value
Number of repetitions 30 (avg. with 99% conﬁdence level)
Simulated time 1 day
Field size approx. 33× 35 km2
Number of eNBs ∣C∣ 604 base stations
Time slot size ts 10 min (144 time slots)
Life time of tokens 24 h (unlimited)
Number of UEs 718 140
Polling interval 2 h
st-datagrams
Number of st-datagrams 100
Delay until sending of st-datagrams U(1 h, 5 h)
Addressed st-regions rectangular areas at random locations
Begin time of addressed st-regions U(6 h, 14 h)
Duration of addressed st-regions U(10 min, 50 min)
Area of addressed st-regions (2 km)2
Token Hierarchy
Spatial aggregation none
Temporal aggregation none
Furthermore, in order to obtain the overall co-location probability, it is suﬃcient to con-
sider, without loss of generality, the number of st-cells (balls) that have been assigned
to the ﬁrst RP (box). Based on these assumptions, the overall co-location probability
Pr(AB ∣ X ≥ 1) can be derived as follows:
Pr(AB ∣ X ≥ 1) = α∑
i=0 Pr(AB ∧X = i ∣ X ≥ 1)= α∑
i=0 Pr(AB ∣ X = i ∧X ≥ 1) ⋅Pr(X = i ∣ X ≥ 1)= α∑
i=1 Pr(AB ∣ X = i) ⋅Pr(X = i)
Here, Pr(X = i ∣ X ≥ 1) represents the probability that the ﬁrst box contains exactly i
balls. Substituting Pr(AB ∣ X = i) and Pr(X = i) in the equation above results in the
following expression for the co-location probability in CSTM:
Pr(AB ∣ X ≥ 1) = α∑
i=1
1
i
⋅ (αi) ⋅ (N − 1)α−i
Nα − (N − 1)α where α = ∣C∣ ⋅ tmaxts0 (5.1)
Note that Pr(X = i ∣ X ≥ 1) is obtained by observing the ﬁrst of the N boxes. Then,
the total number of possible arrangements of balls into boxes corresponds to Nα minus
the number (N − 1)α of possible trials in which the ﬁrst box is empty (accounting for
conditionX ≥ 1). Furthermore, (αi) ⋅ (N −1)α−i denotes the number of possible variations
in which exactly i balls are in the ﬁrst box. Dividing the number of successful trials
where exactly i balls are located the ﬁrst box by the total number of trials, yields the
corresponding probability Pr(X = i ∣ X ≥ 1).
In order to validate Equation 5.1 under the assumption of a perfectly uniform distri-
bution of st-cells to RPs, as well as statistically independent polling behavior of UEs, a
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Figure 5.2 Empiric co-location probability of UEs based on the number of RPs.
simulation study has been conducted for α = 86, 400 and N ∈ {1, . . . , 600}. Since, with
more than 106 repetitions, the empirically computed values conﬁrmed Equation 5.1, an
overview of these results is omitted here. Nevertheless, in real-world scenarios, statis-
tically independent polling behavior may be rather unlikely. Accordingly, in order to
estimate the applicability of Equation 5.1 in a such a setting, the co-location probability
of UEs was empirically measured using the simulation study of the Cologne scenario
outlined in Section 5.2. The respective parameters are listed in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.2a depicts the results for the maximum and mean relative co-location fre-
quency with respect to st-cells for an increasing number of RPs. As expected, the re-
sults of Equation 5.1, which are based on the assumption of statistically independent
polling behavior, show a slight deviation from the empirically measured frequencies.
Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of both ideal and empiric values, as well as the
general behavior for an increasing number of RPs allow STM providers to estimate the
co-location probability that can be expected from a certain service setup. In the Cologne
scenario, CSTM is clearly able to fulﬁll the objective of co-location privacy with respect
to st-cells, yielding relative co-location frequencies of approximately 5 ⋅ 10−4 to 7 ⋅ 10−3.
These values are well below the critical threshold of 50%, at which an adversary could
gain signiﬁcant advantage when observing the RPs being polled by UEs.
Note that in order to be able to provide a general statement on the co-location privacy of
users in a real-world setup, it is necessary to further reﬁne the model suggested in this
work by incorporating, e.g., information about known hot-spots. Nevertheless, assum-
ing large-scale deployment and cellular networks that are well-balanced for the actual
network traﬃc, Equation 5.1 can provide a good initial reference.
Finally, Figure 5.2a shows the empiric results for the maximum and mean relative co-
location frequency with respect to radio cells, i.e., the probability that two UEs which
poll the same RP have – independently from each other – visited the same radio cell
during some arbitrary time slot. Here, the relative frequency shows higher values of up
to 25%which can be explained by the fact that there are only 604 radio cells in contrast
to the 604 ⋅ 144 = 86, 976 st-cells, resulting in a higher chance of UEs being co-located.
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Despite the increased co-location probability, adversaries are also not able to gain a
signiﬁcant advantage in this case.
In summary, assuming that the number of st-cells and RPs is carefully chosen (consid-
ering, as a rough guideline, Equation 5.1), a level of co-location privacy can be achieved
that can be expected to be suﬃcient for most users.
Movement attack Using the movement attack, attacker are able to infer the respon-
sibilities of RPs for certain st-cells. Nevertheless, due to the use of the TLS protocol
between UEs and RPs, attackers are not able to retrieve the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that
are included in the polling messages. Since RP being responsible for k diﬀerent st-cells,
adversaries are unable to determine whether two UEs employ the same idst,K. Hence,
co-location of users cannot be inferred by only relying on the movement attack.
Compromising RPs If an attacker is able to successfully compromise one or more RPs,
she may violate the objective of co-location privacy. This is due to the fact that, in this
case, an attacker is able to obtain the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that are included in the
polling messages of UEs. Accordingly, if two UEs provide the same idst,K to an RP, they
must have been co-located at the respective st-cell.
Despite the potential violation of the co-location of users, there are still some eﬀorts re-
quired for this attack to be actually useful to an attacker. For instance, if an adversary is
aware of the st-cell of a presumedmeeting and has to ability to identify two knownUEs
among the others that are polling an RP, she has to be capable of compromising a spe-
ciﬁc RPs (the one that is responsible for the st-cell where the meeting has taken place).
Additionally, in order to ﬁnd out which RP has to be compromised, it is necessary that
an attacker can successfully perform a probing attack. Apart from determining the co-
location of two known users, an adversary might also be interested in the co-location
of any two users, for example, in order to infer social connections. In this case, she has
to be aware of the st-cell of the meeting and the identities of users in order for the infor-
mation about two UEs sending polling messages with the same st-cell identiﬁer idst,K
to be useful to her. Thus, on one hand, in order to reveal the st-cell of a meeting, an
attacker has to be able to successfully perform a probing attack. On the other hand, an
adversary has to be able to determine the identities of co-located users, which can be
diﬃcult if UEs change their IP addresses or rely on more advanced measures of hiding
their network addresses (e.g., usingmix networks [Cha81] or onion routing [GRS96]).
Compromising eNBs Finally, if attackers compromise one or more eNBs, they may
violate the co-location privacy of users. This is due to the fact that, on one hand, ad-
versaries can obtain the state of the CPRNG for the corresponding radio cells. On the
other hand, having compromised an eNB, attackers may directly observe UEs that are
co-located within the respective cells. Nevertheless, CSTM provides graceful degrada-
tion as the violation of co-location privacy is limited to the aﬀected cells.
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Figure 5.3 Examples for the expected number of st-cells that an UE must have visited for it
to poll all N RPs according to the classic coupon collector problem [cf. DB62; Fel68].
Here, the required number of st-cells equals Tr(N) ∈ Θ(N logN).
5.3.1.3 Absence Privacy
Considering the need to protect the absence privacy of users from certain st-cells, at-
tackers may again rely on the four basic attacks. In order to evaluate the impact of the
potential attacks regarding the absence privacy of users, the following sections now
discuss the implications of these attacks in detail.
Observation attack While attackers can observe the ongoing communication between
entities, they are not able to decrypt and read messages that are exchanged between
themdue to the use of the TLS protocol. Hence, adversariesmight only infer the absence
of speciﬁc users fromcertain st-cells by observingwhether the correspondingUEs never
exchange polling messages with certain RPs. However, with h(⋅)mod N distributing
the responsibilities for st-cells uniformly at random over all RPs, UE exchange polling
messages with all RPs – assuming an appropriate number of st-cells.
In order to obtain a rough estimate of the appropriate number of st-cells for anUE to poll
all RPs, it is possible to apply the classic coupon collector problem [cf. DB62; Fel68]. Here,
given an urn of n distinguishable coupons that are randomly chosen, with replacement,
by a collector, the coupon collector problem describes the expected number of trials
Tr(n) that are necessary for the collector to drawn each coupon at least once:
Tr(n) = n ⋅Hn = n ⋅ n∑
k=1
1
k
(5.2)
Accordingly, Tr(n = N) represents the expected number of visited st-cells for a UE to
poll all N RPs. Figure 5.3 shows some example values for Tr(N), yielding a moderate
increase of the number of required st-cells which follows Tr(N) ∈ Θ(N logN).
If this condition cannot be met, UEs should exchange dummymessages with all RPs to
protect the absence privacy of users, presuming indistinguishability fromactual polling
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messages. This mechanism should also be considered when introducing an STM ser-
vice, since, during this phase, UEs would only progressively start to poll all RPs over
time. In summary, when following the guidelines above, attackers are not able to infer
the absence of users from certain st-cells.
Probing attack When performing the probing attack, an adversary can infer the re-
sponsibilities of RPs for speciﬁc st-cells. Accordingly, attackers could determine the ab-
sence of users from certain st-cells if their UEs never exchange polling messages with
the relevant RPs. This, however, is not the case as UEs send polling messages to all
RPs. The reason for this is the random distribution of st-cell identiﬁers idst,K over all RP
identiﬁers idrp,K = h(idst,K) by the cryptographic hash function h(⋅). Using the probing
attack, adversaries are therefore not able to violate the absence privacy of users.
Movement attack The movement attack enables attackers to infer the responsibilities
of RPs for certain st-cells. Consequently, adversariesmight infer the absence ofUEs from
certain st-cells if they never exchange polling messages with the relevant RPs. How-
ever, according to the probing attack, this is not possible since UEs exchange polling
messages with all RPs. Therefore, adversaries cannot infer the absence of users from
certain st-cells using the movement attack.
Compromising RPs If an adversary is able to compromise one or more RPs, she gains
access to the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that are included in the polling messages of UEs
and stored on the respective RPs. Consequently, an attacker may infer that a UE has not
been residing in a certain region with the identiﬁer idst,K if no such polling message is
received during a polling interval, i.e., over the known time span that is employed by
UEs between two consecutive polls. Accordingly, if no such pollingmessage is received,
an adversary can infer that certain UEs have not visited the st-cells with identiﬁer idst,K.
Here, similar to the discussion of the objective of co-location privacy, for this attack
to yield useful information to an adversary, she has to rely on the probing attack to
obtain the mappings of idst,K → st-cell for the identiﬁers idst,K that are stored at the
compromisedRPs. Furthermore, attackers have to be aware of the identities of users and
their UE addresses in order to be able to recognize that certain RPs are never polled.
Compromising eNBs Finally, considering the compromise of eNBs, the objective of ab-
sence privacy can be locally violated within the respective radio cells. This is due to the
fact that compromised eNBs may detect the absence of a certain user from the cell, pro-
vided attackers are aware of the identities of users and the network identiﬁers of their
respective UEs (for example their IMSIs). Adversaries may not, however, determine the
absence of users from the aﬀected radio cells from some point in time in the past as
the state of the CPRNG does not allow to reveal previous symmetric keys. Therefore,
regarding the compromise of eNBs, CSTM provides graceful degradation, limiting the
violation of the absence privacy of users to the aﬀected radio cells.
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5.3.1.4 Anonymity of Recipients
In terms of the anonymity of users, the implications of the four basic attacks are now
considered in detail in the following paragraphs.
Observation attack In this attack, adversaries may observe the communication be-
tween eNBs and UEs, UEs and RPs, the TPS and RPs, as well as between the sender and
the TPS. In order to infer the identities of users, attackers might rely on their knowledge
of the employed network identiﬁers of the respective UEs like the IMSIs, the GUTIs,
or the currently assigned IP addresses. However, inferring the identities of users from
these identiﬁers requires access to components of the cellular network core like the HSS
or theMME. Since it is assumed that an adversary is not able to gain access to those com-
ponents and the cellular operator itself is assumed to be trustworthy, attackers cannot
infer the identify of users from the respective network identiﬁers. In addition, attackers
could try to infer the identities of users from the locations of their UEs which might
reveal important locations like their home addresses during the night or their work
addresses during the day that can be used to identify individuals. However, since the
location privacy cannot be violated using the observation attack, adversaries are not
able to infer the identities of users from their whereabouts.
If the adversary is expected to be potentially able to access the core network of the cel-
lular operator and might therefore be capable of inferring the identities of users from
their network addresses, UEs should rely on more advanced techniques for anonym-
ity protection when contacting RPs. Such mechanisms for the obfuscation of network
identiﬁers could be, for instance, mix networks [Cha81] or approaches that are based
on onion routing [GRS96] like the Tor network [MSD04].
Probing attack Based on the assumption that an adversary is not able to gain access to
the HSS or the MME and that the cellular operator is considered trustworthy, attackers
cannot infer the identities of users from the respective network identiﬁers. Therefore,
she may only try to infer the identities of users from their whereabouts. However, as
outlined above, while by performing the probing attack, adversaries can gain access
to the mappings of certain st-cells to speciﬁc RPs, they are not able to infer the actual
whereabouts of UEs as RPs are responsible for a large number k of diﬀerent st-cells.
Consequently, an attacker is unable to violate the objective of the anonymity of receivers
of st-datagrams by only relying on the probing attack.
Movementattack Assuming that adversaries are unable to access theHSS or theMME
and that the cellular operator is trustworthy, adversaries cannot retrieve the identities
of users from their network identiﬁers. Accordingly, attackersmight only infer the iden-
tities of users from their locations. However, despite the potential disclosure of the re-
sponsibilities of RPs for certain st-cells, adversaries cannot retrieve the locations of users
since RPs are responsible for at least k st-cells. Hence, the movement attack does not al-
low adversaries to infer the identities of the receivers of an st-datagram.
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Compromising RPs According to the previous discussions, if adversaries are not able
to gain access to the HSS or the MME and assuming a trustworthy cellular operator,
attackers are not able to retrieve the identify of users from their network identiﬁers.
However, in case adversaries are able to compromise one or more RPs, they are able
to get access to the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that are stored on the respective RPs. This
might allow adversaries to infer the identities of users if attackers are able to violate the
location privacy of users by successfully launching a probing attack for the mappings
of idst,K → st-cell and the st-cell identiﬁers idst,K that are stored on the compromised
RPs. Depending on the obtained st-cell, only a single location sample that can reveal
the identity of a user with a high probability, for example, considering the location
sample is located within a rural area with only a few residents. On the other hand, if
the obtained st-cells are located along a highway during the rush hour of a large city,
the anonymity of users is not violated by this information. Accordingly, the anonymity
of users might be violated if attackers are able to violate the location privacy of users
by additionally performing a successful probing attack.
Note that, while the identities of users might be inferred from their locations, the cellu-
lar network structure provides the advantage that radio cells form natural anonymity
zones. Even if a user’s presence to a certain st-cell is revealed, this only refers to the
presence to a radio cell at some time. Since radio cells are designed to balance the load
in the network, it is very likely that there is always a certain number of UEs within each
cell. Furthermore, as the coverage area of radio cells is typically in the magnitude of
several tens or hundreds of meters, it may be diﬃcult to recognize that a user has been
residing in a certain building, for example. Therefore, even if a user’s presence to a radio
cell is revealed, it may still be diﬃcult to actually infer the identity of this user.
CompromisingeNBs While, assuming that attackers are unable to obtain the identities
of users from their network identiﬁers, when being able to compromise eNBs, attackers
might violate the anonymity of receivers by inferring their identities from their known
presence to the aﬀected radio cells. However, on one hand, as outlined in the previous
section, inferring the identities of users from their presence in a radio cell may not be
easy to achieve. On the other hand, if the anonymity of users can be violated, this vi-
olation is limited to the radio cells of the compromised eNBs. Therefore, despite the
potential threat of the violation of the anonymity of users due to the compromise of
eNBs, the CSTM scheme is still able to provide graceful degradation in this case.
5.3.2 Security Aspects
Finally, apart from privacy considerations, the following sections now discuss the abil-
ity of the CSTM approach to fulﬁll the proposed security objectives.
5.3.2.1 Message Confidentiality
Due to the employed TLS, the conﬁdentiality of st-datagrams cannot be violated using
the observation, the probing, or the movement attack. In case adversaries are able to
compromise RPs, the TLS protocol is no longer able to provide conﬁdentiality. Never-
theless, due to the symmetric encryption of st-datagrams with K, even compromised
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RPs do not enable attackers to read the contents of these messages. If adversaries are,
however, able to compromise eNBs, they gain access to the state of the CPRNGs, thus
allowing them to decrypt and read st-datagrams addressing the st-cells of the aﬀected
radio cells after the compromise. Nevertheless, albeit the violation of the message con-
ﬁdentiality in case of compromised eNBs, the CSTM approach is still able to provide
graceful degradation, hence limiting the violation to the aﬀected radio cells.
Assuming that attackers aim todetectwhennew st-datagrams are distributed, theCSTM
scheme can only prevent the disclosure of the distribution of the datagrams to the RPs
by relying on countermeasures against traﬃc analysis like dummy messages [Ray01].
Otherwise, adversaries are always able to detect new messages, despite their lack of
ability to read the contents or infer the destination st-cells of these messages.
5.3.2.2 Message Authentication and Integrity
In order to allow receivers to verify the authenticity and integrity of st-datagrams,
senders should rely on a traditional public-key infrastructure like X.509 to sign their
messages (cf. RFC 5280 [Coo+08] and RFC 6818 [Yee13]).
5.3.2.3 Controlled Access
Due to the availability of a trustworthy TPS that is responsible for relaying st-datagrams
from a sender to the responsible RPs, this entity can be used to manage and control ac-
cess to the STM service by deciding which datagrams to deploy or ignore. In order to
be able to enforce the access policies of the TPS, RPs must only accept st-datagrams
that have been dispatched by the TPS, i.e., storage requests have to be authentic and
of integrity. Furthermore, rejecting invalid st-datagrams that have not been signed by
the TPS is not suﬃcient if attackers are able to compromise RPs. In this case, an adver-
sary can circumvent the access control mechanism by depositing his st-datagrams at a
compromised RP. Therefore, dispatched st-datagrams must also be signed by the TPS
in order to allow UEs to detect and ignore maliciously placed st-datagrams.
5.3.2.4 Spam Prevention
According to the realization of access control, the TPS can incorporate countermeasures
against spamming. Such mechanisms could, e.g., limit the rate at which senders can
request to send st-datagrams or impose restrictions on the addressable destinations.
5.3.2.5 Accountability of Senders
While the CSTM approach does not speciﬁcally address the issue of holding a sender
accountable for the sending or the content of an st-datagram, a service provider could
rely on standard protocols for non-repudiation (e.g., based on a TTP) [KMZ02].
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5.3.3 Summary
In summary, the CSTM approach is able to fulﬁll all privacy and security objectives
given the observation, probing, and movement attack (see Figure 5.4). Only in case of
compromised RPs and by using additional attacks, adversaries may partially or fully
violate the privacy objectives. Finally, given compromised eNBs, attackers may violate
the privacy objectives. Nevertheless, in these cases, the approach is still able to provide
graceful degradation, limiting the attack to the aﬀected radio cells.
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Figure 5.4 Summary of privacy and security properties of CSTM. Here, “+” indicates that
CSTM is able to fulﬁll an objective under certain conditions, while “–” denotes that
it is not. In case of “o”, the approach is only able to partially fulﬁll the objective.
5.4 Discussion of Report Verification Approach
In terms of the witness-based report veriﬁcation approach for large-scale disasters, the
following sections now investigate attacks against the privacy and security objectives
described in Section 4.4.1. These objectives are based on the general privacy and security
objectives for STM services (see Section 3.2.3) and incorporate additional threats that
are speciﬁc to the report veriﬁcation scheme.
5.4.1 Privacy Aspects
Regarding the privacy objectives of the report veriﬁcation scheme, it is assumed that
potential attackers have one or more of the following goals: to infer the identities of
users, their locations, co-location of users, or the absence of users from a location. In
order to achieve these goals, adversaries may observe the communication between en-
tities, move through the service area, send reports, vote as a witness, or compromise
one or more RPs. However, it is presumed that attackers cannot compromise veriﬁers,
the IS, or parts of the cellular network infrastructure. This a viable assumption as it is
easier to control access to one or a few veriﬁer nodes and the IS than protecting a large
number of RPs that is necessary to cover a large service region.
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Probing attack In contrast to CSTM, performing the probing attack does not provide
an advantage to attackers in the report veriﬁcation scheme. In CSTM, an adversarymay
send messages addressing speciﬁc st-cells to the TPS, observing the communication
between the TPS and RPs in order to infer the RPs that are responsible for these st-
cells. In contrast, in the report veriﬁcation scheme, an attacker cannot not simply send
a message addressing a certain st-cell without providing the corresponding token τ
for this region. An adversary may only obtain τ by either having been present at the
respective st-cell or by providing an arbitrary value for τ. On one hand, if an attacker
has been residing in the st-cell, she is already in possession of the corresponding τ and
therefore aware of the responsible RP. Thus, in this case, it is not necessary to perform
the probing attack. On the other hand, if the adversary provides an imaginary token,
she may be able to predict the RP that is responsible for this token. However, since τ
has never been exchanged with other UEs that have been residing in the respective st-
cell, this information is useless as no UEs will ever use this value when sending polling
messages to the RPs. Therefore, due to themutual negotiation of tokens amongUEs, the
probing attack is not applicable in the context of the report veriﬁcation scheme. Hence,
this attack is not considered in the following discussion.
Compromising eNBs Furthermore, it should be noted that attacks aiming to compro-
mise eNBs are also not investigated in the following sections as base stations do not
generate symmetric keys in the report veriﬁcation approach. Accordingly, while attack-
ers might compromise eNBs and therefore violate the privacy of users locally with the
aﬀected cells, this threat is not speciﬁc to the proposed scheme.
5.4.1.1 Location Privacy
Observation attack In the observation attack, adversaries can observe the communi-
cation between entities. This, however, does not violate the location privacy of users due
to the employed TLS protocol. While an attacker may observe communication between
UEs and certain RPs, this does not provide an advantage since RPs are responsible for a
large number of st-cells in an unpredictable manner due to the pre-image resistance of
h(⋅) and rpτ = h(τ). Furthermore, observing the communication between UEs and the
veriﬁer or the IS does also not violate the location privacy as the attacker cannot infer
the report message M due to the encrypted communication.
Movement attack In the movement attack, adversaries rely on UEs to collect tokens
for a few st-cells in order to be able to violate the privacy objectives of users by extrap-
olating the obtained information. If an attacker has access to one or more UEs, she can
obtain speciﬁc tokens τ, the negotiated group keys K, and report messages M for the
visited st-cells. While attackers can obtain τ and therefore knowledge of the RP that is
used to deliver a conﬁrmation request, this does not violate the objective of location
privacy as RPs are responsible for a large number of st-cells. If, however, only one re-
port exists and an adversary is aware of the st-cell addressed in the report message M,
she can obtain the network identiﬁers of users that have been residing in this speciﬁc st-
cell andmay be potential witnesses. Nevertheless, considering the application of the re-
port veriﬁcation scheme in large-scale disaster situations, this seems unlikely as a large
132 Privacy and Security Analysis
number of reports is expected to be present in the system, obfuscating temporal corre-
lations between the veriﬁer dispatching conﬁrmation requests and UEs contacting RPs
in order to retrieve them. Moreover, note that even if adversaries are able to correlate
users to certain conﬁrmation requests, they are still not able to continuously track the
movements of users as they may only obtain information about a speciﬁc st-cell. Still,
if reports are only issued rarely, UEs should contact the IS and veriﬁer periodically to
obfuscate communication patterns with dummy traﬃc.
Compromising RPs Finally, sophisticated adversaries may be able to compromise RPs,
thus obtaining knowledge of the tokens τ that are located on the aﬀectedRPs.Neverthe-
less, the obtained tokens do not reveal the respective st-cell as this requires the knowl-
edge of the group key K that has been negotiated among UEs in the area at the time.
Thus, in addition to the compromise of RPs, attackers have to perform the movement
attack in order to retrieve these group keys K which is only possible for st-cells being
mapped to the RPs after the compromise (although, in this case, it seems more likely
that adversaries will visually observe users directly instead of compromising RPs). As-
suming that attackers are able to obtain the st-cell that is addressed by the tokens τ,
they can infer the presence of UEs polling for this τ at the respective place and time,
hence violating the objective of location privacy. However, according to the discussion
regarding CSTM, adversaries are only able to obtain fractions of the movement paths
of UEs (up to the ratio γ of the compromised RPs) as st-cells are stored across all RPs.
5.4.1.2 Co-location Privacy
Observation attack Due to the employed TLS protocol and RPs being responsible for
a large number of st-cells according to h(τ)mod N, adversaries are not able to infer the
co-location of UEs that communicate with the same RPs.
Movement attack According to the objective of location privacy, the co-location of
users may only be violated if there is just one report in the system.
Compromising RPs Having compromised one or more RPs, attackers are able to de-
termine the tokens τ that are provided by UEs polling the aﬀected RPs. Therefore, they
can violate the co-location privacy of reporters and witnesses if they are aware of the
network identiﬁers of the users’ devices. Otherwise, if adversaries are not aware of the
addresses of speciﬁc users, they can only infer possible social connections among users
of unknown identities which is only of limited use. Note that the potential impact and
threat of this attack can be reduced by relying on network address obfuscation tech-
niques like mix networks [Cha81] or onion routing schemes [GRS96; MSD04] as, in this
case, attackers may only infer co-location between users of unknown identities.
5.4.1.3 Absence Privacy
Observation attack As outlined in the discussion of the absence privacy in the CSTM
approach, adversaries might only infer the absence of users from an st-cell by detecting
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that the corresponding UE does not communicate with a certain RP. However, due to
the distribution of responsibilities for st-cells uniformly at random over all RPs, over
time, UEs send polling messages to all RPs. Hence, adversaries cannot violate the ab-
sence privacy of users by relying on the observation attack.
Movement attack Adversaries can only detect absence of users from a location if UEs
never poll a speciﬁc RP. This, however, is not the case as the cryptographic hash function
h(⋅) distributes responsibilities of RPs for st-cells evenly to all RPs. Thus, the movement
attack cannot violate the objective of absence privacy.
Compromising RPs Corresponding to the objectives of location and co-location pri-
vacy, attackers can violate the absence privacy of users by observing whether his or her
UE never polls a certain τ on the compromised RP. Nevertheless, this only provides an
advantage to the adversary if the network identiﬁers of users are known and she is able
to compromise the speciﬁc RP that is responsible for the st-cell in question. Note that,
again, the potential threat of this attack can be reduced drastically by relying on net-
work address anonymization techniques like [Cha81; GRS96; MSD04] as, in this case,
adversaries cannot detect the UEs of users that are of interest.
5.4.1.4 Anonymity
Observation attack Finally, while an adversary may obtain the network identiﬁers of
UEs, this does not allow her to violate the anonymity of users. According to the CSTM
scheme, this is due to the assumption that an attacker is not able to gain access to the
HSS or the MME and that the cellular operator itself is trustworthy.
Note that if adversaries are expected to be capable of inferring the identities of users
from their network identiﬁers, UEs have to resort to advanced techniques for address
obfuscation (e.g., mix networks [Cha81] or onion routing [GRS96; MSD04]).
Movement attack Since adversaries are assumed to be unable to access the core net-
work of the trustworthy cellular network operator, they could only infer the identities
of users from their locations. However, even if adversaries are able to obtain knowledge
of the responsibilities of RPs for certain st-cells, they cannot infer the locations of UEs
as RPs are responsible for at least k st-cells. Accordingly, the movement attack does not
violate the anonymity of reporters and witnesses.
Compromising RPs According to the previous discussions regarding anonymity, at-
tackers are assumed to only be capable of inferring the identities of reporters and wit-
nesses from their whereabouts. If attackers accomplish to compromise RPs, they gain
access to the tokens τ that are stored on the aﬀected RPs. In case adversaries are addi-
tionally able to obtain knowledge of the corresponding st-cells belonging to the tokens
they are able to obtain one or more samples for the whereabouts of users. Depending
on the amount of information that the attackers are able to retrieve from these samples,
theymight violate the anonymity of users polling the compromised RPs. However, note
that obtaining the underlying st-cells of the tokens that are stored on the aﬀected RPs
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is not easy since this requires that adversaries have been residing in the respective st-
cells. Moreover, this renders the compromise of RPs rather unnecessary as adversaries
might then simply observe users directly.
5.4.2 Security Aspects
In terms of the security objectives of the report veriﬁcation scheme, it is assumed that
adversaries have one ormore of the following goals: to obtain knowledge of the contents
of reports, its reporters and witnesses, or to propagate misleading information using
false, manipulated, or replayed reports to impede rescue operations or hide the com-
mission of crimes. In order to achieve these goals, attackers may observe the commu-
nication between entities, send reports, vote as witnesses, or, assuming sophisticated
adversaries, compromise one or more RPs. However, it is assumed that attackers are
not able to compromise the veriﬁer, the IS, eNBs (see privacy discussion), or other parts
of the infrastructure of the cellular network. This presents an appropriate assumption
since it seems more feasible to protect only one or a few veriﬁer nodes and the IS in
contrast to a large number of RPs which is likely to be necessary considering scalabil-
ity reasons. Given the outlined abilities of an adversary, the following paragraphs now
discuss each of the security objectives in detail.
5.4.2.1 Secure Communication
In order to provide conﬁdentiality, authenticity, and integrity of messages that are ex-
changed between entities, the report veriﬁcation scheme employs the TLS protocol. Ac-
cordingly, attackers are not capable of violating this objective by observing the commu-
nication or by participating in the service. Also, even if adversaries are able to compro-
mise one or more RPs, they cannot read or manipulate the contents of the encrypted
conﬁrmation requests that are stored on the RPs.
5.4.2.2 Resilient Decision-Making
Due to the use of an Identity Server (IS), attackers are not capable of performing a suc-
cessful Sybil attack [Dou02] and can therefore only issue one report or vote for an event.
Hence, by participating in the service, adversaries are only able to attain a malicious
majority, if the majority of votes is malicious. While an attacker could try to send false
reports for which she is in possession of a malicious majority, for example, by using
false tokens to exclude benign witnesses, this does not provide an advantage as long
as benign users issue reports about the same event. More sophisticated attackers could
also be able to compromise RPs. While an adversary cannot manipulate votes directly
in this case, she could still suppress conﬁrmation requests for certain events to reduce
the number of potential witnesses. Nevertheless, if more than one token is included in
a report, the respective conﬁrmation requests are distributed to diﬀerent RPs. Hence, in
order to be able to suppress conﬁrmation requests and therefore votes, attackers have
to compromise all RPs that hold the requests for a report. Finally, an attacker could try
to manipulate decisions by compromising the UEs of benign witnesses. While a possi-
ble countermeasure against such attacks might be reputation-based mechanisms that
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Figure 5.5 Ratio of benign majorities among the veriﬁed reports.
allows to detect and ﬁlter malicious or compromised UEs, such techniques are beyond
the scope of this thesis.
The rest of this section provides a short evaluation of the ability of the proposed re-
port veriﬁcation approach to provide a solid foundation for resilient decision-making
in case of diﬀerent mobility patterns. Note that the results of the following simulation
study have been obtained in the context of the feasibility study in Section 4.4.3. Here,
a certain ratio of users is chosen to be malicious. While these users continue to issue
reports when they enter the area of an event or are considered as a potential witnesses
of another report, it is assumed that malicious users are always able a issue a vote that
either conﬁrms malicious reports or rejects their benign counterparts.
Figure 5.5a shows the ratio of benign majorities among all reports, i.e., the ratio of be-
nign majorities corresponds to the ratio of reports that is veriﬁed correctly due to a
majority of benign users, for 1000 nodes, a token validity period of 5min., and single-
hop token negotiation. Here, the RPGM andNCmobility models yield the highest ratio
of benign majorities. Accordingly, as expected, even in case of a very high ratio of mali-
cious users (0.4), for these mobility models, a report veriﬁcation scheme that only relies
on a simple majority-based voting is still able to correctly verify the correctness of 60%
of all reports. Note that the RWPmodel yields a slightly lower ratio of benignmajorities
whichmay be the result of the comparatively small number ofwitnesses in this case (see
Figure 4.10a). However, in case of the more realistic SLAWmobility model, the ratio of
benign majorities decreases stronger than expected. This can be explained by the fact
that this mobility model results in a considerably higher number of witnesses that are
unsure about the correctness of events. Accordingly, with an increasing number of ma-
licious users, the absolute number of benignwitnesses that are sure about their decision
decreases in comparison to the number of malicious users that are always able to vote
for malicious reports and against benign ones. The results for 2000 nodes, a token valid-
ity period of 10min., andmulti-hop token negotiation (6 hops) conﬁrm this assumption
(Figure 5.5b). Here, the ratio of benign majorities is further reduced due to the increase
of the ratio of unsure benign witnesses (see Figure 4.11a and Figure 4.11d).
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In summary, these results indicate the general ability of a witness-based report veriﬁ-
cation scheme to provide basic resilience against a small ratio of malicious users (up to
0.05 or 0.1). For higher ratios of malicious users, additional measures are necessary to
ensure a high ratio of correctly veriﬁed reports. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the high ratios of malicious users that are considered in this study are not expected
to occur in real disaster situations. Accordingly, resilience against even a small ratio of
malicious users is likely to be suﬃcient for this application.
5.4.2.3 Accountability
Protecting the privacy of reporters and witnesses is an important issue. Nevertheless,
considering the serious consequences of false reports in a disaster situation, it still
should be possible to reveal the identity of a suspect for the prosecution of crimes.
In the report veriﬁcation scheme, this can be achieved by combining the knowledge of
the vote identiﬁer υ and the report message M that the veriﬁer is in possession of and
the secret KIS that is only known to the IS. Furthermore, in order to uncover the iden-
tity of a user, it is necessary to test all user identities id that are known to the IS with
a brute-force search to compare the calculated hash value h(id, h(M),KIS) to the given
vote identiﬁer υ. This brute-force approach is required due to pre-image resistance of
the cryptographic hash function h(⋅). Please note that, in order to perform the search for
a user, it is necessary that the IS does not reveal its secret KIS. Accordingly, the IS is the
only entity that may be entitled to conduct the brute-force search for a given h(M).
5.4.2.4 Availability
The veriﬁer and the IS can implement countermeasures against spamming, for example,
by rejecting users that issue reports or votes at very high rates. Furthermore, the IS
could reject certain users that are known to have voted with malicious intent (although
caremust be taken here to not reject arbitrary users without legitimate reasons). Finally,
the report veriﬁcation schememay incorporate countermeasures against DoS attacks by
including techniques like client puzzles [JB99]. However, techniques against spamming
or DoS attacks in the context of the report veriﬁcation scheme are beyond the scope of
the case study that is discussed in this work.
5.4.3 Summary
The outlined veriﬁcation scheme highlights the application of CSTM in the veriﬁcation
of reports in large-scale disasters while providing the privacy and security properties
that can be expected from this STM approach (see also Figure 5.4).
5.5 Analysis and Discussion of OSTM
Having discussed the privacy and security properties of both the CSTM and report
veriﬁcation schemes, this section now investigates the ability of the Overlay-based Spa-
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tiotemporal Multicast (OSTM) approach to fulﬁll the general privacy and security ob-
jectives for STM services that have been proposed in Section 3.2.3.
5.5.1 Applicability of OPF-based OPE
Before considering the ability of the OSTM approach to fulﬁll the suggested privacy
and security objectives, it is necessary to investigate the general applicability of OPF-
based OPE schemes in the context of this STM service realization. Therefore, the resil-
ience of the “ideal object” and the proposed OPF construction schemes (Section 4.3.3)
against the disclosure of random ciphertexts, random plaintext ciphertext pairs, as well
as chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs is considered in the following sections.
There are several existing security metrics that consider the indistinguishability of ci-
phertexts, namely IND-OCPA, as well as the one-wayness metrics of r, z-WOW and
r, z-WDOW However, these notions do not provide a descriptive metric for measuring
and comparing the expected disclosure-resilience of OPE schemes. On one hand, IND-
OCPA is focused on the ability of an adversary to either succeed or fail in the security
game of distinguishing ciphertexts. While this notion is useful to analyze the security
properties of a scheme regarding the indistinguishability of ciphertexts, it does not pro-
vide a descriptive measure for a direct comparison of the information that is leaked by
anOPE scheme. r, z-WOWand r, z-WDOW, on the other hand, focus on the ability of an
adversary to successfully come upwith an interval of a certain size in which at least one
of underlying plaintexts of the set of given challenge ciphertexts is within. Despite the
utility of these metrics in the analysis of the “ideal object” featuring a single prominent
peak in the probability distribution of the underlying plaintexts of a ciphertext, they do
not consider more complex multi-modal probability distributions where the maxima,
i.e., the most likely plaintexts (m.l.p.s) of a challenge ciphertext, can be far apart.
Therefore, due to the aforementioned shortcomings of existing security notions, the fol-
lowing two security metrics are introduced for the analysis of OPF-based OPE schemes
under the disclosure of ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs:
• First, the number of signiﬁcant plaintexts is proposed, which measures, with a cer-
tain probability, the number of potentially underlying plaintexts that an adversary
has to consider when being presented a challenge ciphertext.
• Furthermore, this work suggests the expected estimation error that a maximum-
likelihood attacker can achieve when relying on the knowledge of the most likely
plaintexts of a given challenge ciphertext.
Before discussing these metrics in detail, consider the following prerequisites:
Deﬁnition 5.5.1 (Probability of c being a ciphertext of OPF f ). Let S be a randomized
construction scheme that produces each order-preserving function f ∈ OPFD,R with
probability PrS( f ). Then, the probability of a ciphertext c ∈ R being a value of the
OPF f that is produced by the construction scheme S is given by:
PrS(c ∈ f (D)) = ∑
f ∈OPFD,R
c∈ f (D)
PrS( f )
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Deﬁnition 5.5.2 (Probability of (p, c) being a plaintext-ciphertext pair of OPF f ). Let S
be a randomized OPF construction scheme. Then, the probability of a pair (p, c) ∈ D×R
being a plaintext-ciphertext pair of f that is produced by S is deﬁned as follows:
PrS( f (p) = c) = ∑
f ∈OPFD,R
f (p)=c
PrS( f )
5.5.1.1 Number of Significant Plaintexts
This section ﬁrst introduces the metric of the number of signiﬁcant plaintexts MSα (c).
Deﬁnition 5.5.3 (Number of signiﬁcant plaintexts for c). Let S be a randomized OPF
construction scheme. For a threshold α ∈ [0, 1] and ciphertext c ∈ R, the number of
signiﬁcant plaintexts for c and α is deﬁned as a random variable of value MSα (c):
MSα (c) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ ∣Q∣ ∣ Q ⊆ D ∧ ∑p∈QPrS( f (p) = c ∣ c ∈ f (D)) ≥ α
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ if PrS(c ∈ f (D)) > 0
0 otherwise
Regarding the ﬁrst case,MSα (c)measures the cardinality of the smallest set of plaintexts
which has at least probability α of containing the plaintext that is mapped to c by a
function f that is produced by the scheme S . In particular, a higher value of MSα (c)
corresponds to a higher disclosure-resilience of S when considering only ciphertext c.
Furthermore, in order to obtain ametric summarizing over all ciphertexts, the following
paragraph introduces the average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts MSα .
Deﬁnition 5.5.4 (Average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts). Let S be a randomizedOPF
construction scheme. Then, for threshold α ∈ [0, 1] and ciphertext c ∈ R, the average
number of signiﬁcant plaintexts is deﬁned as the weighted arithmetic mean of MSα (c)
over all c ∈R using the probabilities for c being a value of functions f produced by S :
MSα ∶= ∑c∈RPr
S(c ∈ f (D)) ⋅MSα (c)
∑
c∈RPrS(c ∈ f (D)) =
1∣D∣ ⋅ ∑c∈RPrS(c ∈ f (D)) ⋅MSα (c)
Note that this deﬁnition relies on the following sum over all PrS(c ∈ f (D)):
∑
c∈RPrS(c ∈ f (D)) = ∣D∣
It should be mentioned here that MSα is related to the concept of r, z-WOW introduced
by [BCO11]. Regarding r, z-WOW, an attacker has to come upwith a domain interval of
size r which contains the plaintext that is mapped to one of z randomly chosen cipher-
texts. Here, the advantage of the adversary corresponds to her probability of success.
Considering z = 1 and a challenge ciphertext c, an adversary has to return an interval
size r ≥ MSα (c) to achieve an advantage of value α. For an increasing number z of chal-
lenge ciphertexts, a similar relationship depends on the question, whether the given
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ciphertexts have disjoint sets of signiﬁcant plaintexts. Furthermore, as stated in the in-
troductory part of this section, it should be noted that the size r of theWOWinterval and
MSα (c) can signiﬁcantly diﬀer for multi-modal probability distributions of plaintexts in
which the maxima of the distributions are far apart. In this case, MSα (c) is able to better
reﬂect the behavior of an optimal attacker preferring to choose more likely plaintexts.
Also, it should be mentioned here that one of the major beneﬁts of this metric is its
ability to enable the analysis and comparison of the security properties of OPF-based
OPE schemes without the need to investigate the details of optimal attack strategies.
5.5.1.2 Expected Estimation Error
In theOSTMscheme, thewhereabouts of users cannot not only be disclosed by the exact
decryption of a ciphertext c that is stored in the CAN overlay, but also if an adversary is
able to estimate a plaintext that is within a narrow interval around the actual plaintext
of c. Hence, this work investigates the ability of a maximum-likelihood attacker that
estimates the underlying plaintext p of a given ciphertext c by drawing, uniformly at
random, one element from the set of the most likely plaintexts of this ciphertext.
Deﬁnition 5.5.5 (Most likely plaintexts). For a given OPF construction scheme S , the
set of the most likely plaintexts of a ciphertext c is deﬁned as follows:
mlpS(c) = argmax
p∈D PrS( f (p) = c)
Deﬁnition 5.5.6 (Expected estimation error). Let S be an OPF construction scheme and
c ∈R. Then, the expected estimation error that an adversary can achieve for c is given as:
ES(c) = ∑
p∈DPrS( f (p) = c) ⋅
∑
m∈mlpS(c) ∣m − p ∣∣mlpS(c) ∣
Finally, the average expected estimation error ES is obtained by weighting ES(c) with the
probabilities of actually observing the ciphertexts c in the functions generated by S .
Deﬁnition 5.5.7 (Average expected estimation error). Let S be an OPF construction
scheme. Then, the expected estimation error of the maximum-likelihood attacker in
terms of this scheme is deﬁned as:
ES ∶= 1∣D∣ ⋅ ∑c∈RPrS(c ∈ f (D)) ⋅ ES(c)
According to the average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts, when comparing diﬀerent
OPF construction schemes, a higher expected estimation error indicates an increased
disclosure-resilience. It should be mentioned here that, while the expected estimation
error is able to provide insight into the potential estimation accuracy that an adversary
can achieve, a maximum-likelihood estimator is not necessarily an optimal attacker.
For instance, for a bimodal distribution of underlying plaintexts with two maxima, a
maximum-likelihood attacker has to choose one maximum. In case of a poor choice,
this can result in an increased estimation error.
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5.5.1.3 Adversaries with Additional Knowledge
In order to consider the (random) disclosure of ciphertexts c and plaintext-ciphertext
pairs (p, c), the introduced metrics have to be extended to incorporate the additional
knowledge of adversaries. Accordingly, given c1, . . . , cz ∈ R or (p1, c1), . . . , (pz, cz) ∈D ×R and a metric φS ∈ {MSα (c),MSα ,ES(c),ES}, the term φS∣c1,...,cz or φS∣(p1,c1),...,(pz,cz)
denotes the version of φS where only OPFs f that satisfy c1, . . . , cz ∈ f (D) or f (p1) =
c1, . . . , f (pz) = cz are considered, respectively. In addition, all involved probabilities are
subject to the restriction of only considering functions that satisfy these conditions.
Deﬁnition 5.5.8 (φS for z known ciphertexts). Let S be a randomized OPF construction
scheme and φS ∈ {MSα (c),MSα ,ES(c),ES} one of the aforementioned metrics. Then, the
metric φS under the condition of z known ciphertexts is deﬁned by computing a weighted
average over all possible z-combinations of ciphertexts:
φS∣z⋅c = 1∣(Dz )∣ ⋅ ∑{c1,...,cz}∈(Rz )PrS(c1, . . . , cz ∈ f (D)) ⋅ φS∣c1,...,cz
Note that the probabilities Pr(c1, . . . , cz ∈ f (D)) sum up to ∣(Dz )∣.
Finally, φS can be adopted for known plaintext-ciphertext pairs:
Deﬁnition 5.5.9 (φS for z known plaintext-ciphertext pairs). According to the previous
deﬁnition, let S be an OPF construction scheme and φS ∈ {MSα (c),MSα ,ES(c),ES}. The
metric φS under the condition of z known plaintext-ciphertext pairs is then deﬁned as:
φS∣z⋅(p,c) ∶= 1∣(Dz )∣ ⋅ ∑P∈(D×Rz )PrS
⎛⎝ ⋀(p,c)∈P f (p) = c⎞⎠ ⋅ φS∣P
5.5.1.4 The Case of Chosen Plaintexts
Apart from obtaining random ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs, in the OSTM
scheme, an adversary is also expected to be able to control the disclosure of speciﬁc
ciphertexts based on a set of z chosen plaintexts before being presented a challenge
ciphertext. This may be possible, for example, using the movement attack where an
attacker moves through the service area and collects both the locations of eNB and the
tokens containing the corresponding encrypted coordinates.
Deﬁnition 5.5.10 (Expected φS for z chosen plaintexts). Let φ ∈ {MSα ,ES} represent
one of the aforementioned metrics. Depending on S , the chosen plaintexts p1, . . . , pz
are mapped to ciphertexts c′1, . . . , c′z with diﬀerent probabilities. Considering the con-
sequences of all possible mappings, it is possible to deﬁne the expected value of φ(c) for
chosen plaintexts p1, . . . , pz and observed challenge c as follows:
φ(c)S∣p1,..,pz = ∑(c′1,...,c′z)∈Rz PrS
⎛⎝ ⋀i∈[1,z] f (pi) = c′i ∣ c ∈ f (D) ⎞⎠ ⋅ φS(c)∣(p1,c′1)..(pz,c′z)
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Furthermore, in order to obtain a metric that summarizes over all ciphertexts, the aver-
age expected value of φ for chosen plaintexts p1, . . . , pz is introduced:
Deﬁnition 5.5.11 (Average expected φ for z chosen plaintexts).
φ
S∣p1,...,pz ∶= 1∣D∣ ⋅ ∑c∈RPrS(c ∈ f (D)) ⋅ φ(c)S∣p1,...,pz
Assuming that an adversary is not able to predict the challenge ciphertext when se-
lecting plaintexts, she will be tempted to query a combination of plaintexts p1, . . . , pz
leading to the worst-case, i.e., minimum, global disclosure-resilience. Accordingly, this
value can be derived as a metric named expected φ under z chosen plaintexts:
Deﬁnition 5.5.12 (Expected φS under z chosen plaintexts).
φ
S∣z⋅p ∶= min(p1,...,pz)∈Dz φS∣p1,...,pz
Note that for the OPF construction schemes considered in this thesis, the aforemen-
tionedworst-case is expected to occur for a choice of (approximately) equi-spaced plain-
texts that partition the domain into (approximately) equal parts.
5.5.1.5 Disclosure-Resilience without Additional Knowledge
In order to evaluate the disclosure-resilience properties of the proposed OPF construc-
tion schemes, as well as the “ideal object”, this work relies on an empiric estimation
of the introduced metrics. Therefore, the “ideal object”, the random oﬀset addition,
the random subrange selection, and both variants of the random uniform sampling ap-
proach have been implemented in C++ using the Boost.Random library3 and itsMersenne
Twister [MN98] implementation for pseudo-random number generation.
The ﬁrst simulation study considers the disclosure-resilience of the aforementioned ap-
proaches in terms of adversaries without additional knowledge of ciphertexts or plain-
text-ciphertext pairs. Therefore, for each scheme S , 108 OPFs were generated using a
domain size of M = 500 and a range size of N = 5000. In the process of generating the
OPFs with those schemes, the frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs that occurred
among the generated functions were recorded.
Figure 5.6 shows the measured frequency distributions for the ciphertexts c = 250,
c = 1000, and c = 2500. These ciphertext were chosen to compare the frequency dis-
tributions at the edge of the range, where a ciphertext c can only be assigned to a rather
small set of plaintexts {p ∈ D ∣ p ≤ c ≤ ∣R∣− (∣D∣− p)}, as well as at a ﬁfth and the half of
the range, where this limitation of the number of the possible plaintexts is less notice-
able. Accordingly, for c = 250, the frequency distributions depicted in Figure 5.6a and
Figure 5.6a do not cover the full domainD = {0, . . . , 499} as plaintexts p > 250 cannot be
assigned to the ciphertext c = 250. Furthermore, note that in the shown frequency dis-
tributions for speciﬁc ciphertexts, the sum of the individual frequencies does not have
to be equal for diﬀerent considered approaches. This is due to the fact that the OPF
construction schemes may use diﬀerent ciphertexts with diﬀerent probabilities.
3http://www.boost.org/libs/random/
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(c) Plaintext frequencies for c = 1000.
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Figure 5.6 Empiricallymeasured frequency distributions of plaintexts that are assigned to spe-
ciﬁc ciphertexts by the respective scheme S (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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(a) Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs for “ideal object”.
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(b) Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs of random oﬀset addition.
Figure 5.7 Measured frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs for the “ideal object” and the
random oﬀset addition approach (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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Ideal object Regarding the depicted frequency distributions, the “ideal object” fol-
lows the expected hypergeometric distribution [Bol+09], yielding a frequency of over
8.6 ⋅ 105 assignments of c = 250 to p = 25 (Figure 5.6a), over 4.7 ⋅ 105 assignments of
c = 1000 to p = 100 (Figure 5.6c), and over 3.7 ⋅ 105 assignments of c = 2500 to p = 250
(Figure 5.6e). According to [BCO11], the “ideal object” shows the expected behavior of
the most likely plaintexts following the restriction mlpideal(c) = ⌈M ⋅ c/N⌉ for N = t ⋅M
for some positive integer t (in this case, t = 10), or, in general:
mlpideal(c) ∈ [ M ⋅ c
N + 1, M ⋅ cN + 1 + 1] (5.3)
Here, it becomes obvious that, despite the reduction of the absolute frequencies of the
most likely plaintexts in the middle of the range, for all three cases, the distributions of
the functions generated by the “ideal object” yield a very dominant peak compared to
the proposed OPF construction schemes. This prominent peak, which follows the hy-
pergeometric distribution [Bol+09], is also clearly visible in the frequency distribution
of the “ideal object” over all ciphertexts in Figure 5.7a.
Randomoﬀsetaddition In contrast, the randomoﬀset addition approach shows a con-
stant frequency of about 2.2 ⋅ 104 assignments over the plaintexts that are mapped to
c = 250 (Figure 5.6b), c = 1000 (Figure 5.6d), and c = 2500 (Figure 5.6f). This uniform
distribution of the underlying plaintexts of ciphertexts is also clearly recognizable in
Figure 5.7b. Accordingly, if no additional information is revealed, the random oﬀset ad-
dition approach provides the expected behavior of a uniform plaintext distribution.
Random uniform sampling Compared to the “ideal object”, both random uniform
sampling schemes are able to reduce the signiﬁcance of themost likely plaintexts, while
the random selection of a splitting elementwith amaximum frequency of over 105map-
pings of p = 250 to c = 250 (Figure 5.6b), over 2.7 ⋅ 104 mappings of the plaintexts p ≈ 100
to c = 1000 (Figure 5.6d), and over 1.8 ⋅ 104 mappings of p = 250 to c = 2500 (Figure 5.6f)
seems preferable over the median-based splitting strategy with over 1.1 ⋅ 105 mappings
of p = 45 to c = 250 (Figure 5.6b), over 3.9 ⋅ 104 mappings of p = 142 to c = 1000 (Fig-
ure 5.6d), and over 2.4 ⋅104mappings of the plaintexts around the twomaxima of p ≈ 200
and p ≈ 300 to c = 2500 (Figure 5.6f). Here, it should be noted that the median variant
results in a multi-modal frequency distribution of the plaintexts due to the selection of
the median of the domain and respective subdomains. This multi-modal distribution
is also noticeable in the locations of the most likely plaintexts in Figure 5.8b, where the
respective curve shows gaps at the locations of the split elements.
Furthermore, the most likely plaintexts resulting from both the median (Figure 5.8b)
and random splitting strategy (Figure 5.9b) of the uniform sampling scheme shift from
an identical mapping of plaintexts to ciphertexts at the edges of the range to a value
that approach the most likely plaintexts of the “ideal object” in the middle section ofR. The identical assignment of plaintexts to ciphertexts at the edges of the domain and
range ismost likely the result of the recursive splitting of the domain and range into two
respective subdomains and subranges. Accordingly, after several splits, the remaining
subspaces of diﬀerent functions that are generated by the uniform sampling approach
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(a) Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
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(b)Most likely plaintexts of ciphertexts.
Figure 5.8 Measured frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and m.l.p.s of each ciphertext
for uniform sampling with median splitting (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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(a) Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
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Figure 5.9 Measured frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and m.l.p.s of each ciphertext
for uniform sampling with random splitting (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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concentrate at both the lower and upper parts of the domain and range. This concen-
tration of plaintext-ciphertext mappings can also be observed in the frequency distri-
butions of plaintexts over all ciphertexts in Figure 5.8a and Figure 5.9a.
Random subrange selection Regarding the random subrange selection schemes, in
this thesis, twoOPF construction schemes are considered for the generation of functions
in the respective subranges: the “ideal object” and the random uniform approach for
both splitting strategies. In terms of the subrange selection scheme that relies on the
“ideal object”, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.10a show a clear reduction of the signiﬁcance
of the most likely plaintexts to a frequency of over 4.4 ⋅ 104 for c = 250 (Figure 5.6b),
3.4 ⋅ 104 for c = 1000 (Figure 5.6d), and 3.0 ⋅ 104 for c = 2500 (Figure 5.6f). For the “ideal
object”, the subrange selection scheme seems to preserve the approximate locations of
the maxima of the frequency distributions. Accordingly, the frequencies of plaintexts
peak at p = 25 for c = 250 (Figure 5.6b), at p = 100 for c = 1000 (Figure 5.6d), and at
p = 250 for c = 2500 (Figure 5.6f) corresponding to the most likely plaintexts of the
“ideal object”. This behavior is also clearly visible from the locations of the m.l.p.s over
the full range along the diagonal depicted in Figure 5.10b.
In terms of the random subrange selection approach that relies on the uniform sampling
schemes, Figure 5.6 highlights the ability of the subrange selection technique to reduce
the signiﬁcance of speciﬁc plaintexts over the domain. Nevertheless, the subrange se-
lection scheme tends to map plaintexts at the edges of the domain to the respective
ciphertexts at the edges of the range (Figure 5.6b and Figure 5.6d). For the middle ci-
phertext c = 2500, the frequencies of plaintexts yield an almost uniform distribution
(Figure 5.6f). Furthermore, it should be noted that, in Figure 5.6, both splitting variants
(random selection and median-based) show basically the same behavior. This obser-
vation is conﬁrmed in the frequency distributions of plaintexts over all ciphertexts in
Figure 5.11a and Figure 5.12a, as well as the distributions of themost likely plaintexts in
Figure 5.11b and Figure 5.12b. The distributions of the most likely plaintexts also high-
lights the preference of assigning plaintexts that are very close at the edge of the domain
to ciphertexts at the edges of the range. Accordingly, in the subrange selection scheme
relying on the randomuniform sampling, the ciphertexts c ≤ 500 (or c ≥ 4500) are almost
exclusively assigned to a single plaintext p = 0 (or p = 499, respectively). This may be
the result of the property of the random uniform sampling scheme to assign the cipher-
texts at the edges of the range to plaintexts with the same numeric value c = p. With
the subrange selection technique reducing the size of the range N to a subrange N′ ≤ N
and spreading it over the full range, the lower ciphertexts that are assigned to identical
plaintexts are also spread over the range. This might lead to a preference for ciphertexts
at the edges of the range being assigned to only a few plaintexts at the corresponding
edges of the domain.
Conclusion In summary, regarding the disclosure-resilience in case of adversarieswith-
out additional knowledge, the proposed schemes show the expected, promising be-
havior of reducing the signiﬁcance, i.e., the probability of the most likely plaintexts
of ciphertexts that are a major weakness of the “ideal object”. The following section
now investigates the ability of both the suggested approaches and the “ideal object” to
provide resilience under the disclosure of ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs and
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(b)Most likely plaintexts of ciphertexts.
Figure 5.10 Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and m.l.p.s of each ciphertext for sub-
range selection using the “ideal object” (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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(b)Most likely plaintexts of ciphertexts.
Figure 5.11 Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and m.l.p.s for subrange selection using
uniform sampling with median splitting (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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(b)Most likely plaintexts of ciphertexts.
Figure 5.12 Frequencies of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and m.l.p.s for subrange selection using
uniform sampling with random splitting (108 OPFs; M = 500, N = 5000).
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compares the schemes using the proposed metrics of the number of signiﬁcant plain-
texts and the expected estimation error.
5.5.1.6 Disclosure-Resilience in Case of Additional Knowledge
In order to empirically estimate the disclosure-resilience of the suggestedOPF construc-
tion schemes and the “ideal object” using the proposed metrics, for each approach, 108
OPFs were generated for domain of size M ∈ {20, 30} and range of size N = M2. Then,
both metrics were computed for adversaries with no additional information, adver-
saries with 0 ≥ z ≤ 2 known ciphertexts, as well as adversaries with 0 ≥ z ≤ 2 known
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Please note that, due to the complexity of computing φS∣z⋅c,
φS∣z⋅(p,c), and φS∣z⋅p, which requires the collection of the frequency distributions of all pos-
sible z-combinations of ciphertexts andplaintext-ciphertext pairs, the experimentswere
limited to these rather small domain and range sizes, as well as to z ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
The following paragraphs now discuss the obtained results for both the average num-
ber of signiﬁcant plaintexts, aswell as the average expected estimation error. Figure 5.13
and Figure 5.14 show the results ofMS0.5 and ES for the “ideal object” and the proposed
OPF construction schemes. Note that α = 0.5 was chosen for the average number of
signiﬁcant plaintexts as, in this case, its value corresponds to the size of the set of plain-
texts that an adversary has to consider for this set to contain the underlying plaintext
of a challenge ciphertext with a probability of at least 50%.
Random oﬀset addition As expected, if no additional ciphertexts or plaintext-cipher-
text pairs are known to the adversary, the random oﬀset addition approach achieves the
highest average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts of the given schemes with Moﬀset0.5 ≈ 10
for M = 20 (see Figure 5.13a and Figure 5.14a) and Moﬀset0.5 ≈ 15 for M = 30 (see Fig-
ure 5.13b and Figure 5.14b). While this also holds if only ciphertexts are known to the
adversary, the random oﬀset addition scheme still suﬀers from the disclosed cipher-
texts, yielding an average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts of Moﬀset0.5 ∣ 1⋅c ≈ 6.8 for M = 20
and Moﬀset0.5 ∣ 1⋅c ≈ 10.1 for M = 30 for z = 1 disclosed ciphertext, as well as Moﬀset0.5 ∣ 2⋅c ≈ 5.1 for
M = 20 and Moﬀset0.5 ∣ 2⋅c ≈ 7.9 for M = 30 for z = 2 disclosed ciphertexts. Furthermore, as
anticipated, the random oﬀset addition scheme breaks once a single plaintext-cipher-
text pair is known to the adversary. Accordingly, for z = 1 and z = 2 disclosed plain-
text-ciphertext pairs, the random oﬀset addition approach yields an average number
of signiﬁcant plaintexts of Moﬀset0.5 ∣ z⋅c = 1 for both M = 20 and M = 30. This conﬁrms the
expectation that, while random oﬀset addition highlights the achievable average num-
ber of signiﬁcant plaintexts for adversaries without additional knowledge, it cannot be
considered as an encryption technique for real-world applications like OSTM.
Coinciding with the results of the number of signiﬁcant plaintexts, the random oﬀset
addition approach yields the highest average expected estimation error Eoﬀset ≈ 6.3 for
M = 20 (Figure 5.13c and Figure 5.14c) and Eoﬀset ≈ 9.9 for M = 30 (Figure 5.13d and
Figure 5.14d). However, in contrast to the average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts, for
z ≥ 1 disclosed ciphertexts, the randomoﬀset addition scheme already shows a stronger
decline compared to the random uniform sampling schemes in both cases. This may be
due to the fact that the empiricallymeasured frequencies of the oﬀset addition approach
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Figure 5.13 φS for known ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs (108 OPFs).
varies only slightly over the plaintexts of the domain. Therefore, it is more likely that
the maximum-likelihood estimation technique selects an m.l.p. that results in a larger
estimation error. Finally, as anticipated, the average expected estimation error reﬂects
the inability of random oﬀset addition to provide resilience against known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. Accordingly, Eoﬀset∣ z⋅(p,c) = 0 for z = 1 and z = 2 known pairs.
Randomuniform sampling Considering both the average number of signiﬁcant plain-
texts and the expected estimation error, the random uniform sampling approach is
clearly able to outperform the “ideal object” (Figure 5.13). Furthermore, the random
splitting strategy seems preferable over the median variant as it generally results in
higher values φu-sampl-rand when compared to φu-sampl-med. Nevertheless, while the ran-
dom uniform sampling scheme yields higher values of Mu-sampl-med0.5 and M
u-sampl-rand
0.5
in case of no additional information, z ≤ 2 known ciphertexts, and z = 1 known plain-
text-ciphertext pair, for both M = 20 (Figure 5.13a) and M = 30 (Figure 5.13b), in case
of z = 2 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts
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Figure 5.14 φS for known ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs (108 OPFs).
shows a strong decline with only a slightly better result in comparison to the “ideal ob-
ject”. However, this decline for z = 2 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs is less noticeable
when considering the average expected estimation error for M = 20 and M = 30 which
results in Eu-sampl-rand∣2⋅(p,c) ≈ 1.2 (see Figure 5.13c) and Eu-sampl-rand∣2⋅(p,c) ≈ 1.8 (see Figure 5.13d),
respectively. This may be due to the fact that the maximum-likelihood estimator has to
select one speciﬁc m.l.p. which, in case of a poor choice, can result in a higher estima-
tion error. Since, for the “ideal object”, there is one distinct, very prominent m.l.p., the
maximum-likelihood estimator may be less prone to such a poor choice.
It should also be mentioned here that the “ideal object” seems to be less vulnerable
against known ciphertexts attacks as there is no visible decline of neither the average
number of signiﬁcant plaintexts nor the average expected estimation error for z = 1 and
z = 1 known ciphertexts. This, however, is not an indicator for the resilience of the “ideal
object” against attackers with additional knowledge, but for its vulnerability even in
case of no additional information where an adversary is still able to quite accurately
predict the underlying plaintext of a challenge ciphertext via Equation 5.3.
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Random subrange selection In terms of the average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts
and the average expected estimation error, all three variants of the random subrange se-
lection scheme show the anticipated higher disclosure-resilience in direct comparison
with the “ideal object” (Figure 5.14). The subrange selection technique is able to no-
ticeably improve the disclosure-resilience of the “ideal object”, yielding values that are
equivalent to the one resulting from the subrange selection scheme employing uniform
sampling. Regarding the uniform sampling approach, when employed in the context
of the subrange selection scheme, in contrast to its direct application, the splitting strat-
egy of the uniform sampling approach becomes irrelevant for its disclosure-resilience.
Furthermore, note that, for z = 2 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the measured num-
ber of signiﬁcant plaintexts and the expected estimation error of the subrange selection
techniques yield a strong decline that is independent of the employedOPF construction
scheme. In terms of the question whether the “ideal object” or the uniform sampling
scheme is preferable for the subrange selection scheme, the average number of signiﬁ-
cant plaintexts indicates that uniform sampling is advantageous in case of no disclosed
information, as well as for z = 2 known ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs for
both M = 20 (Figure 5.13a) and M = 30 (Figure 5.13b). In contrast, the “ideal object”
seems to achieve a higher number of signiﬁcant plaintexts for z = 1 known ciphertexts
or plaintext-ciphertext pairs, while Msubrange-ideal0.5 ∣ z⋅c and Msubrange-ideal0.5 ∣ z⋅(p,c) decrease for z = 2.
The reason for thismay be the prominentmost likely plaintexts of the “ideal object” that
enable adversaries to more easily infer the boundaries of the subrange for an increasing
number of disclosed ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Accordingly, due to its
resilience against additional knowledge, using the uniform sampling approach in the
subrange selection technique seems preferable. Regarding the average expected estima-
tion error, the subrange selection approach employing the “ideal object” shows smaller
estimation errors compared to the subrange selection scheme relying on uniform sam-
pling for both M = 20 (Figure 5.13c) and M = 30 (Figure 5.13d). Again, this may be due
to fact that the maximum-likelihood estimator is less prone to a poor choice of an m.l.p.
considering the dominant most likely plaintexts of the “ideal object”.
Conclusion When comparing the disclosure-resilience of the proposed OPF construc-
tion techniques and the “ideal object”, both the average number of signiﬁcant plaintexts
(Figure 5.15a and Figure 5.15b) and the average expected estimation error (Figure 5.15c
and Figure 5.15d) indicate the ability of all suggested schemes to achieve a higher resil-
ience if no information is disclosed to the adversary. This also holds for z ≤ 2 disclosed
ciphertexts as well as z = 1 plaintext-ciphertext pair. Furthermore, the subrange selec-
tion schemeusing either the “ideal object” or uniform samplingwithmedian or random
splitting are preferable if no or only few information (i.e., z = 1) is disclosed to an adver-
sary. Otherwise, the random uniform sampling scheme with the random selection of a
splitting element should be favored. However, for z = 2 disclosed plaintext-ciphertext
pairs, the resilience of all of the suggested approaches decreases drastically, yielding
only a slightly higher φS than the original “ideal object”.
5.5.1.7 Disclosure-Resilience in Case of Chosen Plaintexts
In order tomeasure the disclosure-resilience of the givenOPF construction schemes and
the “ideal object” for chosen plaintext attacks, 108 OPFs were generated for a domain of
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Figure 5.15 φS for known ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs (108 OPFs).
sizeM ∈ {20, 30} and a range of size N = M2. Figure 5.16 shows the results of φS∣z⋅p for the
“ideal object” and the suggested schemes for z = 1 and z = 2 chosen plaintexts. Accord-
ing to the observations regarding the disclosure of (randomly chosen) ciphertexts and
plaintext-ciphertext pairs, for M = 20 (Figure 5.16a and Figure 5.16c) and M = 30 (Fig-
ure 5.16b and Figure 5.16d), the uniform sampling approach is able to provide a slightly
higher value of φ
S∣z⋅p in comparison to the “ideal object”. Furthermore, while the selec-
tion of the splitting strategy seems irrelevant for the uniform sampling technique when
employed in the random subrange selection approach, the random splitting strategy
is again preferable over median splitting for random uniform sampling as it achieves
higher values of φ
S∣z⋅p for both domains.
Nevertheless, despite the slight advantage compared to the “ideal object” even for only
z = 1 chosen plaintext, the subrange selection scheme as well as random uniform sam-
pling are unable to provide the expected resilience against the disclosure of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs resulting from the chosen plaintext. For z = 2 chosen plaintexts, all of
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Figure 5.16 φ
S
for the chosen plaintext attack (108 OPFs).
the suggested schemes basically show roughly the same results as the “ideal object”.
Accordingly, contrary to the expected behavior, none of the proposed OPF generation
schemes are able to provide resilience against the disclosure of chosen plaintexts.
5.5.1.8 Conclusion
In summary, while the proposed OPF generation schemes are able to provide the ex-
pected higher disclosure-resilience in comparison to the “ideal object”, contrary to the
initial expectations, in case of a chosen plaintext attack, none of the outlined OPF con-
struction mechanisms are able to achieve satisfying results. Accordingly, in this the-
sis, OPF-based OPE schemes are not considered a viable encryption techniques for the
OSTM approach. Consequently, for the realization of the OSTM scheme, this work fo-
cuses on GOPE [XY12a] to encrypt the coordinates in the CAN overlay.
The obtained results also imply consequences for the DBMS-based realization of an
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STM service. Here, due to the necessary assumption of the adversary’s knowledge of
the plaintext space, existing database systems that focus on OPF-based OPE schemes
or index tagging mechanisms (e.g, CryptDB [Pop+11]) cannot be considered as a viable
solution for a DBMS-based realization of an STM service.
5.5.2 Privacy Aspects
This section now investigates the privacy properties of theOSTMapproach according to
the attacks introduced in Section 4.1.2.3. Here, when considering the individual privacy
objectives, the following research questions are of interest:
• How does the served number of st-cells influence user privacy?
• How does the number of RPs aﬀect user privacy?
• Should a two- or three-dimensional CAN be preferred to protect user privacy?
• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect user privacy?
• Is it possible to improve user privacy by adjusting the rekeying interval?
In order to evaluate the OSTM approach, an extensive simulation study was conduced
in OMNeT++ using the parameters depicted in Table 5.2. Given the mobility trace of
users according to the cell switches in the cellular network outlined in Section 5.2, each
of the 604 eNBs announced tokens every 10 minutes or delivered them to UEs when
entering the coverage area of a radio cell. In order to reduce the simulation time, UEs
polled RPs only once at the end of the simulation. Note that this is not expected to aﬀect
the privacy properties of OSTM since additional pollingmessages, while increasing the
network load, do not increase the amount of information that is being revealed about
the movements of users. In particular, given an unlimited token life time, a single poll
at the end of the day subsumes additional polls at diﬀerent times of the day.
The following sections now investigate the privacy and security properties of OSTM,
discussing the relevant results of the simulation study.
5.5.2.1 Location Privacy
Observation attack According to the CSTM scheme, due to the employed TLS proto-
col, in theOSTMapproach, adversariesmay only violate the location privacy of users by
observing them directly in the respective st-cells. However, in contrast to CSTM, due to
the ongoing communication among RPs when forwarding polling messages, attackers
might infer the approximate layout of the CAN overlay network via the local neighbor-
hood of RPs. This may be achieved, for example, by building a graph of the connections
between RPs to infer the positional relation of their zones.Moreover, in case adversaries
are aware of the total number N of RPs, they can also estimate the size of the zones in
the overlay. This raises the following research question:
• How does the size of the service area influence location privacy?
• How does the number of RPs aﬀect location privacy?
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Table 5.2 Parameters for the privacy evaluation of OSTM.
Parameter Value
Number of repetitions 30 (avg. with 99% conﬁdence level)
Simulated time 1 day
Field size approx. 33× 35 km2
Number of eNBs ∣C∣ 604 base stations
Time slot size ts 10 min (144 time slots)
Life time of tokens unlimited
Number of UEs 718 140
Polling interval single poll at end of day
Rekeying interval (multiple of ts) 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
st-datagrams
Number of st-datagrams 100
Delay until sending of st-datagrams U(1 h, 5 h)
Addressed st-regions rectangular areas at random locations
Begin time of addressed st-regions U(6 h, 14 h)
Duration of addressed st-regions U(10 min, 50 min)
Area of addressed st-regions (500m)2, (2 km)2, (5 km)2, (10 km)2
Content-Addressable Network
Number of RPs 50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600
Dimensionality 2-dim., 3-dim.
Number of long links no long links
In order to investigate these questions, the following paragraph now provides a simple
model for the size of the partitions in the CAN.With RPs joining at random coordinates
and the balancing of the zone sizes [Rat+01a], the CAN tends to form a uniform grid of
squared zones of approximately equal size (and, depending on the number of nodes,
rectangular zones in which the length of one side is double the size of the other). Ac-
cordingly, given thismodel of a uniform grid, the extents of a CAN zone are expected to
roughly correspond to a fraction d
√
N of the full CAN space of extents s [Rat+01a] where
d ∈ {2, 3} is the dimensionality of the CAN in OSTM. Note that, while CAN originally
relies on axes in the range of [0, 1] (i.e., its extents correspond to s = 1), OSTM requires
an upscaling of the ﬂoating point space in order to transform it into one that is based
on integer numbers which is necessary for the use of an OPE scheme like GOPE.
In order to estimate the ability of an adversary to estimate thewhereabouts of users, this
work relies on the metrics of the average size of the privacy area A, i.e., the average size of
the geographic area in which users polling an RP have been residing in. Furthermore,
for the sake of better descriptiveness, results are provided for the maximum expected
estimation error Emax, i.e., the average maximum estimation error that is expected from
an adversary considering the size of the privacy area.
Note that while the use of the average size of privacy areas (or estimation errors, respec-
tively) instead of the minimum or the maximum may seem inappropriate to estimate
the advantage of adversaries, it is considered reasonable to estimate and compare the
potential threat of attackers under varying circumstances. This assumption is based on
the fact that the splitting mechanism of the CAN overlay is designed to balance zone
sizes. While there may be extremely unlikely scenarios where only a few zones are split
very often, in these situations, the advantage of adversaries in accurately estimating the
whereabouts of users in very small zones is compensated by their disadvantage in es-
timating the locations of users less accurately in large zones. Accordingly, A and Emax
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Figure 5.17 Example illustrating the extents of zones in the CAN space according to the uni-
form grid model (assuming N = 4).
provide descriptive measures to estimate the expected advantage of adversaries.
Given the uniform grid model, the values of A and Emax can be calculated depending
on the number of RPs in the overlay network. Accordingly, the size of the privacy area
corresponds to the following equation (see Figure 5.17):
A = ( sd√N)
2
(5.4)
With adversaries being unsure about the locations of users within the privacy areas,
they are expected to rely on the centroid of this area in order to minimize their error.
Accordingly, based on the assumption that adversaries use the centroid of the privacy
area when estimating the locations of users, the maximum expected estimation can be
calculated as follows (see Figure 5.17):
Emax = sd√N ⋅
√
2
2
= sd√N ⋅√2 (5.5)
Figure 5.18a and Figure 5.18b show a comparison of A and Emax (relative to the extents s
of the CAN space) between the values provided by the model and the empirically ob-
tained results for an increasing number of RPs and d ∈ {2, 3}, conﬁrming the validity of
the results provided by the uniform grid model. Note that the deviation of the empiric
results from the values provided by the uniform gridmodel is be due to the fact that the
model does not incorporate the splitting of zones into two equi-sized rectangular par-
titions. Accordingly, in case d
√
N is not an integer number, there is a mixture of squared
and rectangular zones leading to a deviation from the uniform grid model. Further-
more, for d = 3, there is a noticeable deviation from the measured results. This likely
due to the fact that CAN nodes partition zones ﬁrst along the u, then the v, and ﬁnally
the w-axis. Therefore, due to this splitting order, zones tend to be partitioned along the
u and v-axis ﬁrst which results in slightly greater areas of the projection of zones on
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Figure 5.18 Empirically measured average size of privacy area A and maximum expected es-
timation error Emax compared to ideal values based on the uniform grid model.
the uw and vw-planes in contrast to the projection on the uv-plane (cf.Figure 5.19). This
leads to the observable overestimation of A and Emax by the uniform grid model.
Given these results, it is now possible to consider the relationship between the number
of RPs and the size of the service area. As indicated by Figure 5.17, an increasing num-
ber of RPs strongly reduces the size of the privacy areas. Assuming that adversaries
are able to infer the layout of the overlay network, they are able to more accurately esti-
mate the locations of users with an increasing number of RPs. Nevertheless, the partial
derivatives of A and Emax with respect to N in Equation 5.6 show that their decrease
approaches zero with increasing N (see Figure 5.18c and Figure 5.18d).
∂
∂N
A = −2
d
⋅ s2 ⋅N− 2d−1 ∂
∂N
Emax = −s ⋅N− 1d−1
d ⋅√2 (5.6)
Accordingly, while for a rather small number of RPs, the estimation error of attack-
ers quickly decreases with increasing N, for a larger number of RPs, the advantage of
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Figure 5.19 Example of a three-dimensional CAN overlay with N = 300 RPs. Here, with zones
being split along the u and v-axis ﬁrst, the areas of the projection of zones on the
uw and vw-planes tend to yield larger values than the areas on the uv-plane.
adversaries becomes less signiﬁcant. Hence, in order to protect the location privacy of
users despite the strong initial reduction of the size of the privacy areas for small N, a
large-scale service area is required to compensate against the decline for increasing N.
Note that, in this context, the deﬁnition of “large-scale” depends on the desired estima-
tion accuracy according to Equation 5.4 and Equation 5.5. For example, given a desired
average privacy area of at least A ≥ 100 km2, the following equation has to be fulﬁlled:
( sd√N)
2 ≥ 100 km2 ⇒ sd√N ≥ 10 km
Accordingly, for 200 RPs and d = 3, the extents s of a squared coverage area should be:
s ≥ 10 km ⋅ 3√200 ≈ 60 km
While a large-scale service area can protect the location privacy of users, it should nev-
ertheless be noted here that inferring the layout of the CAN requires a powerful ad-
versary that is able to analyze the communication patterns between all RPs (benign-
but-curious providers of the infrastructure of RPs are discussed for attacks aiming to
compromise RPs). Therefore, if it is necessary to protect against such powerful attackers
given a small service area, an STM service provider should rely on traditional measures
for unlinkability (e.g., mix networks [CFN90]) to obfuscate the layout of the overlay.
An important aspect not considered so far is that the number of RPs depends on the
size of the service area. Accordingly, the number N of RPs that are required for a service
area with extents s can be expressed as:
N = n
a
⋅ s2 (5.7)
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Then, the average size of privacy area A can be rewritten as:
A = ⎛⎝ sd√s2 ⋅ na ⎞⎠
2 = ⎛⎜⎝ ss 2d ⋅ (na ) 1d
⎞⎟⎠
2 = ⎛⎝s1− 2d ⋅ (na )−
1
d⎞⎠
2 = s2− 4d ⋅ ( a
n
) 2d (5.8)
It is noteworthy here that, for d = 2, privacy area A no longer depends on s:
A = a
n
(5.9)
Accordingly, in case of a two-dimensional CAN, the average size of the privacy area in
OSTM depends only on the number of RPs n that are necessary to serve an area a:
n ≤ a
A
d = 2 (5.10)
Given, for example, a desired privacy area of 10 km × 10 km = 100 km2 and a service
area a = 4000km2, a two-dimensional CAN may use n ≤ 40 RPs to serve this area.
For d > 2, the minimum extents of the service area are given by:
s ≥ ⎛⎝A ⋅ (na )
2
d⎞⎠
1
2− 4d
d > 2 (5.11)
For d = 3, this can be rewritten as:
s ≥ ⎛⎝A ⋅ (na )
2
3⎞⎠
3
2 = A 32 ⋅ n
a
(5.12)
For instance, let the desired privacy area be at least 10 km× 10 km = 100 km2. Further-
more, it is estimated that n = 1 RP is necessary to serve an area of a = 25 km2. Then, to
provide location privacy, the extents s of the squared service area should be at least:
s ≥ (100 km2) 32 ⋅ 1
25 km2
= 40 km
Apart from the number of RPs, the following paragraphs now discuss the remaining
research questions stated above.
• Should a two- or three-dimensional CAN be preferred considering location privacy?
Summarizing the intermediate results, location privacy in OSTM strongly depends on
the relation of the size of the service area and the number of RPs that is required to
serve this area. According to the uniform grid model and the measured results, a three-
dimensional CAN should be preferred over a two-dimensional one. This is due to the
fact that, for d = 3, the zones in a CAN feature larger uv-areas and therefore, from the
point of view of an adversary, larger areas of uncertainty. Furthermore, as outlined in
Equation 5.11 and Equation 5.12, a three-dimensional CAN enables OSTM to beneﬁt
from an increasing size of the service area.
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• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect location privacy?
While the use of long links does not inﬂuence the size of zones in the CAN, they can
contribute to the obfuscation of the overlay network as communication links do not nec-
essarily imply direct neighborhood anymore. Nevertheless, due to the expected more
frequent use of long links, powerful adversaries being able to observe the communica-
tion between all RPs may still be capable of inferring the layout of the CAN.
• May location privacy be improved by adjusting the rekeying interval?
Although the size of zones are not aﬀected by the rekeying interval, due to the rekey-
ing procedure of OSTM, i.e., the shuﬄing of the responsibilities of RPs for diﬀerent
zones when changing the OPE keys at regular time intervals, an adversary only has a
limited number of time slots to analyze the traﬃc between RPs. Reducing the rekeying
interval therefore contributes to the obfuscation of the network structure. Still, in case
of powerful adversaries observing all communication, only a suﬃciently large service
area should be considered as an eﬀective countermeasure against this attack.
In summary, since the location privacy of users inOSTMmight be violated by the obser-
vation attack if an attacker is able to infer the layout of the CAN, it is crucial to carefully
consider the number of RPs serving a certain area. Furthermore, for d = 3, increasing the
service area can further contribute to limiting the estimation accuracy of adversaries.
Probingattack In the probing attack, an adversary tries to obtain the locations of users
by sending an st-datagram to a speciﬁc st-cell and observing which RP is contacted by
the TPS. Then, if a UE sends a polling message to this RP, an attacker may infer the
presence of the user at this st-cell. According to the CSTM approach, this attack may
only be successful if the adversary is able to detect its st-datagram among the messages
that are exchanged between the TPS and the RPs. This, however, requires that the ad-
versary is the only sender of a message due to the employed TLS protocol. Please note
that dummy traﬃc [Ray01] might again be used to prevent the probing of st-cells.
Nevertheless, even if an adversary is able to infer the RP that is responsible for a speciﬁc
st-cell, depending on the total number of RPs, each RP is still responsible for several st-
cells. This provides a notion of k-anonymity based on the number of st-cells that an RP
is responsible for. Here, the following research questions are of interest:
• How does the size of the service area influence location privacy?
• Howdoes the number of RPs aﬀect the number of st-cells that each RP is responsible for?
• What is the impact of the dimensionality on the number of st-cells in this context?
With the service area beingmapped into the CAN, an increasing number of RPs should
decrease the number of possible st-cells that a user may have visited (assuming that the
UE contacts an individual RP). Given the uniform grid model, the average number of
radio cells r that are assigned to an RP are expected to be approximated as follows:
r = ∣C∣
d√N2 (5.13)
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Figure 5.20 Average number of st-cells and radio cells that are served by an RP.
Here, ∣C∣ corresponds to the total number of radio cells which are assumed to be dis-
tributed uniformly in the service area. According to the previous assumption of a uni-
form distribution of radio cells, the average number of st-cells st that are assigned to an
RP are expected to be approximated as follows:
st = ∣C∣ ⋅ tmaxts
N
(5.14)
Here, tmax represents the maximum time span up to which st-datagrams can be deliv-
ered into the past while ts corresponds to the duration of the used time slots. Accord-
ingly, tmax/ts represents the total number of time slots.
In order to visualize the impact of the relation of the number of RPs and the size of the
service area, Figure 5.20a shows the empirically measured average number of st-cells
that are served by a single RP as well as the idealized value according to Equation 5.14
for the Cologne scenario. Here, independent of the dimensionality of the CAN, an in-
creasing number of RPs results in the expected decrease of the average number of st-
cells that are assigned to an RP. Furthermore, it should be noted that the uniform grid
model is again able to predict the empirically obtained results.
While the average number of st-cells that are served by an RP is independent of the di-
mensionality of the CAN, the average number of radio cells that are assigned to an RP
may be smaller for d = 2 in contrast to d = 3 as the zones of the CAN should be smaller in
this case. Figure 5.20b conﬁrms this assumption with a two-dimensional overlay yield-
ing a smaller average number of radio cells that are served by an RP both theoretically
(Equation 5.13) and empirically. Consequently, regarding the probing attack, a three-
dimensional CAN should again be preferred in OSTM. For example, even in case of 600
RPs serving roughly the same number of eNBs (∣C∣ = 604) which results in the expected
1-to-1 mapping between RPs and eNBs for d = 2, a three-dimensional CAN is still able
to yield an average of approximately r = 8 diﬀerent radio cells per RP.
In order to provide k-anonymity among the potentially polled st-cells and radio cells of
Analysis and Discussion of OSTM 165
an RP, N can be approximated according to Equation 5.14 and Equation 5.13:
k ≈ ∣C∣ ⋅ tmaxts
N
∧ k ≈ ∣C∣
d√N2 ⇒ N ≤ min
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ ∣C∣ ⋅
tmax
ts
k
, (∣C∣
k
) d2 ⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect location privacy?
Since long links do not aﬀect the sizes of the zones in the CAN, the success of the prob-
ing attack is not expected to be determined by the use or the number of such shortcuts.
• Is it possible to improve location privacy by adjusting the rekeying interval?
Even if an attacker is able to infer the RP that is responsible for a certain st-cell, due
to the shuﬄing of responsibilities during the rekeying procedure, RPs are responsible
for diﬀerent zones in diﬀerent realities (using diﬀerent OPE keys) of the CAN in an
unpredictable manner. Therefore, by decreasing the rekeying interval, the number of
st-datagrams that are necessary to obtain information about the responsibilities of RPs
for diﬀerent OPE keys can be increased aswell. This enables the TPS to prevent probing,
e.g., by limiting the rate at which messages can be sent.
In summary, even if an adversary is able to infer the RP that is responsible for a speciﬁc
st-cell, due to the responsibilities of RPs for multiple st-cells, the OSTM approach is still
able to provide graceful degradation. Accordingly, an attacker that is aware of the RP
serving a speciﬁc st-cell may only obtain the approximate locations of users with an
accuracy depending on the dimensionality d as well as the number of RPs.
Movement attack In the movement attack, adversaries try to infer the locations of
users by extrapolating the tokens that are obtained by moving through the service area
or by deploying UEs in a few speciﬁc radio cells. The ability of the OSTM approach to
resist this attack depends on the resilience of the employed OPE scheme against the
disclosure of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. While both existing as well as the proposed
OPF-based OPE schemes are not able to provide such resilience (see Section 5.5.1), the
question remains how well GOPE sustains against the disclosure of plaintext-cipher-
text pairs. Therefore, the following paragraphs discuss the privacy implications of the
disclosure of plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are obtained using malicious UEs.
• How does the size of the service area influence location privacy?
• How does the number of RPs aﬀect location privacy?
• Should a two- or three-dimensional CAN be preferred in this context?
Since GOPE only leaks the order and not the distances of plaintexts among the cipher-
texts, each of the revealed plaintext-ciphertext pairs partitions the domain and range
into two subspaces. Accordingly, to obtain the maximum amount of information about
the ciphertexts in the respective subspaces, for an adversary, the optimal strategy is to
place UEs along the diagonal of the service area. When assuming this placement, the
metrics of the size of the privacy area and the maximum expected estimation error of
166 Privacy and Security Analysis
u-axis
v-
ax
is
s
s
CAN (2-dim.)
)1c,1p(
)2c,2p(
Privacy 
area
2
2
√
·
1+2
s
=maxE
2
1+2
s
=A
Figure 5.21 Example for the disclosure of two plaintext-ciphertext pair vectors along the di-
agonal of a two-dimensional CAN. Here, the disclosed pairs partition the overlay
space in equi-sized segments along both the u and v-axis.
an adversary can be deduced according to Figure 5.21. Here, the average size of the
privacy area under z disclosed plaintext-ciphertext pair vectors (p⃗, c⃗) corresponds to:
A ∣ z⋅(p⃗,c⃗) = ( sz + 1)2 (5.15)
Note that the average size of the privacy area is related to the one-dimensional metric
of the number of signiﬁcant plaintexts along both the u and v-axis between two known
plaintext-ciphertext pair vectors (p⃗i, c⃗i) and (p⃗j, c⃗j) for all i < j.
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 5.21, the maximum expected estimation error for z
disclosed plaintext-ciphertext pair vectors (p⃗, c⃗) is deﬁned as:
Emax ∣ z⋅(p⃗,c⃗) = sz + 1 ⋅
√
2
2
= s(z + 1)√2 (5.16)
According to these equations, the advantage of an adversary regarding known plain-
text-ciphertext pairs can only be limited by an increasing size of the service area. More-
over, neither the number of RPs nor the dimensionality of the CAN can be used to
control the advantage of an attacker. Please note that s may still deﬁne N and both N
and d aﬀect the sizes and extents of the zones in the CAN (and thus the privacy area and
expected estimation error) as outlined in the discussion of the observation attack above.
Accordingly, when deciding on an appropriate size of a service area, the minimum of
A and A ∣ z⋅(p⃗,c⃗) (or Emax and Emax ∣ z⋅(p⃗,c⃗), respectively) should be considered.
Figure 5.22a shows the average size of the privacy area relative to s2, i.e., the size of
the service area. Furthermore, Figure 5.22b depicts the maximum expected estimation
error relative to the extents s of the service area.Here, it becomes obvious that theOSTM
approach requires a large-scale service area in order to provide resilience against the
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Figure 5.22 Average privacy area size A ∣ z⋅(p⃗,c⃗) and as maximum expected estimation error
Emax ∣ z⋅(p⃗,c⃗) under z disclosed plaintext-ciphertext pair vectors. The depicted values
are relative to the size s2 and extents s of the service area.
disclosure of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Therefore, the following equation should be
considered to determine the appropriate minimum size of the service area:
s ≥ √(z + 1)2 ⋅ A (5.17)
For example, given a desired privacy area of at least 10km × 10km = 100km2 while
aiming to provide resilience against the disclosure of z ≤ 20 plaintext-ciphertext pairs,
the extents s of the service area should be at least:
s ≥ √(20+ 1)2 ⋅ 100km2 ≥ 210km
The following paragraphs now discuss the remaining research questions in detail.
• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect location privacy?
Regarding the movement attack, long links do not provide an advantage to attackers.
• Is it possible to improve location privacy by adjusting the rekeying interval?
Decreasing the rekeying interval can reduce the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs
that an adversary may obtain. This, however, is only the case if the adversary employs
one or more mobile UEs instead of ﬁxed ones. Nevertheless, since UEs that are placed
statically along the diagonal of the service area allow attackers to obtain the respective
plaintext-ciphertext pairs immediately when announcing tokens using diﬀerent OPE
keys, adjusting the size of the rekeying interval does not aﬀect location privacy.
In summary, the movement attack allows to infer speciﬁc plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Thus, providing location privacy in OSTM demands a suﬃciently large service area.
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Compromising RPs Apart from the previously described attacks, adversaries might
be capable of compromising one or more RPs. In this case, attackers can obtain knowl-
edge of multiple ciphertexts, potentially allowing them to break the order-preserving
encryption once all ciphertexts are obtained. Note that it is necessary for an adversary
to retrieve all ciphertexts of the plaintexts of a domain (or, assuming known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs, a subdomain). Otherwise, given a domain of M plaintexts (and ci-
phertexts, respectively), if only M − 1 ciphertexts are known to an adversary, there are
still ( MM−1) = M possible combinations that have to be considered by an attacker. Ac-
cordingly, even M − 1 known ciphertexts provide no advantage over random guessing.
Note that this implies the inability of the OSTM approach to protect against adver-
saries compromising all RPs, as well as against a benign-but-curious service provider
that maintains and controls the complete RP overlay network.
In order for the OSTM approach to be able to protect the location privacy of users, it is
important to consider the number of RPs that an adversary has to compromise to infer
all distinct ciphertexts along all axes (or all ciphertexts between two known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs, respectively). Apart from known ciphertexts, the knowledge of plain-
text-ciphertext pairs can provide an advantage to adversaries due to the partitioning
of domain and range. Such pairs can be obtained, for instance, by deploying UEs in
the service area as outlined in the discussion of the movement attack in the previous
section. Since it may be relatively easy for adversaries to place a few UEs within the
service area, the following research questions also consider the additional knowledge
of chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Before investigating the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent rekeying intervals, ﬁrst, it is necessary
to consider the number of ciphertexts that are disclosed to an individual RP due to the
forwarding of polling messages as a part of the operation of the CAN. Accordingly, the
following research questions are of interest:
• How do the size of the service area and the number of RPs influence the number of ci-
phertexts that are disclosed by compromising RPs?
• Should a two- or three-dimensional CAN be preferred to limit this disclosure?
• How do chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs aﬀect the revealed number of ciphertexts?
Figure 5.23 shows both the average and maximum number of distinct ciphertexts that
have been observed byRPs along the u and v-axis in the simulation study of theCologne
scenario for a rekeying interval of 10 ⋅ ts. Here, for d ∈ {2, 3}, a slight decrease of both
the average and maximum number of disclosed ciphertexts can be observed with an
increasing number of RPs (which usually also corresponds to an increasing size of the
service area). Regarding the preferred dimensionality of the CAN, a three-dimensional
overlay is again able to better protect the privacy of users. This is due to the provisioning
of additional paths for the forwarding of pollingmessages, aswell as the responsibilities
of RPs for only a limited time frame in contrast to d = 2where each RP serves a speciﬁc
geographic region over the full supported range in time.Nevertheless, despite the slight
advantage of d = 3, the choice of the dimensionality of the overlay has a rather small
impact on the number of ciphertexts that may be obtained by a compromised RP.
While the average and maximum number of ciphertexts that can be collected by an RP
provides an impression of the inﬂuence of the total number of RPs, it does not reﬂect
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Figure 5.23 Number of distinct ciphertexts being observed by each RP while forwarding stor-
age requests and polling messages in a d-dimensional CAN. The depicted values
show the sum of the number of disclosed ciphertexts along the u and v-axis.
the ability of adversaries to break the order-preserving encryption scheme. Since an at-
tacker has to obtain allM ciphertexts to break the encryption, it is necessary to consider
the overlapping sets of known ciphertexts between compromised RPs. Here, a more ex-
pressive metric is the minimum number of RPs that an adversary has to compromise
in order to obtain knowledge of all ciphertexts. This raises the following question:
• Howmany RPs may be compromised before breaking a “perfect” OPE scheme?
In order to measure the minimum number of RPs that have to be compromised by an
attacker, for the simulative evaluation, it is assumed that an adversary is capable of
compromising RPs based on a greedy selection strategy which iteratively chooses the
RP providing the highest advantage to the attacker, i.e., disclosing the highest number
of previously unknown ciphertexts for a given set of compromised RPs. Note that while
this approach may not provide an optimal selection of RPs to be compromised, it still
reﬂects the level of resilience that can be expected from OSTM against this attack.
Figure 5.24a and Figure 5.24b illustrate the number of RPs that have to be compromised
by an adversary employing the outlined greedy selection scheme in case no additional
plaintext-ciphertext pairs have been disclosed to an attacker. Despite the potentially
non-optimal selection of RPs, the outlined results still reﬂect the inability of OSTM to
resist the compromise of only a few RPs. Accordingly, in order to obtain all ciphertexts
and to accurately guess the locations of users from their encrypted coordinates, an ad-
versary only has to compromise an average number of about 3 to 6 RPs in the given
scenario. This small number of RPs that have to be compromised in order to obtain
all ciphertexts along each axis can be explained by the fact that, initially, UEs dispatch
their polling message to an RP that is randomly chosen among the known gateways.
With the pollingmessages entering the overlay network at randomly chosen zones, they
have to be forwarded to the coordinate contained in the respective messages, allowing
compromised RPs to collect a large number of encrypted coordinates over time. Here,
while an increasing number of RPs results in an increase of the number of RPs that have
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Figure 5.24 Number of RPs that an attacker must compromise to obtain all ciphertexts for an
increasing number of RPs. The values show the number as average of u and v-axis.
to be compromised by an adversary, its slope is almost negligible. Furthermore, while
a three-dimensional CAN is slightly more resilient against against the compromise of
RPs, the general impact of the dimensionality is not signiﬁcant.
Regarding known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Figure 5.24c and Figure 5.24d visualize
the strong decline of the minimum and average number of RPs that have to be compro-
mised by an adversary for one or two known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Here, despite
the disclosure of just a few plaintext-ciphertext pairs, adversaries are already able to
break the order-preserving encryption scheme by deploying a small number of mali-
cious UEs in the service area and compromising about 1 to 3 RPs.
• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect location privacy?
Depending on the number l of long links, adversaries may infer the sizes and locations
of the CAN zones of the compromised RPs. This is due to the fact that, on one hand,
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the number of long links discloses the approximate sizes of zones. Note that in case
of a dynamic adjustment of the number of long links to the size of zone according to
[BK08], attackers are able to immediately infer the sizes of zones. Thus, in this work, it
is assumed that the maximum number of long links is ﬁxed in order to limit the ability
of adversaries to accurately estimate the sizes of zones.
On the other hand, since long links specify wrap-around shortcuts to other zones in a
clockwise direction, they can be exploited to estimate the location of a compromised
zone (i.e., the zone of a compromised RP). Note that while the coordinates of CAN
zones may not be directly available to attackers, they are still able to compare the co-
ordinates of the linked zones to the zones of the compromised RPs. Therefore, given
the strict clockwise direction of long links, adversaries may estimate the approximate
location of a compromised zone by comparing each of the linked zones to the zone of
the compromised RP and checkingwhich zone of the available long links is no longer at
a larger coordinate. This shift in the order of the comparison of coordinates of the com-
promised zone and the zone of a speciﬁc shortcut restricts the possible responsibility
of the compromised RP for a certain area in the CAN.
While exploiting long links of compromised RPs may seem unnecessary considering
themore straightforward observation attack, the observation attack still requires a very
powerful attacker that is able to observe the communication between multiple or even
all RPs in order to be successful. An adversary might therefore aim to compromise an
RP and exploit the available long links instead.
Given a CAN overlay which uses l long links per zone, an adversary is able to esti-
mate the extents of a compromised zone along each axis with an accuracy of at least s2l ,
where s represents the extents of the CAN’s coordinate space along each dimension.
This limits the maximum size of the privacy area of users to:
A ≤ ( s
2l
)2
With this inverse exponential upper bound on A, an STM service provider should only
use a very small number of long links in a suﬃciently large service area. In particular,
given a desired size of the privacy area A and a service area of size s2, the following
condition should be consideredwhen choosing an appropriate number l of long links:
l ≤ ⌊ log2 s√
A
⌋
For instance, given s = 50km and a desired A = 10km ⋅ 10km = 100km2, the maximum
number of long links that should be used is calculated as follows:
l ≤ ⌊ log2 50km√
100km2
⌋ ⇒ l ≤ 2
• Is it possible to improve location privacy by adjusting the rekeying interval?
As outlined earlier in this section, an adversarymay break the order-preserving encryp-
tion by compromising a small number of RPs. With the rekeying interval specifying
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Figure 5.25 Number of RPs that an attacker must compromise to obtain all ciphertexts for an
increasing rekeying interval. The values show the average of u and v-axis.
the frequency at which OPE keys are changed and therefore inﬂuencing the maximum
length of path segments that may be used in the polling messages of UEs, reducing the
size of this interval should enable service providers to weight the necessary number
of polling messages against the number of RPs that is required to be compromised for
an adversary to obtain all ciphertexts (or, assuming a partial breakdown of the encryp-
tion scheme, all ciphertexts between two known plaintext-ciphertext pairs). In case of
no known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Figure 5.25a and Figure 5.25b show the minimum
and average number of RPs to be compromised for an increasing size of the rekeying
interval given a CAN overlay that consists of 300 RPs in total. While an increasing size
of the rekeying interval yields the expected decrease of both the mean and minimum
number of RPs that must be compromised by an adversary, this decrease is most sig-
niﬁcant between a rekeying interval of 1 and 5. Nevertheless, even in case of a rekeying
interval of 1, only a slight increase of the number of RPs to be compromised can be
observed. Given known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, this situation further worsens ac-
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cording to the strong decline of the necessary number of RPs to be compromised as
depicted in Figure 5.25c and Figure 5.25d. Accordingly, despite the possibility to adjust
the resilience of the OSTM approach via the rekeying interval, this parameter is only
of limited use considering the small number of RP that have to be compromised to ob-
tain all ciphertexts. Note that, in this work, the situation of a partial breakdown of the
order-preserving encryption between two known plaintext-ciphertext pairs is not con-
sidered as the results outlined in Figure 5.25 already indicate the inability of the OSTM
approach to provide resilience against the compromise of RPs.
In summary, given the small number of RPs that is necessary to obtain all ciphertexts
and thus break the order-preserving encryption, OSTM is no longer able to achieve
location privacy if adversaries are able to compromise one or more RPs.
Compromising eNBs Finally, in case adversaries are capable of compromising one or
more eNBs, they are able to directly observe themovements and presence of UEswithin
the aﬀected radio cells. Apart from the direct observation of users, attackers may also
gain access to the encrypted coordinates that are to be announced after the compromise,
enabling them to infer the current and future whereabouts of UEs polling speciﬁc RPs.
Consequently, according to the CSTM approach, when being able to compromise RPs,
the location privacy of users may be violated in OSTM as well. Nevertheless, the OSTM
approach may still provide graceful degradation, limiting the violation of the location
privacy of users to the aﬀected radio cells. Furthermore, the violation only aﬀects st-
cells after the time at which the respective eNB has been compromised.
5.5.2.2 Co-location Privacy
The following paragraphs now discuss the ability of the OSTM approach to provide
resilience against attacks aiming to violate the co-location privacy of users.
Observation attack In this attack, adversaries are able to observe communication be-
tween entities. They cannot, however, decrypt the exchanged messages and obtain co-
ordinates which are used to store or retrieve st-datagrams in the CAN overlay due to
the use of the TLS protocol. Still, with attackers being able to detect whether two or
more UEs poll the same RPs, they may infer that the respective UEs might have been
co-located at some st-cell. Assuming that an adversary is able to track the encrypted
messages that are exchanged between UEs and an RP via the overlay network, this
work considers the probability that two UEs which poll such an RP have actually been
co-located at an st-cell which is served by this RP. Since it is diﬃcult to provide an
analytic model due to the stochastic dependencies between st-cells that are served by
certain RPs, the ability of OSTM to provide co-location privacy is evaluated by empir-
ically estimating Pri(A ∩ B), which denotes the probability that two devices UEA and
UEB, which poll the same RPi, have been residing in the same st-cell. The following
paragraphs now discuss the suggested research questions in detail.
• How does the size of the service area influence co-location privacy?
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Figure 5.26 Empiric co-location probability of UEs based on the number of RPs.
Since the advantage of adversaries strongly depends on the co-location probability
which is deﬁned by the number of st-cells and radio cells being served by each RP,
the size of the service area may inﬂuence this number given a ﬁxed number of RPs. As-
suming, however, that an increasing size of the service areawill require a linear increase
in the number of RPs, it is suﬃcient to consider the impact of the number of RPs on the
co-location privacy below to evaluate the ability of OSTM to fulﬁll this objective.
• How does the number of RPs aﬀect co-location privacy?
• Should a two- or three-dimensional CAN be preferred here?
Given a two-dimensional CAN overlay, the inﬂuence of the number of RPs on the co-
location probability of users is rather small as RPs are responsible for st-cells belonging
to the same radio cells over multiple time slots (see Figure 5.26a which assumes neither
the use of long links nor rekeying). In contrast, for d = 3, the impact of the number of
RPs on the co-location probability is more visible as subdivisions in the CAN space also
reduce the size of zones on the time axis, allowing attackers to more easily guess the
co-location of UEs. Despite the increasing advantage of adversaries with an increasing
number of RPs, the empiric co-location probability for st-cells remains within a range
of approx. 1.5% to 7%, which is clearly below the critical threshold of 50%. Given a
suﬃcient number of time slots, the OSTM approach is thus able to provide co-location
privacy with respect to st-cells for both d = 2 and d = 3.
In terms of co-location privacy at the granularity of radio cells, Figure 5.26b highlights
the inability of OSTM to fulﬁll this objective for d = {2, 3}. Here, while an increasing
number of RPs shows the expected increase of the co-location probability due to re-
duced number of radio cells that is assigned to each RP, the increase of the co-location
probability is within an acceptable range of about 5% between N = 50 and N = 600 in
case of d = 2 and approx. 18% for d = 3. Nevertheless, the general level of the co-loca-
tion probability of about 70% to 93% provides adversaries with a strong advantage in
correctly guessing the co-location of UEs within the same radio cell by only observing
which RPs are polled by UEs. Accordingly, the OSTM approach is not able to provide
co-location privacy with regards to radio cells, neither for d = 2 nor for d = 3.
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• How does the use and the number of long links aﬀect co-location privacy?
While long links may enable adversaries to infer the layout of the overlay network and
thus responsibilities of RPs for certain st-cells more accurately, their use does not aﬀect
the co-location probability of UEs which primarily depends on the number of st-cells
(and radio cells) that are served by each individual RP.
• Is it possible to improve co-location privacy by adjusting the rekeying interval?
The ability of adversaries to infer the co-location of users cannot be limited by adjusting
the size of the rekeying interval. This is due to the fact that rekeying aims to reduce
the likelihood of neighboring st-cells being assigned to the same RP, whereas the co-
location probability depends primarily on the number of st-cells (or radio cells) that are
assigned to each RP. The average number of st-cells per RP, however, is not expected to
show any major deviations for diﬀerent rekeying intervals beyond a potentially more
uniform distribution of st-cells over all RPs for smaller rekeying intervals (due to the
shuﬄing of responsibilities of RPs as part of the rekeying procedure). Consequently,
rekeying does not have a signiﬁcant impact on co-location privacy.
Probing attack In the observation attack outlined above, adversaries can learn about
the co-location of UEs while not being necessarily able to determine the time and loca-
tion of the meeting. In contrast, using the probing attack and the resulting knowledge
of responsibilities of RPs for certain st-cells, attackers may infer the time and location of
speciﬁc meetings. Regarding the co-location probability of UEs, however, adversaries
are not expected to gain any additional advantage as the number of st-cells and radio
cells that are served by RPs is not aﬀected by the probing attack.
Movement attack Using the movement attack, adversaries may obtain additional in-
formation about certain ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Similar to the prob-
ing attack, while this enables attackers to infer st-cells at which UEs have been co-
located, it does not further reduce the overall co-location probability of UEs.
Compromising RPs Assuming that attackers are able to compromise one or more RPs,
the objective of co-location probability can, bydeﬁnition, no longer be fulﬁlled byOSTM
for the st-cells that are served by the aﬀected RPs. This is due to the fact that, for com-
promised RPs, adversaries are directly able to determine UEs using the same encrypted
coordinates in their polling messages.
Compromising eNBs Given the ability of attackers to compromise one or more eNBs,
co-location privacy can no longer be provided by the OSTM approach for st-cells within
the aﬀected radio cells after the compromise. For these st-cells, attackersmay determine
co-located users by observing UEs which are registered at the eNBs.
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5.5.2.3 Absence Privacy
The following paragraphs discuss the ability of OSTM to fulﬁll the objective of absence
privacy under the suggested four attack scenarios.
Observation attack In this attack, attackers can observe which RPs are being polled
by UEs while not being able to determine the content of the exchanged messages.
According to CSTM (see Section 5.3.1.3), OSTM may provide absence privacy if UEs
send polling messages to all N RPs. However, if OSTM does not rely on the rekeying
technique proposed in Section 4.3.2, this is unlikely as UEs are not expected to have
visited a large fraction of all served st-cells. In particular, to fulﬁll the objective of ab-
sence privacy, for d = 2, UEs should have visited all served radio cells at some point
during the supported service time span, or, in case of d = 3, have been present to a suﬃ-
ciently large number of st-cells extending over the full service area during diﬀerent time
slots. Since this presents an unrealistic assumption, the application of rekeying should
be mandatory in order to fulﬁll absence privacy. By relying on the rekeying procedure,
the responsibilities of RPs for speciﬁc st-cells are randomly shuﬄed at regular intervals,
resulting in even non-mobile UEs polling multiple RPs.
Note that in order to determine the absence of users from a speciﬁc st-cell, it is neces-
sary for adversaries to determine the RPs serving this st-cell. Depending on the prior
knowledge of attackers, this may demand additional probing or movement attacks.
As outlined above, rekeying should be considered mandatory to reduce the number of
RPs that are never polled by a UE. Since rekeying introduces a random distribution of
st-cells to RPs according to CSTM, UEs will ultimately send polling messages to all RPs
as well. Hence, OSTM can provide absence privacy given a suﬃciently large number
of visited st-cells. Since, in the rekeying procedure, the TPS also assigns st-cells uni-
formly at random to RPs, it is again possible to apply the coupon collector problem (see
Section 5.3.1.3) to answer the following research questions:
• How does the served number of st-cells aﬀect absence privacy?
• What is the influence of the number of RPs on this objective?
• Should a two- or three-dimensional CAN be preferred to protect absence privacy?
In order to answer these questions, it is assumed that UEs are not moving at all. This
present the worst case for the absence privacy of users where UEs send polling mes-
sages to the smallest number of RPs possible. In particular, for d = 2, a static UE polls
exactly one RP for each rekeying interval. This is due to the fact that during each of
these periods, exactly one RP is responsible for the radio cell in which the UE resides.
Therefore, a UE should visit at least Trd=2 st-cells in order to poll all N RPs:
Trd=2 = βrekey ⋅N ⋅ N∑
k=1
1
k
Here, βrekey is the number of time slots within each rekeying interval. In order words,
with static UEs polling an additional RP every βrekey-th time slot, the expected number
of st-cells that must be visited increases by a factor of βrekey compared to CSTM.
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In case of d = 3, the number of st-cells that are visited by a static UE during a rekeying
period equals βrekey. Furthermore, the number of time slots βrp that are, on average,
mapped to an RP can be approximated as follows:
βrp ≈ tmaxts ⋅ 1d√N
Note that this corresponds to the number of time slots that are expected to ﬁt within
the extents of the CAN zone of an RP along the temporal w-axis of the overlay.
Then, during a rekeying period, a static UE is expected to send polling messages to ap-
proximately Nrekey RPs, where Nrekey can be approximated using βrekey and βrp above:
Nrekey ≈ ⌈ βrekeyβrp ⌉
The number Trd=3 of st-cells that a static UE should have at least visited for it to poll all
RPs in a three-dimensional CAN can then be estimated as follows:
Trd=3 ≈ Nrekey ⋅N ⋅ N∑
k=1
1
k
Note that Trd=3 ≤ tmax/ts must also be considered carefully since Trd=3 not only depends
on N but also on the total supported number of time slots tmax/ts.
In summary, based on βrp ≥ 1, the relationship of the necessary number of visited st-
cells in a two- and three-dimensional CAN can be expressed as follows:
Trd=3 ≈ Trd=2βrp ⇒ Trd=3 ≤ Trd=2
Hence, absence privacy is easier to achieve for d = 3 since UEs have to visit less st-cells.
• How does the use and the number of long links influence absence privacy?
The use of long links is not expected to aﬀect the absence privacy of users inOSTM. This
is due to the fact that UEs send polling messages to certain RPs which are responsible
for their visited st-cells. While long links may allow attackers to more easily infer the
layout of the overlay network and hence the responsibilities of RPs for speciﬁc st-cells,
this does not aﬀect the number of RPs that are polled by UEs.
Probing attack By relying on probing, an adversary is more likely to infer responsi-
bilities of RPs for certain st-cell. While this is crucial for determining the time and place
of an absence, the ability of OSTM to provide absence privacy is not aﬀected here.
Movement attack Similar to probing, the movement attack increases the chances of
adversaries to determine the st-cells related to an absence. In this regard, disclosed
plaintext-ciphertext pairs present an additional source of information. While this has
no impact on absence privacy, attackers may still diminish the ability of OSTM to fulﬁll
this objective by physically observing the absence of users from the visited st-cells.
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Compromising RPs Once attackers are able to compromise one or more RPs, OSTM is
no longer able to provide absence privacy since adversaries are able to determine the
st-cells that are being polled by UEs. However, similar to previous privacy objectives,
this is limited to the aﬀected st-cells that are served by the compromised RPs.
Compromising eNBs In case adversaries compromise one or multiple eNBs, absence
privacy cannot be maintained due to the possibility to physically observe the presence
of users and thus infer their absence if no contact is established with the base station.
Nonetheless, note that actually prooﬁng absence may be challenging if a user claims to
have switched oﬀ his or her device during the visit of the corresponding st-cells.
5.5.2.4 Anonymity of Recipients
This section discusses the ability of OSTM to provide anonymity of recipients.
Observation attack Like with CSTM, given a trustworthy cellular network operator,
adversaries cannot infer the identities of users via the IMSI or GUTI of their UEs. Still,
attackers might try to infer the identities of one or more users from their locations.
However, with OSTM being able to protect location-related information under the con-
straints outlined in Section 5.5.2.1, anonymity of recipients can be preserved.
Probing attack With the probing attack potentially increasing the ability of adver-
saries to accurately estimate the locations of UEs, attackers are more likely to violate
this objective when compared to the observation attack. Nevertheless, presuming that
more than one st-cell is served by an RP, k-anonymity is provided among users polling
an RP. Accordingly, if the number of users and the number of st-cells per RP are suﬃ-
ciently large, attackers are not expected to be capable of inferring identities from such
coarse-grained location information. Furthermore, as indicated in the analysis of CSTM,
radio cells provide natural anonymity zones that further complicate or even completely
prevent the deduction of identities from the locations of base station towers.
Movement attack Similar to the previous attacks, anonymity might not be fulﬁlled if
attackers are able to infer identity-related information from the locations of users. In
OSTM, protecting location privacy against the movement attack demands a suﬃciently
large service area (cf. Section 5.5.2.1). Note that even if this condition cannot be met,
anonymity of receivers can still be preserved due to k-anonymity among UEs polling
certain RPs, as well as the notion of anonymity zones that is given within radio cells.
Compromising RPs In this attack, anonymity of receivers depends on the ability of
attackers to infer the identities of users from the locations of base stations, e.g., by cor-
relating an address to the name of its resident. While this may not be impossible if only
very few UEs reside within radio cells, in real-world situations, this is extremely un-
likely as cellular network operators are interested in distributing the operational load
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caused byUEs as uniformly as possible among eNBs.Nevertheless, this is due to the ini-
tially chosen granularity of addressable st-regions and not based on techniques which
are implemented by OSTM to protect receiver anonymity.
Compromising eNBs In case attackers are able to compromise one or more eNBs, an-
onymity of recipients may be violated if adversaries can determine the identities of
users from their locations. Since OSTMs cannot provide location privacy within com-
promised radio cells, receiver anonymity can no longer be guaranteed. However, as out-
lined above, inferring identities from the locations of base station towers is expected to
present a highly challenging, if not impossible task.
5.5.3 Security Aspects
The following sections now provide a short discussion of the ability of the OSTM ap-
proach to fulﬁll the given security objectives.
5.5.3.1 Message Confidentiality
In CSTM, eNBs distribute symmetric keys to all UEs traveling through or residing
within their radio cells. This corresponds to a proactive key exchange for message con-
ﬁdentiality. In OSTM, however, eNBs only distribute coordinate vectors that have been
encrypted using an OPE scheme. Since UEs have to rely on these coordinate vectors to
poll the RP overlay, they may not be used in the encryption of st-datagrams. Therefore,
OSTM is not able to providemessage conﬁdentiality. Note that, while not considered in
this thesis, message conﬁdentiality could still be provided as outlined in Section 4.3.
5.5.3.2 Message Authentication and Integrity
According to CSTM, in order to enable receivers to verify the authenticity and integrity
of st-datagrams, senders can rely on a public-key infrastructure like X.509 [Coo+08].
5.5.3.3 Controlled Access
With the TPS representing a trusted entity that is responsible for dispatching datagrams
to RPs, it may be used to implement the access control mechanisms of an STM service.
According to the realization of access control in CSTM, enforcing the access policy of
the TPS requires that RPs only accept st-datagrams that have been signed by the TPS.
Furthermore, if attackers are able to compromise RPs, rejecting unsigned datagrams is
not suﬃcient as, in this case, adversaries may circumvent the access control mechanism
by depositing st-datagrams at a compromised RP. Consequently, st-datagrams have to
be signed by the TPS in order for UEs to ﬁlter maliciously placed st-datagrams.
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5.5.3.4 Spam Prevention
Similar to the realization of access control, a TPS can provide countermeasures against
spamming. Such countermeasures could rely on a limitation of the rate atwhich senders
are allowed to dispatch st-datagrams or on restricting the addressable st-regions.
5.5.3.5 Accountability of Senders
While OSTM does not directly consider the issue of sender accountability, a service
provider could, for example, rely on a TTP [KMZ02] to realize non-repudiation.
5.5.4 Summary
In summary, OSTM is able to fulﬁll most security objectives as well as the following
privacy objectives (see Figure 5.27). OSTM is able to provide location privacy, as well as
co-location privacy with respect to st-cells. In contrast, co-location privacy in terms of
radio cells cannot be guaranteed. Finally, while absence privacy can be fulﬁlled when
relying on rekeying, it is probably diﬃcult to achieve in real-world scenarios due to the
high load that would be induced from polling all RPs in the CAN overlay.
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Figure 5.27 Summary of privacy and security properties of OSTM. Here, “+” indicates that
OSTM is able to fulﬁll an objective under certain conditions,while “–” denotes that
it is not. In case of “o”, the approach is only able to partially fulﬁll the objective.
Regarding the employed order-preserving encryption, the suggested OPF construc-
tion techniques yield the expected improvement of the disclosure-resilience properties.
However, despite the resulting increase of disclosure-resilience when compared to the
“ideal object”, OPF-based OPE is not still not suited to fulﬁll the desired privacy objec-
tives (due to the knowledge of adversaries of the plaintext space, i.e., the locations of
base stations). Therefore, this works assumes that the use of an OPE scheme disclosing
only the order of ciphertexts is mandatory.
In the evaluation of the privacy properties of OSTM under the assumption of a “per-
fect” OPE scheme, the following observations have been made. OSTM is more eﬀective
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in protecting the privacy of users when relying on a three-dimensional CAN instead of
only two dimensions. Furthermore, while long links enable compromised RPs to more
accurately estimate the sizes and locations of their zones, the use of a very small number
of such links can be acceptable. This represents a good trade-oﬀ between user privacy
and routing performance, which is already expected to improve signiﬁcantly for even
a small number of long links (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, the proposed rekeying pro-
cedure in OSTM contributes to the obfuscation of the overlay network structure and
allows to reduce the number of ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs that a com-
promised RP is able to retrieve. Finally, in order to achieve absence privacy in OSTM,
rekeying must be applied so that, over time, each UE polls every RP.
5.6 Comparison of Approaches
In this chapter, CSTMandOSTMhave been evaluatedwith respect to their ability to ful-
ﬁll the given privacy and security objectives under the suggested attacks. The following
paragraphs now summarize the most relevant results (cf. Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.27).
Location privacy Both CSTM and OSTM are able to protect the location privacy of
users against observation, probing, and movement attacks. If an adversary is able to
compromise one or more RPs, OSTM is no longer able to provide location privacy. In
contrast, CSTM is still able to partially fulﬁll this objective by preventing attackers from
continuously tracking the movements of users. Given adversaries that are capable of
compromising eNBs, neither CSTM nor OSTM are able to protect the location privacy
of users within the aﬀected radio cells. In summary, CSTM achieves slightly stronger
guarantees for location privacy in comparison to the CAN-based OSTM approach.
Co-location privacy CSTM is able to protect the co-location privacy of users against
observation, probing, and movement attacks. However, if attackers compromise an RP
serving speciﬁc st-cells, CSTM can no longer achieve this objective for the respective
st-cells. OSTM cannot ensure co-location privacy with respect to radio cells for neither
observation, probing, nor movement attacks. Nevertheless, co-location privacywith re-
spect to st-cells may be achieved by OSTM. Finally, if adversaries compromise eNBs,
neither CSTM nor OSTM are able to fulﬁll this objective. In general, CSTM provides
stronger guarantees for co-location privacy when compared to OSTM.
Absence privacy While CSTM can provide absence privacy given observation, prob-
ing, and movement attacks, OSTM must rely on the suggested rekeying procedure in
order to be able to achieve this objective. This, however, is likely to severely decrease
the eﬃciency of OSTM. If adversaries may compromise RPs, both CSTM and OSTM
are no longer able to fulﬁll the objective of absence privacy. Nevertheless, the violation
of the objective is limited to the st-cells being served by the compromised RPs. Finally,
if attackers are capable of compromising eNBs, absence privacy cannot be guaranteed
by the proposed RP-based approaches. In summary, both schemes achieve absence pri-
vacy against observation, probing, and movement attacks. Here, while OSTM has to
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consider very speciﬁc parameter conﬁgurations to fulﬁll this objective, CSTM already
provides absence privacy if a suﬃciently large number of st-cells is being served.
Anonymity Given an observation, probing, or movement attack, adversaries are not
able to violate the anonymity of users in any of the twoproposedRP-based STMschemes.
While in case of compromised RPs and eNBs, CSTM and OSTM do not implement di-
rect measures to protect the identities of users, anonymity may still be preserved. This
is based on the fact that, assuming a trustworthy cellular network operator, radio cells
provide a notion of k-anonymity among the visitors of these cells.
Security objectives In terms of the suggested security objectives, CSTM and OSTM
can achieve message authentication and integrity, controlled access, spam prevention,
and accountability of senders. Regarding message conﬁdentiality, CSTM is able to pro-
vide this objective in case of observation, probing, andmovement attacks. If adversaries
are capable of compromising RPs or eNBs, CSTM cannot provide message conﬁden-
tiality within the aﬀected st-cells or radio cells, respectively. Finally, contrary to CSTM,
OSTM is not designed to achievemessage conﬁdentiality for the potential beneﬁt of less
operational overhead and improved elasticity of the service infrastructure.
5.7 Conclusion
Both CSTM and OSTM are able to fulﬁll the objectives of location privacy and ano-
nymity against observation, probing, andmovement attacks. However, CSTM provides
stronger guarantees for co-location and absence privacy and is – to some extent – even
able to resist the compromise of RPs. Furthermore, given its straightforward statistical
characteristics, the analysis of CSTM is more expressive with respect to the constraints
that have to be considered to ensure speciﬁc privacy properties. Nevertheless, despite
the weaker privacy notion that it can provide, OSTM is still able to fulﬁll crucial privacy
and security objectives for attacks which may be more easily conducted by participants
of the service. Accordingly, OSTM achieves an acceptable level of privacy if there is
no incentive for very powerful adversaries to perform sophisticated attacks. In partic-
ular, due to its potentially improved level of communication eﬃciency, scalability, and
increased ﬂexibility in the adaptation of the service infrastructure, OSTMmight signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the operational costs of an STM service. Therefore, the following chapter
investigates performance-related properties of CSTM and OSTM to evaluate the trade-
oﬀ between potential operational advantages and the achievable level of privacy.
6 Performance Evaluation & Discussion
In this chapter, performance-related aspects of CSTM and OSTM are evaluated for spe-
ciﬁc functional and non-functional objectives (see Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2). Re-
garding the functional service objectives, the following aspects are of interest:
• Long-term support: A service should allow senders to address st-regions lying a
longer time in the past.
• Accurate delivery: Only legitimate recipients should receive an st-datagram.
In terms of non-functional objectives, this chapter focuses on the following properties:
• Communication eﬃciency: The distribution of st-datagrams should be accurate
and with few duplicates.
• Scalability: An STM service should scale with respect to
– the number of participants, i.e., UEs,
– the number of st-datagrams to be delivered,
– the size of the addressed st-regions, as well as
– the payload size of datagrams.
For CSTM, in particular, communication eﬃciency and delivery accuracy are investi-
gatedwith respect to the suggested token aggregation scheme in a large-scale vehicular
traﬃc scenario for spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal token hierarchies. Considering
the communication eﬃciency of OSTM, the outlined adaptations of a traditional CAN
that are necessary to apply OPE (cf. Section 4.3.4) are evaluated in detail. Finally, the
chapter concludes with a comparative discussion of performance-related properties of
CSTM and OSTM, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.
Note that the objectives of delivery speed, robustness against failures, and elasticity of
infrastructure are not evaluated in detail within this work. Nevertheless, these aspects
are discussed shortly with respect to both approaches at the end of this chapter.
6.1 Research Questions
Cluster- andOverlay-basedSTM Considering the given functional and non-functional
objectives, this chapter investigates the ability of CSTM and OSTM to fulﬁll the respec-
tive service properties. Here, the following research questions are of interest.
• How does the number of UEs aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
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Given that the number of UEs are expected to directly inﬂuence the polling load of
an RP-based STM service, it is crucial to consider the impact of this parameter on the
communication eﬃciency of the proposed CSTM and OSTM approaches.
• How does the number of RPs influence communication eﬃciency?
• How does the sending rate of st-datagrams aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
Since the number of RP that are used to operate an STM service are critical to scale with
an increasing number of users, this is also expected to result in an increasing eﬀort for
depositing st-datagrams at the respective RPs. Accordingly, this chapter evaluates the
trade-oﬀ between the ability of CSTM and OSTM to serve a large number of UEs while
still being able to deposit st-datagrams that are dispatched by senders at high rates.
• What is the performance impact of the sizes of the addressed st-regions?
With increasing sizes of the addressed st-regions deﬁning the eﬀort that is necessary
to deliver st-datagrams to a potentially increasing number of recipients, this chapter
investigates the behavior of CSTM andOSTM for various sizes of destination regions.
• How does the payload size of st-datagrams aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
As an increasing payload size is expected to strongly aﬀect the communication load in
the network, this chapter investigates the performance implications of this parameter.
• To which degree may CSTM and OSTM provide long-term support?
In order to provide long-support, an approach should be able to serve a large number
of st-cells. Thus, this chapter evaluates this capability – including the ability of each
approach to scale with an increasing number of served st-cells.
Cluster-based STM Apart from the questions outlined above, when considering the
eﬃciency of CSTM, the eﬀectiveness of spatial and temporal token aggregation is eval-
uated with respect to the following research questions.
• Which token hierarchy best reduces the polling load while providing accurate delivery?
The proposed token aggregation scheme is expected to decrease the overall polling load
which is to be handled by RPs. This, however, is also expected to introduce false pos-
itives among the delivered st-datagrams, i.e., users who are not intended to receive
certain datagrams may read the content of these messages. Accordingly, this chapter
evaluates the trade-oﬀ between a reduced polling load and an increasing number of
false positives by considering diﬀerent strengths of token aggregation, i.e., grouping
diﬀerent amounts of st-cells to be considered in each level of the hierarchy.
• Under which circumstances should spatial or temporal aggregation be preferred?
Spatial and temporal token aggregation are likely to yield diﬀerent performance prop-
erties in scenarios with little or highly mobile UEs. Speciﬁcally, spatial aggregation is
expected be advantageous in highlymobile circumstances, while temporal aggregation
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should be preferable in more static situations. In order to conﬁrm these assumptions,
this chapter investigates both aggregation strategies in diﬀerent mobility settings.
• How eﬀective is token aggregation compared to a limitation of the token life time?
While the suggested token aggregation is expected to strongly improve the communi-
cation eﬃciency of CSTM, it is questionable whether this approach is able to provide
a signiﬁcant advantage over a simple limitation of the lifetime of tokens. Hence, this
aspect is analyzed in detail within this chapter.
• Under which conditions may CSTM perform similar or worse than a naïve broadcast?
Apossible shortcoming of CSTM is the demand for a potentially high number of polling
messages. Given a polling interval that considerably exceeds the number of st-data-
grams to be delivered, even a rather ineﬃcient approach like a naïve broadcast (see
Section 3.4.1) might yield similar or better communication eﬃciency when compared
to CSTM. Hence, this chapter evaluates these situations to identify conditions under
which a broadcast could be preferable over an RP-based mechanism like CSTM.
Overlay-based STM Finally, regarding OSTM, the ability to fulﬁll the given functional
and non-functional objectives is evaluated with respect to the required adaptations of
the CAN overlay. Here, in particular, the following research questions are of interest.
• Does direction-based forwarding perform comparable to a distance-based approach?
While a CAN usually relies on a greedy distance-based routing scheme, the use of OPE
demands a strategy that does not require the computation of distances among cipher-
texts. In order to fulﬁll this requirement, OSTM relies on a direction-based approach
which is expected to increase the average number of hops that is necessary to route
messages through the overlay. Hence, this chapter evaluates the severity of the poten-
tial performance degradation resulting from this modiﬁcation of the original CAN.
• Can long links enable performance improvements that justify decreased user privacy?
Given the fact that only few long links should be used for OSTMs to still provide a
suﬃciently high level of privacy (see Section 5.5.2.1), the questions is up towhich degree
these shortcuts may improve the routing eﬃciency in the CAN overlay.
• What are the performance implications of the rekeying procedure in OSTM?
OSTM proposes the use of a rekeying procedure that aims to strengthens the order-
preserving encryption. In particular, by reducing the rekeying interval, it is possible to
limit the number of ciphertexts that an adversary may obtain (see Section 5.5.2.1). This,
however, is expected to increase the network load as UEs have to send pollingmessages
for path segments in diﬀerent overlay realities for diﬀerent OPEs keys. Therefore, this
chapter evaluates communication eﬃciency for various rekeying intervals.
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6.2 Evaluation of CSTM
This section investigates communication eﬃciency and scalability aspects of CSTM. In
order to evaluate these properties, ﬁrst, a model of communication costs is provided.
Then, the proposed cost model is evaluated using an extensive simulation study which
is based on the TAPAS Cologne scenario described in Section 5.2. An overview of the
employed parameters is depicted in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Parameters for the performance evaluation of CSTM.
Parameter Value
Number of repetitions 30 (avg. with 99% conﬁdence level)
Simulated time 1 day
Field size approx. 33× 35 km2
Number of eNBs ∣C∣ 604 base stations
Time slot size ts 10 min (144 time slots)
Life time of tokens 6 h, 24 h (unlimited)
Number of UEs 718 140
Polling interval 2 h
st-datagrams
Number of st-datagrams 100
Delay until sending of st-datagrams U(1 h, 5 h)
Addressed st-regions rectangular areas at random locations
Begin time of addressed st-regions U(6 h, 14 h)
Area and duration of st-regions ((500m)2, 5min), ((1 km)2, 10min),((2 km)2, 50min), (5 km)2, 100min),((10 km)2, 200min)
Token Hierarchy
Spatial clustering scheme greedy
Sizes of spatial clusters (l0, l1, l2) (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 4), (1, 1, 8),(1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 4), (1, 2, 8),(1, 4, 4), (1, 4, 8),(1, 8, 8)
Number of time steps (l0, l1, l2) (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 4), (1, 1, 8),(1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 4), (1, 2, 8),(1, 4, 4), (1, 4, 8),(1, 8, 8)
Level validity periods ([0 h, 2 h), [2 h, 4 h), [4 h, 6 h))
6.2.1 Analytical Model of Communication Costs
This work distinguishes between the costs – i.e., the number of network messages, also
referred to as Protocol Data Units (PDUs) – of depositing st-datagrams at RPs and the
eﬀort that is necessary for UEs to retrieve datagrams using polling. In particular, com-
munication costs in an RP-based STM approach S can be deﬁned as follows:
Cost Stotal = Cost Sstore + Cost Sretrieve (6.1)
Here, Cost Sstore equals the costs of storing st-datagrams at RPs, while Cost Sretrieve repre-
sents the costs of retrieving datagrams from RPs.
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In order to come upwith a realistic, yet analytically tractable cost model, several simpli-
fying assumptions are applied. First, it is assumed that UEs always hold a set of tokens
with equal cardinality θ. Given such a set of tokens, UEs are then expected to initiate
the same number P of polls during the observed time interval [ti, tj]. Secondly, it is pre-
sumed that all D st-datagrams have equal destination region sizes, i.e., the number of
st-cells contained in each destination region is always δ. In addition, the payload size
of all st-datagrams is considered to be constant, requiring exactly M PDU messages to
transfer an st-datagram between two hosts in the network. Furthermore, the TPS is not
assumed to be able to deposit multiple datagrams at the same RP with a single PDU.
Put diﬀerently, in order to deposit k st-datagrams at the same RP, the TPSmust dispatch
k ⋅Mmessages. Likewise, UEs are not presumed to be capable of retrieving multiple st-
datagrams from an RP with a single PDU. Finally, for each dispatched st-datagram, an
equal amount of R recipients is considered to exist among UEs.
In summary, given these assumptions, the following variables are of interest:
• N: number of RPs
• U: number of UEs
• D: average number of st-datagrams delivered during time span [ti, tj]
• M: average number of PDU messages required to transfer one st-datagram
• R: average number of recipients for each st-datagram, where 1 ≤ R ≤ U
• P: average number of polls sent by each UE during [ti, tj]
• δ: average number of st-cells addressed by st-datagrams
• θ: average number of tokens present at each UE at all times
Based on this, a communication cost model is deﬁned for CSTM in the next sections.
6.2.1.1 Storage of st-datagrams
In order to evaluate the given research questions, this work considers the metrics of
the average number of messages that are necessary to store a single st-datagram at an
RP as well as the average number of RPs at which copies of each st-datagram have
to be deposited. For CSTM, storing an st-datagram at an RP requires an average of M
messages, i.e., the average number of PDUs that are necessary to transfer an st-datagram
to an RP is M. In order to determine the expected number Nδ of RPs at which copies
of each datagram have to be deposited, it is necessary to consider the average number
δ of st-cells being addressed by datagrams. Note that Nδ corresponds to the expected
number of distinct faces when throwing δ dice with N faces [cf. Con14]:
Nδ = N ⋅ (1− (1− 1N)δ) (6.2)
Here, Nδ is obtained by ﬁrst considering the probability 1/N that a speciﬁc RP i (where
0 ≤ i < N) is responsible for a single st-cell. With this, among all N RPs, the probability
that an RPi is not responsible for any of the δ addressed st-cells corresponds to:
Pr( “RP i not responsible” ) = (1− 1
N
)δ
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Figure 6.1 Examples for the expected number Nδ of RPs serving δ st-cells according to the
number of distinct faces resulting from throwing δ dice with N faces [cf. Con14].
Note that Nδ either approaches N or δ for diﬀerent combinations of N and δ.
Consequently, the probability that RP i serves at least one addressed st-cell equals to:
Pr( “RP i responsible” ) = 1− (1− 1
N
)δ
Then, the expected number of RPs being responsible for a destination st-region is:
Nδ = N ⋅Pr( “RP i responsible” ) = N ⋅ (1− (1− 1N)δ)
Figure 6.1 illustrates examples for the progression of Equation 6.2 Note that Nδ either
approaches N or δ for diﬀerent combinations of the number of RPs and st-cells.
Given the expected number of RPs being responsible for storing an st-datagram in
Equation 6.2, the storage costs of CSTM correspond to:
Cost cstmstore = D ⋅M ⋅Nδ = D ⋅M ⋅N ⋅ (1− (1− 1N)δ) (6.3)
These costs represent the number of PDUs that are required to store all D st-datagrams
at the responsible number Nδ of RPs. Since, for each relevant RP, a single st-datagram
is transferred to the RP using M PDUs, the total number of PDUs is obtained by multi-
plying Nδ with the number D of st-datagrams and the necessary number M of PDUs.
In order to validate the applicability of Cost cstmstore , the average number of RPs that are
responsible for storing an st-datagram have been measured in the Cologne scenario
for diﬀerent numbers of RPs and an increasing size of the addressed st-regions (cf. Ta-
ble 6.1). Figure 6.2 shows the empiric results and the values of Equation 6.2 for st-data-
grams addressing st-regions with the extents of 5 km over 100 min as well as regions
with an area of 10× 10 km2 over a time span of 200min. The values that are calculated
by Equation 6.2 are based on the number N of RPs and the measured number of st-cells
being addressed by the respective st-regions. As expected, for both st-region sizes, the
measured results conﬁrm the applicability of the analytic model.
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Figure 6.2 Comparison of themeasured number of RPs that are responsible for storing st-data-
gramswith the analytic model from Equation 6.2. The theoretic values are based on
the measured number of st-cells being addressed by the st-regions of datagrams. In
the table, regions which are plotted in the graph are shown in dark gray.
6.2.1.2 Retrieval of st-datagrams
Apart from storage costs, it is necessary to consider the eﬀort of retrieving st-datagrams.
Retrieval costs are measured using the average number of polling messages that are
required forUEs to obtain st-datagrams from the RPs. Over time, UEs collect tokens that
are later used to check for st-datagrams at regular time intervals. If an RP is holding a
datagrammatching to the supplied tokens, they transmit the datagram to the respective
UEs. Accordingly, assuming that each UE holds an average number of θ tokens, the
required number of messages in retrieving st-datagrams can be described as follows:
Cost cstmretrieve = Cost cstmpoll + Cost cstmdeliver= U ⋅ P ⋅Nθ + D ⋅M ⋅ R
= U ⋅ P ⋅N ⋅ (1− (1− 1
N
)θ) + D ⋅M ⋅ R (6.4)
Here, Cost cstmpoll represents the number of messages that are necessary for UEs to peri-
odically check for st-datagrams. Note that an individual poll demands Nθ messages,
resulting in each UE to dispatch an average number of P ⋅ Nθ polling messages in the
observed time frame. Considering all U mobile devices, the total number of polling
messages equals U ⋅ P ⋅ Nθ. Regarding Cost cstmdeliver, i.e., the number of messages that is
necessary to deliver all st-datagrams to the relevant UEs, it is necessary to consider the
average number R of UEs that are expected to receive a datagram. Then, the delivery
costs can be calculated by multiplying R with the number D of st-datagrams and the
average payload size expressed as the required number M of PDUs.
190 Performance Evaluation & Discussion
6.2.1.3 Comparison with naïve broadcast
Given the storage and retrieval costs described by the necessary number of PDUs, the
total communication costs of CSTM can be summarized as follows (see Equation 6.2):
Cost cstmtotal = Cost cstmstore + Cost cstmretrieve= D ⋅M ⋅Nδ + U ⋅ P ⋅Nθ + D ⋅M ⋅ R= D ⋅M ⋅ (Nδ + R) + U ⋅ P ⋅Nθ (6.5)
In order to enable a comparative evaluation of the complexity of CSTM and a naïve
broadcast with respect to communication costs, it is ﬁrst necessary to consider the num-
ber of PDUs that are necessary to deliver an st-datagram using a naïve broadcast:
Cost broadcasttotal = Cost broadcastsend + Cost broadcastdeliver= D ⋅M ⋅U (6.6)
Here, Cost broadcasttotal consists of the number of PDUs that are necessary to send an st-
datagram to a dispatcher which is responsible for distributing datagrams to all U UEs
that are registered with the service. For U subscriptions and a requested delivery of D
st-datagrams of length M, this equals to a total of D ⋅M ⋅U messages. Given these cost
models, it is possible to consider the following research question:
• Under which conditions may CSTM perform similar or worse than a naïve broadcast?
In order to investigate this question in the next section, the following equation considers
circumstances under which CSTM yields lower communication overhead demanding
lessmessages for the delivery of st-datagramswhen compared to the naïve broadcast:
Cost cstmtotal < Cost broadcasttotal
Accordingly, in order to fulﬁll this equation, the following condition should be met:
DM(Nδ + R)+UPNθ < DMU (6.7)
Since this equation represents an underdetermined system of non-linear inequalities
(or linear, depending on the selection of constants and variables), there exists an inﬁnite
number of possible parameter selections in which either CSTM or the naïve broadcast
can be superior. While this demands for service providers to decide about the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each approach on a case-by-case basis, Equation 6.7 still
highlights the expectation of CSTM yielding more eﬃcient operation for increasingly
large service scenarios. Here, a hybrid approach could be for STMproviders to ﬁrst rely
on a naïve broadcast at the cost of slightly reduced privacy and security properties and
later switch to CSTM. An in-depth evaluation of such potential deployment strategies
is, however, beyond the scope of this work.
The following section now analyzes communication eﬃciency and scalability aspects
of CSTM, drawing a comparison to the naïve broadcast where applicable.
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6.2.2 Analysis of Eﬃciency and Scalability
Based on themodel outlined above, this section investigates the ability of CSTM to fulﬁll
the objectives of communication eﬃciency and scalability.
Discussionof costmodel In order to gain detailed insights of the performance proper-
ties of CSTM, the following paragraphs provide a discussion of the asymptotic growth
of this approach with respect to various service parameters.
• How does the number of UEs aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
In CSTM, the number of PDUs that is expected to be required for delivering st-data-
grams can be expressed as follows (cf. Equation 6.5):
Cost cstmtotal (U) = U ⋅ PNθ + RDM +DMNδ ∈ O(U)
Here, R = λ ⋅U with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 represents the expected average number of recipients of
a datagram. Thus, according to the naïve broadcast, the number of PDUs in CSTM is
expected to grow linearly with the number of UEs holding service subscriptions.
• How does the number of RPs influence the performance of the service?
Considering the impact of the number N of RPs, Equation 6.5 may be rearranged to:
Cost cstmtotal (N) = Nθ ⋅UP +Nδ ⋅DM +DMR= O(N) ⋅UP +O(N) ⋅DM +DMR ∈ O(N)
Since Nθ and Nθ yield an asymptotic growth of O(N), the number of PDUs that are
necessary to deliver st-datagrams in CSTM is expected to be deﬁned by a linear increase
with N. This behavior coincides with the random distribution of the responsibilities of
RPs for st-cells due to the use of a uniform, cryptographic hash function h(⋅).
• How does the number and size of st-datagrams aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
In order to evaluate the impact of the sending rate of st-datagrams, this work relies
on the number D of datagrams being dispatched during a certain time interval. Here,
each datagram is presumed to consist of an average number M of PDUs. Accordingly,
the inﬂuence of D on communication costs can be expressed as follows:
Cost cstmtotal (D) = D ⋅ (MNδ +MR)+UPNθ ∈ O(D)
Furthermore, the asymptotic growth of the total number of PDUs with M equals to:
Cost cstmtotal (M) = M ⋅ (DNδ +DR)+UPNθ ∈ O(M)
Since st-datagrams are usually deposited at all RPs and with UEs polling each RP peri-
odically, an increase of the number D of datagrams as well as the number M of PDUs
per datagram results in the expected linear growth of the total communication costs.
While this asymptotic behavior corresponds to a naïve broadcast, in CSTM, the actual
increase of the number of PDUs is primarily deﬁned by N and the average number R of
recipients per datagram. In contrast, the dominating factor for communication costs in a
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naïve broadcast (cf. Equation 6.6) is the total numberU of UEs, where it is expected that
U ≫ N andU ≫ R in case of service deployment in real-world applications. Thus, for a
growing number of st-datagrams as well as an increasing size of these messages, CSTM
can achieve higher communication eﬃciency when compared to a naïve broadcast.
• What is the performance impact of the sizes of the addressed st-regions?
In OSTM, increasing the size of the addressed st-region results in a growing number of
RPs holding the respective datagram (see Section 6.2.1.1). Therefore, the size of an st-
region linearly aﬀects the eﬀort that is necessary to store an st-datagram:
Cost cstmtotal (δ) = (1− (1− 1N)δ) ⋅NDM +UPNθ +DMR= O(1) ⋅NDM +UPNθ +DMR = O(1)
Considering the asymptotic growth of communication costs with respect to the size of
the addressed st-regions, there is no impact of this parameter onCost cstmtotal . This behavior
is consistent with the assumption that, once a destination region is suﬃciently large, it
has to be deposited at all N RPs. Accordingly, this conﬁrms the expectation that CSTM
strongly beneﬁts from rather small st-regions addressing only few st-cells.
• To which degree may CSTM achieve the objective of long-term support?
Regarding the ability of CSTM to provide long-term support allowing users to address
st-cells from along time ago, Equation 6.5 can be rearranged as follows:
Cost cstmtotal (θ) = (1− (1− 1N)θ) ⋅NUP +DMNδ +DMR= O(1) ⋅NUP +DMNδ +DMR ∈ O(1)
Here, presuming long-term support, UEs poll every RPs over time. In this case, the
communication costs in CSTM are not deﬁned by the number of st-cell that have been
visited by each UE. Thus, according to a naïve broadcast, an increasing time span that
is supported by the service does not severely aﬀect the communication eﬃciency in
CSTM. Note that this assumes that a polling message consists of one or only few PDUs.
If this is not the case, communication costs can be expected to show linear growth.
Analysis of token aggregation In order to improve communication eﬃciency with re-
spect to the number of polling messages, CSTM can rely on hierarchical token aggrega-
tion (see Section 4.2.1). This allows to provide a trade-oﬀ between the number of polls
and the delivery accuracy that is achieved by CSTM. The following paragraphs discuss
the given research questions related to this approach.
• Which hierarchy best reduces the polling load while providing accurate delivery?
• How eﬀective is token aggregation compared to a limitation of the token life time?
The evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of spatial and temporal token aggregation as well as
the impact of the token life time relies on a three-tiered token hierarchy (see Table 6.1).
Here, l0-l1-l2 represents a speciﬁc conﬁguration of a hierarchy where li denotes either
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the number of radio cells or time slots that share the same key at level i in the spa-
tial or temporal domain. Note that, for spatial hierarchies, radio cells were grouped
based on a simple greedy algorithm which added radio cells to clusters based on the
measured number of cell switches. These relocations of UEs between radio cells were
collected in advance over the full course of the 24 hours of the Cologne scenario. Then,
when deciding which neighbor to add to a cluster, the spatial clustering algorithm iter-
atively selected the adjacent radio cell with the highest number of recorded relocations
between an originating radio cell and the respective candidate among its neighbors.
In CSTM, the life time of tokens allows to limit the polling load in CSTM. Accordingly,
UEs should only store tokens for a speciﬁc duration after reception. Note that the token
life time also controls the supported time span for which datagrams may be delivered
for st-cells referring to a point in time in the past. Regarding the hierarchical token ag-
gregation scheme within this chapter, the validity periods of each level is two hours.
Thus, UEs employ the keys of l0 when sending polling messages within the ﬁrst two
hours after receiving a token. Within two to four hours after reception, the keys of l1
are used, while in between four and six hours, UEs rely on the keys of l2. Finally, six
hours after reception, tokens are discarded by UEs. While such a limitation of the life
time of tokens is inherent when relying on a token hierarchy, the question is whether
the expected reduction of the polling load is primarily the result of the limitation of the
life time or due to the aggregation of tokens.
In order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent token hierarchies, this work re-
lies on three metrics: the average number of polling messages that are dispatched by
each UEs, the average number of RPs storing st-datagrams, and the ratio of wrongly
delivered st-datagrams among all st-datagram. Figure 6.3 shows the average number
of polling messages per UE. Here, both the limitation of the token life time from 24 to
six hours, as well as the token aggregation yield the expected reduction of the number
of polling messages. However, contrary to the initial expectations, spatial token aggre-
gation only provides a minor decrease of the polling load when compared to a simple
limitation of the token life time. In contrast, temporal and spatiotemporal aggregation
result in a stronger reduction of the number of polling messages. As expected, this de-
crease becomes more signiﬁcant with an increasing number of st-cells sharing a key.
Regarding the number of RPs being responsible for storing an st-datagram, the use of to-
ken aggregation shows an increase of a factor of up to 2.2 in case of 1-1-2 (see Figure 6.4).
For hierarchies with larger clusters of st-cells sharing a key, this increase again reduces
due to the decreased number of st-cell clusters generated by each hierarchy. Note that
while the relative increase of the number of RPs storing st-datagrams is higher than
the relative decrease of the number of polling messages, a high number of UEs still
provides a stronger reduction of the total polling load being generated in the service.
While the given token hierarchies achieve an increasing reduction of the number of
pollingmessages, this does not yet consider the expected increase of wrongly delivered
st-datagrams. Thus, Figure 6.5 illustrates this increase for the respective hierarchies.
Here, while temporal aggregation only results in a moderate ratios of false positives of
up to approximately 13% of the delivered datagrams, spatial aggregation shows up to
30% of wrongly delivered st-datagrams. This is likely due to less eﬀective aggregation
of tokens when using a spatial hierarchy. For spatial and temporal hierarchies, the ratio
of false positives strongly increases up to 72%. While this strong increase can be ex-
plained by the fact that the use of both spatial and temporal hierarchies result in larger
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clusters of st-cells (e.g., in case of 1-8-8 for spatial and temporal hierarchies, up to 64 st-
cells may share a key), this does not justify the only slight reduction of the polling load
in contrast to plain temporal aggregation (cf. Figure 6.3).
Furthermore, it seems to be preferable to employ token hierarchies that only slightly
increase the number of radio cells or time slots that share a key for each level of the
hierarchy. For instance, given temporal aggregation, in case of 1-1-4, the average number
of polling messages per UE is only decreased to approximately 135, while 1-2-2 allows
to reduce this number down to 121. Furthermore, the ratio of false positives is about
2.6% in case of 1-1-4, while 1-2-2 achieves a lower ratio of 0.7% of wrongly delivered st-
datagrams. This behavior ismost likely the result of a higher probability ofUEs residing
within a smaller number of neighboring st-cells. Therefore, it is beneﬁcial to rely on a
rather small number li of st-cells that share a key at a lower level i instead of employing
a larger st-cell cluster size lj > li at a higher level j > i.
• Under which circumstances should spatial or temporal aggregation be preferred?
Generally, a token hierarchy should aim to share keys among st-cells such that UE have
a high probability of having visited most or all of the st-cells within a cluster. Here, a
token aggregation scheme can rely on spatial, temporal, or spatial and temporal aggre-
gation of st-cells. In order for a spatial token hierarchy to reduce the number of polling
messages without resulting in a decrease of the delivery accuracy, UEs that have visited
one of the radio cells at level 0 of a hierarchy should also have been residing in one of the
corresponding neighboring cells that are part of the clusters at higher levels. Since this
requires that a UE has visited diﬀerent radio cells during a speciﬁc time slot, sharing
keys within spatial clusters is expected to provide an advantage in high traﬃc situa-
tions. In contrast, temporal token aggregation should be superior when assuming that
UEs tend to reside within the same radio cells during multiple time slots. Accordingly,
this kind of aggregation is expected to be more appropriate for low traﬃc scenarios
where users reside – for most of the time – within the same geographic area.
In order to evaluate these assumptions, token aggregation has been observed for a high
and low traﬃc situation being isolated from the Cologne scenario. Figure 6.6 illustrates
these scenarios by considering the number of traveling vehicles, as well as their average
speed. Here, two distinct time frames were chosen to provide a high and low traﬃc
scenario. On one hand, between 7:00 and 8:00 am (highlighted in dark gray), i.e., during
rush hour, the number of traveling vehicles peaks at almost 16000, resulting in traﬃc
jams that can be observed by the decline in the overage speed of cars. On the other hand,
during oﬃce hours between 10:00 and 11:00 am (depicted in light gray), the number of
traveling vehicles is rather low with approximately 3500, which allows these cars to
reach their destinations at a higher average speed.
Given these scenarios, Figure 6.7 shows the average number of successfully aggregated
tokens per poll and UE in the spatial (Figure 6.7a), temporal (Figure 6.7b), and spa-
tiotemporal domain (Figure 6.7c). Note that the number of aggregations in the high
and low traﬃc scenario were obtained by only considering aggregations for tokens re-
ferring to st-cells within the respective time intervals. These measurements conﬁrm the
assumption that, during high traﬃc situations, spatial aggregation is able to achieve a
higher number of aggregations, while, given low traﬃc, temporal aggregation should
be considered superior. Furthermore, spatiotemporal aggregation seems to be advan-
tageous in case of high traﬃc scenarios. This is likely due to the fact that in order for a
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Figure 6.6 Overview of the traveling number of UEs and their average speed in the TAPAS
Cologne scenario over the diﬀerent times of the day. The time intervals between
7:00 and 8:00 am, as well as between 10:00 and 11:00 am are chosen to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of token aggregation in high (dark gray) and low traﬃc (light gray).
spatiotemporal aggregation to occur, spatial aggregations are a prerequisite. Since these
are more likely in high traﬃc situations, spatiotemporal aggregation performs similar
to pure spatial token aggregation. Nevertheless, regarding the total number of aggre-
gations, temporal aggregation again achieves the highest level of aggregation with up
to almost six tokens per poll and UE. In contrast, spatial and spatiotemporal aggrega-
tion are only able to provide an average number of up to approximately 1.4 and 1.05
successfully merged tokens per UE and poll.
In summary, temporal aggregation shows the highest level of token aggregation in a
real-world environment. Finally, in order to reduce the polling load while providing a
high delivery accuracy, token hierarchies that share keys among rather small clusters
of st-cells in lower levels of the hierarchy should be preferred over sharing of keys in
larger clusters of st-cells in higher levels of the respective hierarchy.
6.2.3 Summary
As outlined above, CSTM provides the expected linear asymptotic growth with respect
to the number of UEs, RPs, as well as the number of st-datagrams and their respec-
tive payload sizes. While this basically corresponds to the asymptotic complexity of a
naïve broadcast, CSTM is expected to scale much better with increasing payload sizes.
In contrast to a naïve broadcast, CSTM allows to control the trade-oﬀ between commu-
nication costs and delivery speed by the adjusting the polling interval. Nevertheless,
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Figure 6.7 Average number of tokens being aggregated according to the employed spatial and
temporal token hierarchy. Note that the depicted results only consider tokens that
refer to st-cells in the high and low traﬃc time intervals, respectively.
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considering a time-slotted broadcast dispatching datagrams only at regular time inter-
vals, CSTM shows – from a plain performance perspective – strong relations to the naïve
broadcast. Accordingly, an STM service provider has to carefully consider the intended
application scenario in order to be able to make an informed decision.
In order to further limit the number of PDUs that are required for the delivery of st-
datagrams, CSTM can rely on the suggested token aggregation scheme. Here, while
spatial aggregation is suited for high traﬃc situations during, e.g., rush-hour, temporal
aggregation generally yields stronger aggregation in urban scenarioswhereUEs tend to
residewithin the same radio cells formost of the time. Thus, for real-world applications,
it is necessary for a service provider to ﬁnd an optimal mix of both of these strategies
based on the expected user mobility. Investigating the process of obtaining such an
optimal token aggregation strategy is, however, beyond the scope of this work.
The following section now analyzes the performance of OSTM and provides a compar-
ative evaluation between CSTM and OSTM.
6.3 Evaluation of OSTM
In order to evaluate communication eﬃciency and scalability properties of OSTM, an
extensive simulation study has been conducted using the TAPAS Cologne scenario out-
lined in Section 5.2. The respective simulation parameters are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.2 Parameters for the performance evaluation of OSTM.
Parameter Value
Number of repetitions 30 (avg. with 99% conﬁdence level)
Simulated time 1 day
Field size approx. 33× 35 km2
Number of eNBs ∣C∣ 604 base stations
Time slot size ts 10 min (144 time slots)
Life time of tokens unlimited
Number of UEs 718 140
Polling interval single poll at end of day
Rekeying interval (multiple of ts) 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
st-datagrams
Number of st-datagrams 100
Delay until sending of st-datagrams U(1 h, 5 h)
Addressed st-regions rectangular areas at random locations
Begin time of addressed st-regions U(6 h, 14 h)
Area and duration of st-regions ((500m)2, 5min), ((1 km)2, 10min),((2 km)2, 50min), (5 km)2, 100min),((10 km)2, 200min)
Content-Addressable Network
Number of RPs 50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600
Dimensionality 2-dim., 3-dim.
Number of long links 0, 1, 2, 3, unlimited
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Figure 6.8 Overview of the impact of the adaptations to CAN which have been suggested in
this work. The modiﬁcations are required to use OPE in OSTM (cf. Section 4.3.4).
6.3.1 Analysis of CAN-related Adaptations
Before comparing CSTM and OSTM in detail, this section evaluates the adaptations
of the original CAN structure described by Ratnasamy et al. [Rat+01a] that were in-
troduced in this work to enable the use of OPE. Here, in particular, the performance
impact of the employed forwarding strategy in considered, as well as the inﬂuence of
the use of a few speciﬁc long links as suggested by Boukhelef and Kitagawa [BK08].
• Does direction-based forwarding perform comparable to a distance-based approach?
The original CAN relies on a distance-based approach when deciding on the neighbor
that amessages is forwarded to. Since this is no longer possiblewhen relying on anOPE
scheme that only discloses the order, and not the distance, among ciphertexts, a direc-
tion-based forwarding scheme has been suggested in this work. While it is expected
that the number of hops that are necessary to send a message to a certain point in the
overlay increases for a direction-based approach, this impact should be neglectable for
practical applications. Figure 6.8a conﬁrms this assumption for both a two- and three-
dimensional CAN. Here, for an increasing number of RPs the increase of the average
number of hops yields the expected asymptotic growth of O( d√N) [Rat+01a]. While,
in contrast to the original distance-based approach, the suggested direction-based for-
warding scheme shows a slightly higher average number of hops that are required to
route a message to a certain point in the overlay, this increase is still smaller than one
hop. Consequently, the impact of this adaptation can be neglected.
• Can long links enable performance improvements that justify decreased user privacy?
Regarding long links, it is expected that the use of a small number l of long links is
already suﬃcient to strongly reduce the number of hops that are required to deliver a
message to a certain point in the overlay space. This is due to the fact that long links
are established to nodes which zones are at logarithmically decreasing distances from
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the originating node’s zone. Accordingly, even few long links should allow to signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the required number of hops. This assumption is conﬁrmedby Figure 6.8b
which depicts the average number of hops that are required to route a message to a cer-
tain point in the overlay for N = {50, 600} using direction-based forwarding.
In case of N = 600 and d = 2 (dark red), while the average number of hops only drops
from approximately 14.2 to 12.4 when using one long link, this number already drops
to 8.1 for l = 2 long links. Additional long links further decrease the number of hops to
approximately 5.3 which represents a lower bound according to the number N of RPs
and the dimensionality d of the CAN. A similar observation can be made for N = 600
and d = 3 (light red). While the number of hops is lower here according to the use of a
higher dimensionality [cf. Rat+01a], even the use of few long link allows to reduce the
number of hops from 8.2 to approximately 4.5 on average. In case of N = 50, the use
of long links does provide less of an advantage. Since the average number of hops is
already between 4.5 and 3.6 for d = 2 (dark gray) and d = 3 (light gray), the use of long
links only provides a minor decrease for a smaller number of RPs here.
In summary, assuming a large number of RPs, the use of few long links can signiﬁcantly
reduce the required number of hops –whichmay be acceptable from a privacy perspec-
tive for a suﬃciently large service area. Given a rather small number of RPs, however,
long links only provide a minor decrease that does not justify the inherent advantage
for an adversary intending to break the order-preserving encryption.
6.3.2 Comparative Evaluation of Eﬃciency and Scalability
This section now investigates the given research questions that are related to eﬃciency
and scalability aspects of OSTM. In the following discussion and comparison of OSTM
to CSTM, the inﬂuence of the proposed rekeying procedure is of particular interest.
• How does the number of UEs aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
When considering the impact of the number of UEs, it is necessary to evaluate the net-
work load that is induced by the polling procedure. In general, OSTM is expected to
show linear asymptotic growth with the number of UEs according to CSTM. Never-
theless, when compared to the CSTM approach, OSTM should still show a decrease
of the actual network load as it relies on polygonal chains of spatiotemporal coordi-
nates along the users’ movement paths instead of individual st-cells when polling RPs
for st-datagrams. In order to evaluate the communication eﬃciency with respect to the
number of UEs, this work investigates the increase of the network load resulting from
each additional UE . Accordingly, Figure 6.9 depicts the measured number of PDUs
per poll and UE, i.e., the average number of polling messages that an individual UE
dispatches for each poll in the Cologne scenarios for a CANwith d = {2, 3} dimensions
and N = {50, 600} RPs. Furthermore, it shows the number of messages per poll and UE
forCSTMgiven no token aggregation aswell as aggregationwith a spatial and temporal
1-8-8 hierarchy (cf. Section 6.2.2). Note that while a direct comparison of these numbers
must consider the diﬀerent service properties of each approach, they still provide an
overview of the network load that is to be expected in CSTM and OSTM.
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Figure 6.9 Comparison of the average number of PDUs per poll and UE. The rekeying interval
speciﬁes the number of time slots sharing OPE keys, allowing OSTM to leverage
locality among visited st-cells. CSTM is illustrated assuming no token aggregation
as well as aggregation using a three-tiered spatial and temporal 1-8-8 hierarchy.
Given N = 50 and a rekeying interval of 1 time slot, OSTM yields a signiﬁcantly higher
number of messages per poll and UE with over 300 messages for d = 2 and approxi-
mately 240 messages for d = 3 when compared to CSTM with about 140 messages (see
Figure 6.9a). While this seems to contradict the initial expectation of OSTM inducing
lower communication loadwhen compared to CSTM, this observation can be explained
by the fact that, for a rekeying interval of 1 time slot, responsibilities of RPs for certain st-
cells are randomly assigned after each time slot. This basically corresponds to a random
distribution of st-cells to RPs according to CSTM. Consequently, since pollingmessages
have to be delivered over multiple hops in the overlay instead of being sent directly to
RPs, a higher load is to be expected in OSTM for a rekeying interval of 1 time slot.
Note that, compared to d = 2, a three-dimensional CAN provides a lower number of
messages. This is likely due to the fact that the number of messages that are required
to deliver a message to a speciﬁc key in a CAN strongly reduces with increasing di-
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mensionality [cf. Rat+01a]. For N = 600, this diﬀerence between CSTM with roughly
220 PDUs per poll and UE and OSTM with a rekeying interval of 1 time slot increases
even more, resulting in over 900messages for d = 2 and over 500messages for d = 3.
Despite the inferiority of OSTM for a rekeying interval of 1 time slot, for an increas-
ing rekeying interval, OSTM shows the expected reduction in the number of PDUs. In
particular, for N = 50, a rekeying interval of 5 time slots already allows OSTM to de-
crease the number of messages to approximately half the number that is demanded
by CSTM – assuming no token aggregation (see Figure 6.9c). Note that even with spa-
tial and temporal aggregation relying on a three-tiered token hierarchy of 1-8-8, CSTM
still requires a higher number of messages – despite the resulting degradation of the
delivery accuracy. For an increasing number of RPs (N = 600), the diﬀerence between
OSTMandCSTMbecomes less signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, with d = 3, the number ofmes-
sages required by OSTM is again reduced to approximately 50% of the value of CSTM
without token aggregation (see Figure 6.9d). This observation can be explained by the
fact that an increasing number of RPs results in an increasing number of hops. Over-
all, when further increasing the rekeying interval, the number of PDUs that is required
by OSTM decreases according to a roughly exponential distribution, highlighting the
beneﬁt of reducing the network load using even a small rekeying interval. This con-
ﬁrms the assumption that the rekeying procedure in OSTM allows to provide a good
trade-oﬀ between user privacy and communication eﬃciency. In particular, even with
a rather small rekeying interval of 5 time slots, OSTM is already able to achieve lower
network load than CSTM. Therefore, in comparison to CSTM, the OSTM approach is
able to provide superior scalability properties with an increasing number of UEs.
• How does the number of RPs influence communication eﬃciency?
As outlined above, a growing number of RPs increases the number of messages per
poll and UE for both CSTM and OSTM. However, assuming rekeying, OSTM is able to
provide a lower increase of PDUs than CSTM (cf. Figure 6.9).
Apart from the number of polling messages, a growing number of RPs raises the num-
ber of RPs that are responsible for storing st-datagrams in CSTM (cf. Section 6.2.1.1).
This behavior is also expected in OSTM, where a growing number of RPs increases the
density of RPs in the overlay space. Figure 6.10 conﬁrms this assumption for diﬀerent
sizes of destination st-regions and various rekeying intervals. While for smaller desti-
nation regions (Figure 6.10a and Figure 6.10b), CSTM only yields a slight increase of
the average number of RPs that are responsible for storing st-datagrams for an increas-
ing number N, larger destination regions clearly conﬁrm the expected increase of the
responsible RPs for growing N (Figure 6.10c and Figure 6.10d). Similarly, OSTM shows
an increasing average number of RPs that are responsible for storing datagrams. In
contrast to CSTM, OSTM achieves a signiﬁcantly lower number of responsible RPs for
all cases but d = 2 and N ≥ 400 with a rekeying interval of 1 time slot. Nevertheless,
in these cases, the number of responsible RPs in both approaches are roughly of the
same order of magnitude. This highlights the ability of OSTM to leverage the locality
among neighboring st-cells in the CAN overlay. In summary, OSTM provides superior
scalability properties with an increasing number of RPs when compared to CSTM.
• What is the performance impact of the sizes of the addressed st-regions?
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Figure 6.10 Empirically measured number of RPs that are, on average, responsible for storing
st-datagrams addressing st-regions of diﬀerent sizes (destination area × duration).
In order to evaluate the impact of the sizes of destination regions in st-datagrams on
both CSTM and OSTM, it is necessary to consider the costs of storing datagrams at
RPs. This is due to the fact that increasing region sizes require that the TPS dispatches
messages to a raising number of RPs being responsible for a growing number of st-cells.
Note that, with the TPS being aware of the overlay structure inOSTM, it is not necessary
to consider the network load resulting from the forwarding of messages here.
Given small destination regions (see Figure 6.10a and Figure 6.10b), CSTM shows an
almost constant number of responsible RPs for an increasing number of Nwith approx-
imately 3 and 6 RPs for regions sizes of (500m)2 × 5min and (1km)2 × 10min, respec-
tively. This roughly corresponds to the expected average number of st-cells belonging to
destination regions of such sizes (according to Figure 6.2). In contrast, for larger region
sizes (Figure 6.10c and Figure 6.10d), the number of responsible RPs in CSTM follows
Equation 6.2. By addressing a large number δ of st-cells (compared to N), the number
of RPs that store st-datagrams almost linearly increases with the number N of RPs.
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In contrast to CSTM, the number of responsible RPs in OSTM show roughly the same
relative growth over a varying number N of RPs. However, the absolute values vary
strongly depending on the employed dimensionality of the CAN, as well as the rekey-
ing interval that is being used in each case. For d = 2 and a rekeying interval of 1 time
slot, the number of responsible RPs are close to the values of CSTM (especially for
larger regions of (5km)2 × 100min and (10km)2 × 200min). Given a rekeying interval
of 50 time slots the number of responsible RPs is reduced to approximately 50%when
compared to a rekeying interval of 1 time slot for smaller regions (Figure 6.10a and
Figure 6.10b). For larger region sizes (Figure 6.10c and Figure 6.10d), this reduction be-
comes more signiﬁcant, resulting in a decrease of about 20% of the value of a rekeying
interval of 1 time slot. This observation can be explained by the fact that, for growing
destination region sizes, locality among the addressed st-cells allows to better reduce
the number of RPs that have to store a datagram. A similar behavior can be observed
for d = 3, where for a rekeying interval of 1 time slot, the number of responsible RPs
reduces to approximately 30 − 50% when compared to both d = 2 and CSTM. When
relying on a rekeying interval of 50 time slots, this number decreases even further, with
larger destination region sizes yielding a stronger reduction according to the two-di-
mensional CAN case (see Figure 6.10c and Figure 6.10d).
In summary, an increasing destination st-region size clearly aﬀects both CSTM and
OSTM. CSTM is strongly inﬂuenced by an increase of the addressed number of st-
cells, resulting in a clear increase from about 3 to 6 responsible RPs for region sizes
of (500m)2 × 5min and (1km)2 × 10min to roughly between 50 and 500 RPs for region
sizes of (5km)2 × 100min and (10km)2 × 200min. In contrast, OSTM is able to achieve
a considerably lower number of about 10 to 50% of the measured results of CSTM for
d = 3 or d = 2with a rekeying interval that is greater than 1 time slot. By further increas-
ing the rekeying interval, this number can be reduced further to roughly 6% for d = 3
and a rekeying interval of 50 time slots. Overall, by leveraging locality among neighbor-
ing st-cells, OSTM achieves superior scalability with respect to increasing destination
region sizes when compared to CSTM.
• How does the sending rate and payload size aﬀect communication eﬃciency?
When considering the inﬂuence of an increasing number of st-datagrams that are to
be delivered during a certain time span, it is necessary to consider the communication
costs of storing a datagram at the responsible RPs. In OSTM, according to CSTM, these
costs grow linearly with the number of datagrams. However, with OSTM yielding a
lower number of RPs that have to store a certain datagram, it allows a TPS to serve
datagram delivery requests of senders at a higher rate. Accordingly, with the payload
size of datagrams directly aﬀecting the number of PDUs that the TPS has to dispatch
to the responsible RPs, OSTM allows the TPS to deposit a certain number of datagrams
with larger payloads. Therefore, in comparison to the CSTM approach, OSTM provides
a superior level of scalability with respect to the number and size of datagrams that
should be delivered by an STM service during a given time interval.
• To which degree may OSTM provide long-term support?
With an increasing number of tokens being collected by UEs, the length of the polyline
representing the path of visited st-cells of a UE grows linearly. Therefore, the number of
polyline segments resulting from the rekeying procedure and its random permutation
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of the responsibilities of RPs increases accordingly. Despite the growth of the number
of polyline segments that must be considered by a UE in each poll, the number of PDUs
that are necessary to conduct a poll is expected to remain constant. Thus, according to
CSTM, the OSTM approach may provide long-term support if the infrastructure is able
to scale linearly with the time span that should be supported by the service.
6.3.3 Summary
When considering the communication eﬃciency and scalability properties of the sug-
gested RP-based schemes, OSTM, in general, provides the expected reduction of com-
munication costs when compared to CSTM. Nevertheless, in order to be able to provide
this advantage, OSTMhas to rely on the rekeying procedure with intervals greater than
just 1 time slot. Furthermore, relying on a three-dimensional instead of a two-dimen-
sional CAN allows to further decrease the polling load in OSTM.
Finally, CSTMmay rely on token aggregation to strongly reduce the network load at the
cost of a decreased delivery accuracy. In order to keep this degradation as low as possi-
ble, a service provider should rely on small aggregation steps increasing over multiple
stages of a multi-tiered token hierarchy instead of only few large aggregation steps.
6.4 Discussion of Additional Objectives
Having discussed eﬃciency and scalability aspects of CSTM and OSTM, this section
provides a short overview of service objectives that have not been considered so far.
Delivery speed In an RP-based approach, the speed at which st-datagrams can be de-
livered to users depends on the time that is required for the TPS to deposit datagrams at
RPs, the polling interval of UEs, as well as the time that is necessary to forward polling
messages to the respective RPs. Since the processing time at the TPS and the direct de-
livery of datagrams to RPs is considered neglectable, the main factors inﬂuencing the
delivery speed are the polling interval and network latency. RegardingCSTM,withUEs
sending polling messages directly to the relevant RPs, this latency can be neglected. In
case of OSTM, pollingmessages usually require several hops to reach the intended RPs.
While this may slightly increase the delivery delay, the primary factor for the speed of
delivery is the employed polling interval. For instance, given a polling interval of one
hour, an st-datagram might, in the worst case, be delivered with a delay of approxi-
mately one hour. Accordingly, the delivery delay can be reduced by employing a smaller
time interval for polling. This, however, will increase the communication load that RPs
have to handle as, e.g., halving the polling interval will double the overall number of
polling messages. For service providers, it is therefore crucial to consider the reciprocal
linear dependency between the delivery delay and the amount of polling messages to
ﬁnd a suitable trade-oﬀ between service quality and operational costs.
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Robustness against failures In the proposed RP-based schemes, the TPS represents a
potential single point of failure. Accordingly, in case of a failing TPS, senders can no
longer dispatch st-datagrams. Furthermore, new RPs are unable to join the service in-
frastructure. Nevertheless, existing datagrams may still be delivered via the remaining
RP infrastructure. In order to provide robustness against failing TPS, it may be possible
to rely on a distributed structure of multiple TPS entities. An in-depth investigation of
such an approach is left for future work. Finally, in order to provide robustness against
failing RPs, both CSTM and OSTM may rely on replication schemes to deposit data-
grams at multiple RPs. For instance, in CSTM, the TPS could deposit datagrams not
only at the RP that is responsible according to the RP identiﬁer idst,K = h(idrp,K), but
also at further RPs with identiﬁers hk(idrp,K) (see Section 4.2.3.3). Finally, OSTM may
refer to replication mechanisms distributing datagrams to neighboring nodes for fail-
ure-tolerance as suggested by Ratnasamy et al. [Rat+01a].
Elasticity of infrastructure When introducing an STM service, it is likely that users
numbers ﬂuctuate with users subscribing and canceling their service subscriptions. Ac-
cordingly, in order to handle the varying load conditions, the questions is howwell the
proposed RP-based schemes are able to adapt their service infrastructure. In CSTM,
adding or removing RPs either demands a notiﬁcation of all participants of the cur-
rent number N of RPs in order to allow UEs to send subsequent polling messages to
the correct RPs or requires the use of a mechanisms such as DNS to redirect the polling
messages of UEs to another RP. RegardingOSTM, RPs can join or leave the CANvia the
TPS which needs to provide the encrypted coordinates for the new overlay partitions.
In summary, while both approaches are able to adapt their infrastructure to various
load demands, OSTM provides a more self-organized infrastructure via CAN.
6.5 Conclusion
As outlined in this chapter, both CSTM and OSTM are able to operate eﬃciently and
scale with an increasing demand on an STM service. However, in comparison to CSTM,
the OSTM approach is able to strongly decrease communication load on the service
infrastructure and can therefore provide a superior level of scalability with respect
to broad set of service objectives. Nevertheless, service providers should be aware of
the respective privacy and security implications. In particular, in comparison to OSTM,
CSTM is able to achieve a higher level of user privacy. Thus, a service provider should
not be tempted to only consider performance beneﬁts of OSTM, but also assess the rele-
vance of speciﬁc privacy and security aspects thatmay only be provided byCSTM (or an
alternative realization). Given these implications, CSTM represents a resilient approach
that is likely to be preferred in initial commercial realizations of an STM service.
7 Conclusion and Outlook
The last chapter of this work ﬁrst shortly reviews the motivation for the concept of
a privacy-preserving spatiotemporal multicast. Following this, scientiﬁc contributions
and results of this thesis are summarized. In particular, the insights that have been
gained with respect to the proposed RP-based spatiotemporal multicast schemes are
outlined in detail, highlighting the individual strengths and weaknesses of both CSTM
and OSTM. Finally, the chapter concludes this work with an outlook on open questions
and promising future research directions that have not been considered so far.
7.1 Summary and Conclusion
With the increasing availability of powerful smart phones and tablets, mobile informa-
tion services have become an essential tool in almost everyone’s life today. Among such
services, geographic multicast schemes enable users to send messages to all users that
are currently residingwithin a certain geographic area. Despite the demand for innova-
tive concepts, there has been little to none eﬀort to incorporate the temporal dimension
in this context. Therefore, this thesis introduced the novel concept of a so-called spa-
tiotemporal multicast, which refers to the challenge of enabling a sender to dispatch
messages to all users that have been residing within a speciﬁc geographic area dur-
ing some point in time in the past. One of the main adoption barriers of such an STM
service is the desire of users to protect their individual privacy. Accordingly, this work
primarily focused on the design and potential realization techniques of a privacy-aware
spatiotemporal multicast service.
Apart from introducing and discussing several novel use cases of the proposed con-
cept from various application domains, an extensive set of relevant design goals and
objectives considering functional, non-functional, as well as privacy and security as-
pects were presented. Based on these objectives and a detailed survey of the state of the
art, this work proposed four diﬀerent realization options consisting of a naïve broad-
cast, approaches relying on database management systems, the prediction of the cur-
rent whereabouts of users from their past locations, as well as RP-based schemes. After
this, the applicability of the given realization techniques was evaluated in a detailed
qualitative discussion regarding the suggested use cases, which underlined the chosen
focus of this work on two RP-based schemes. Both approaches require a trusted entity,
referred to as TPS, which plans and generates the mapping of st-cells to RPs. Accord-
ingly, this entity is required to resolve RPs that are serving a given set of st-cells.
CSTM was proposed as a possible implementation of an RP-based approach relying
on cryptographic hashing. Here, in order to prevent adversaries from inferring the re-
sponsibilities of RPs, st-cells are mapped to RPs using a cryptographic hash function.
One of the main motivations for designing CSTM in its particular way was to support
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the objective of message conﬁdentiality, i.e., preventing users that are no legitimate re-
cipients from reading the contents of st-datagrams. Therefore, at the beginning of the
time span of each st-cell that eNBs are responsible for, they randomly generate sym-
metric keys from initial seeds that are provided by the TPS. Since keys (i.e., tokens) are
distributed to UEs visiting those radio cells, they are later able to retrieve st-datagrams
for the corresponding st-cells. Furthermore, with the TPS distributing random seeds to
eNBs, it is possible to share initial seeds among eNBs according to a token hierarchy.
This provides a trade-oﬀ between the network load and delivery accuracy.
With respect to privacy and security, as discussed in Chapter 5, CSTM is able to achieve
location, co-location, absence privacy, as well as anonymity against observation, prob-
ing, and movement attacks. In case of compromised RPs, attackers may gain access to
st-cell identiﬁers idst,K, allowing them to infer, to some degree, the mapping of st-cells
to RPs. Furthermore, assuming adversaries who are able to compromise eNBs, user
privacy can no longer be guaranteed for st-cells that are related to the aﬀected radio
cells. Finally, CSTM is able to fulﬁll the given security objectives, with the exception of
message conﬁdentiality when assuming attackers that are able to compromise eNBs.
In terms of performance-related properties of CSTM, this work proposed an analytical
communication cost model which displayed the mostly linear, asymptotic scalability
behavior of this approach. Furthermore, a model of communication costs of the naïve
broadcast schemewas introduced as a basis of comparison (ignoring the slightly diﬀer-
ent privacy and security properties). Here, it could be shown that neither the naïve
broadcast nor CSTM yield superior communication eﬃciency and scalability proper-
ties under all circumstances. Instead,while a naïve broadcastmay be preferable in situa-
tions where st-datagram are only dispatched infrequently, CSTM tends to be preferable
for an increasing number of st-datagramwith growing payload sizes. In particular, one
of the most crucial parameters for CSTM to achieve better communication eﬃciency is
the interval at which UEs dispatch polling messages to RPs.
In order to evaluate the applicability of CSTM for a possible real-world scenario, a novel
witness-based report veriﬁcation service was introduced in Section 4.4. In this feasibil-
ity study, mobile users among the aﬀected population in a disaster are able to report
certain events such as hazards to increase the situational awareness of oﬃcial respon-
ders or other people in the respective area. Here, three aspects are of relevance. First,
a spatiotemporal multicast is required here in order to allow users to leave a possibly
dangerous zone while still being able to send out warnings for users entering this area
later on (e.g., once they are somewhere safe or an uplink is available). Secondly, the spa-
tiotemporal multicast must protect user privacy, as in post-disaster situations, oﬃcial
agencies are not expected to be able to ensure legal rights. Moreover, such a reporting
service has to provide mechanisms to verify the correctness of the user-generated in-
formation. Accordingly, the proposed service relies on a so-called veriﬁer node which
issues conﬁrmation requests to other users that have visited the area of interest. Since
observations of events can be time-limited, a spatiotemporal multicast is again required
here to request conﬁrmations from suitable witnesses. Within this work, it could be
shown that such a witness-based report veriﬁcation service can be realized based on
CSTM. Finally, a simulative study of several mobility models highlighted its ability to
achieve resilience against a small ratio ofmalicious users givenmajority-based voting.
Motivated by the expected shortcomings of CSTM regarding its ability to scale with
an increasing number of st-datagrams, as well as the sizes of the addressed st-regions,
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an alternative realization of an RP-based approach was suggested in Section 4.3. Based
on the observation that, for each addressed st-cell, CSTM has to deposit a copy of a
given st-datagram at a speciﬁc RP, OSTM is designed to leverage locality among the
addressed st-cells. In particular, OSTM relies on a CAN to map the three-dimensional
real-world space consisting of the spatial and temporal domain into this distributed
overlay structure. With this, entities may address a range of st-cells with geometrically
shaped identiﬁers, such as rectangular destination areas or polygonal lines referring to
a path along radio cells over a certain amount of time.
In the design ofOSTM, as in CSTM, it was crucial to incorporate the one-wayness aspect
of mapping st-cells to its corresponding RPs. Since, however, the random assignment
of responsibilities of RPs based on a uniformly distributed cryptographic hash func-
tion contradicts the ability of an approach to leverage locality among st-cells, this work
suggested to employ order-preserving encryption in OSTM. While known to provide a
weaker security notion than traditional cryptographic measures, OPE was considered
to enable a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and privacy properties.
In order to improve the existing “ideal object”, this thesis introduced several novel OPE
techniques based on order-preserving functions. Despite their ability to increase the
disclosure-resiliencewhen compared to the “ideal object”, the overall resilience of these
approaches was demonstrated to be insuﬃcient for OSTM. On one hand, this behavior
could be explained by the fact that OPF-based schemes, in general, disclose distances
among ciphertexts instead of just their order. On the other hand, given the application
of OPE in the particular situation of a known plaintext space (i.e., coordinates of base
stations), attackers are more likely to break the order-preserving encryption. Thus, for
the evaluation of OSTM, this work assumed the availability of an OPE scheme with the
strongest possible security notion that may be achieved by such an approach – an OPE
scheme that only discloses the order among ciphertexts. Among existing approaches, at
the time of this writing, only GOPE is known to achieve this notion (apart from existing
index tagging schemes that are not applicable here).
Regarding the given privacy objectives, OSTM was shown to be able to protect the lo-
cation privacy of users against observation, probing, andmovement attacks by limiting
the accuracy up to which adversaries may determine the exact whereabouts of UEs.
In particular, the use of a three-dimensional CAN proved to enable higher resilience
against attacks. In terms of co-location privacy, the evaluation indicated thatOSTMmay
only partially fulﬁll this objective (among the st-cells that an RP is responsible for, not
the underlying radio cells) when facing such attacks. Considering absence privacy, the
use of rekeying was shown to be a mandatory prerequisite. Furthermore, anonymity
can be preserved here given a trustworthy cellular network operator. In case of attack-
ers that are able to compromise RPs or eNBs, neither location, co-location, nor absence
privacy may be guaranteed any longer. Finally, apart from message conﬁdentiality, all
of the given security objectives were shown to be fulﬁlled by OSTM.
Considering communication eﬃciency, the conducted simulation study highlighted the
ability of OSTM to strongly reduce the network load when compared to CSTM – given
that the employed rekeying intervalwas larger than one. This conﬁrmed the expectation
that OSTM scales better with an increasing number of service participants, growing
demand for delivery of st-datagrams, as well as increasing destination st-regions.
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In summary, both approaches are able to protect user privacy up to a certain degree.
While CSTM provides message conﬁdentiality and is generally more resilient against
attacks, OSTM oﬀers superior communication eﬃciency and scalability properties.
7.2 Outlook
A variety of research topics can be identiﬁed that demand further investigation.
First of all, this thesis only considered the implementation of an STM service in the
context of cellular radio networks. While this is a legitimate restriction for an initial in-
vestigation of this topic, commercial real-world applications most likely will demand
higher accuracy in addressing st-regions. Here, an in-depth analysis with respect to
privacy-aware content-based publish/subscribe schemes may be of relevance. Addi-
tionally, while two RP-based schemes were the focus of this thesis, an in-depth evalua-
tion of alternative realizations, such as DBMS-based approaches that, for instance, use
novel encryption techniques other than OPE or rely on non-centralized structures of
data storage, still present an open research direction.
In terms of the introduced RP-based schemes, due to the high impact of the polling
interval on communication eﬃciency, more sophisticated polling strategies could be
conceived. For instance, UEs might only send polling messages for a certain subset of
its collected tokens during each poll. This may reduce the overall polling load at the
cost of a slightly increase delivery delay. In addition, as the impact of duplicates among
delivered st-datagrams was not investigated in detail, this aspect should be considered
in future work. It might be possible, for example, to rely on the caching of identiﬁers at
RPs or UEs in order to assemble a list of datagrams that have already been delivered.
Here, potential privacy implications have to be considered accordingly.
Another aspect to be examined with respect to RP-based schemes is the centralized
TPS that is required for the planning and distribution of tokens enabling UEs to retrieve
datagrams for their visited st-cells. Since this entity can represent a potential bottleneck
and single point of failure, future work might consider the realization of a distributed
TPS structure. Also, the challenge of incorporating UEs as part of the service infras-
tructure, allowing them to serve as RPs in the process of message delivery, was not
examined here. This includes the open issue of evaluating the robustness of these ap-
proaches under varying network load and spontaneous failure conditions.
Furthermore, thiswork did not consider the challenge of preserving user privacy in case
of an untrustworthy cellular operator. Moreover, despite separating knowledge about
users between the TPS andRPs, the analysis of countermeasures against benign-but-cu-
rious service providers requires further investigation. This incorporates the evaluation
of the risk of sophisticated traﬃc analysis strategies that may be used to violate user
privacy. Apart from aspects concerning the trustworthiness of a service provider, the
objectives of perfect forward privacy and resilience against DoS attacks were not a part
of this thesis, as were the investigation of the impact of directly integrating anonymiza-
tion techniques such as mix network or onion routing in the service infrastructure.
RegardingOSTM,while suggesting rekeying as a countermeasure against attackers try-
ing to collect ciphertexts and plaintext-ciphertext pairs, this work did not evaluate the
possibility of adversaries trying to break the order-preserving encryption by analyzing
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relations between keys that are used subsequently in the rekeying procedure. Further-
more, attacks that are based on the analysis of the frequency of plain- and ciphertexts, or
other spatiotemporal correlations between plain- and ciphertexts, were not considered.
Here, instead of applying OPE separately for each axis of the spatiotemporal coordi-
nates, future eﬀorts could aim at employing encryption techniques that incorporate all
axes of the overlay space [cf. CKG11]. Correspondingly, other cryptographic measures
that might encrypt or obfuscate coordinates in a speciﬁc overlay structure should be
investigated further. Also, this work presumed that adversaries are able to infer the net-
work layout of the CAN overlay, allowing attackers to infer the coordinates and extents
of zones. Conﬁrming this assumption by evaluating the actual eﬀort that is necessary
to infer the layout of the overlay network remains an open challenge.
This thesis evaluated the application of an STM service in the context of awitness-based
report veriﬁcation service for disaster situations. However, it only considered a simple
majority-based voting scheme, whereas future work could examine the challenge of de-
termining appropriate witnesses for the conﬁrmation of an event. This includes more
sophisticated approaches for credibility estimation according to diﬀerent criteria, such
as proximity to an event, or the reputation of a user. Finally, apart from the report veriﬁ-
cation approach, other use cases require further investigation. In particular, these eﬀorts
should consider STM services that are tailored to the needs of commercial applications
such as retroactive advertising and mobile social services.
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CEOE Committed Eﬃcient Orderable Encryption
CPRNG Cryptographic Pseudo-Random Number Generator
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DoS Denial-of-Service
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IND-OLCPA Indistinguishability under Ordered and Local Chosen-Plaintext Attack
IP Internet Protocol
IS Identity Server
LBS Location-Based Service
232 Abbreviations
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MANET Mobile Ad hoc Network
m.l.p. most likely plaintext
MME Mobility Management Entity
mobicast Just-in-Time Multicast
MOPE Modular Order-Preserving Encryption
mOPE Mutable Order-Preserving Encoding
NAT Network Address Translation
NC Nomadic Community
OPE Order-Preserving Encryption
OPF Order-Preserving Function
OSTM Overlay-based Spatiotemporal Multicast
P2P Peer-to-Peer
PDN Public Data Network
PDU Protocol Data Unit
PGW Packet Data Network Gateway
POPF Pseudo-Random Order-Preserving Function
POPF-CCA POPF advantage under Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
QoS Quality of Service
RFC Request for Comments
ROPF Random Order-Preserving Function
RP Rendezvous Point
RPGM Reference Point Group Mobility
RWP RandomWaypoint
SGW Serving Gateway
SLAW Self-similar Least-Action Walk
SMS Short Message Service
STM Spatiotemporal Multicast
st-cell spatiotemporal cell
st-datagram spatiotemporal datagram
st-region spatiotemporal region
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
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TPS Token Planning Server
TTP Trusted Third Party
UE User Equipment
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
VANET Vehicular Ad hoc Network
WDOW Window Distance One-Wayness
WOW Window One-Wayness
ZOF Zone of Forwarding
ZOR Zone of Relevance
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